In this episode, the guest is Amar Dank, a researcher of war termination, for a conversation about how leaders make decisions on continuing or ending a military conflict. The discussion focuses on the concept of the “gambler’s dilemma,” taken from Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, and examines how loss aversion can lead leaders to continue and escalate wars in the hope of erasing prior losses, even at the cost of taking greater risks. The model is applied to the Russia-Ukraine war, the “Swords of Iron” war, and the conflict with Iran.
According to Amar Dank, his analysis of wars is realistic and does not address moral aspects or the righteousness of the cause, but rather tries to understand the interests and considerations of all sides. The central theoretical framework he presents is the “gambler’s dilemma.” According to this principle, taken from the world of behavioral economics, human beings are loss-averse. As a result, they are willing to take greater risks to avoid a loss or to recoup losses already incurred than the risks they are willing to take to achieve a gain.
At any given moment in a war, a leader faces the decision of whether to continue fighting or to work toward ending it. According to Dank, when a leader perceives the situation as a loss, he may prefer to continue the war, even if the expected utility is doubtful, in the hope that continued fighting will bring an achievement that will allow him to erase the loss.
To demonstrate the model, Boris Gorelik asks to apply it to the Russia-Ukraine war. Amar Dank explains that dictatorial rulers like Putin have a different set of considerations than leaders in democracies. Their main goal is not the welfare of the citizens, but survival in power. Putin, in Dank’s assessment, started the war on the assumption that he would achieve a quick victory and restore a puppet regime in Ukraine. When this gamble failed, he faced a clear loss. Instead of “cutting his losses” and ending the war, he chose to continue gambling. He increased the risk, for example through a large-scale mobilization in September 2022, hoping to change the situation and avoid admitting a failure that could have endangered his rule.
Dank applies the same logic to the war in Gaza. He argues that after the initial and “automatic” phase of the war, which ended around January 2024 with the capture of Khan Yunis and the release of reserve forces, the war became a “war of choice” for Israel. At this stage, the chief decision-maker, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, faced a dilemma. In Dank’s assessment, Netanyahu perceives the events of October 7th as a huge political and personal loss. Out of this loss aversion, and for fear that elections after the war would lead to his defeat, he prefers to continue the war and take additional risks, hoping to achieve a total victory that would allow him to erase the stain of failure.
Boris Gorelik challenges the analysis and asks if the decision to continue does not stem from a substantive security consideration, namely the fear of leaving Hamas in power. Dank replies that the central question in his model is not the objective loss, but the way the leader subjectively frames the situation. In his assessment, Netanyahu frames the situation as a personal political loss, and therefore he acts to avoid it.
The conversation moves to the Israeli-American conflict with Iran. Dank explains how here too, the decision to expand the conflict into an all-out war stemmed from the same dilemma. He thought that an Israeli success in a limited conflict with Iran would be a good opportunity for Netanyahu to “realize gains” and go to elections, but this did not happen. According to his interpretation, the polls showed that the achievement was not enough to guarantee a victory, so Netanyahu chose to raise the stakes and continue the war.
On the other hand, the Iranian regime’s ultimate goal is survival. After the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal, Iran lost faith in agreements. Therefore, its strategy in the war is not to achieve a direct military victory, but a war of economic attrition. By closing the Strait of Hormuz and harming the Gulf states, Iran is putting pressure on the global economy and on the United States’ allies, aiming to force Washington to end the war.
At the end of the discussion, Dank analyzes the options facing Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Israel has three main alternatives: a full occupation of the Strip and control over two million Palestinians, a move he says is not practical; continuation of the current situation of constant friction; or a unilateral withdrawal to the border line.
For Hamas, the options are to continue ruling the population under the current conditions, while exploiting the humanitarian aid that Israel is forced to let in, or to advance a political process that would lead to an Israeli withdrawal. Finally, Dank explains that the October 7th attack was, from Hamas’s realistic point of view, a rational move designed to shake up the status quo and disrupt the trend of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which had pushed the Palestinian issue to the margins.
The original episode, in Hebrew: מהמרים על סוף המלחמה
]]>In this episode, the guest is Dr. Tuvia Buk, a reserve first sergeant, combat medic, and author of the book “Heroes of Palmar”. The episode is about the Palmar (Plugat Marpe, or Medical Company), an innovative medical evacuation unit in the IDF, and the revolution it has brought to combat medicine. Dr. Buk talks about the unit’s activity in the “Swords of Iron” war, the technologies it uses, and the human challenges its members face.
According to Dr. Buk, the Palmar is a new unit established following previous operations in Gaza, based on the understanding that the evacuation time for wounded soldiers from the battlefield needed to be shortened. The unit’s goal is to break the “golden hour,” the critical period in which life-saving treatment must be administered. He explains that the unit has succeeded in reducing the average time from the moment of injury to arrival in the operating room to less than an hour, and sometimes even to forty minutes. According to the data he presents, the unit has so far saved 2,851 soldiers in the current war, 380 of whom were evacuated by helicopter in cooperation with Unit 669.
Dr. Buk says that the idea for the unit’s establishment arose from a need identified during Operation “Protective Edge”. An IDF officer, a mutual friend of his and Boris Gorelik’s, recognized that soldiers were dying from injuries that should not have been fatal, and decided to find a solution. The guiding principle is that medical treatment does not begin at the hospital, but continues throughout the entire process, from the moment of injury in the field. One of the main innovations, he says, is the use of real type O-negative blood units in the field, not just plasma. Every ambulance is equipped with blood units at the correct temperature, which aids in rapid recovery. The unit, which began as a small organic team of doctors, paramedics, medics, and combat soldiers, has grown and now comprises eight companies and serves as a new model for emergency medicine in the IDF.
Dr. Buk describes a technological tool used by the unit: a digital replacement for Form 101, which allows for continuous documentation of a wounded soldier’s treatment. In a mass casualty event, a soldier records all the data on a phone-like device. The information is transmitted in real time to the evacuation helicopter and the hospital, so all treating parties can monitor the patient’s condition and prepare for further treatment. He gives an example of a case where a wounded soldier needed morphine and ketamine. The team in the field managed to administer morphine before the helicopter arrived, and the paramedic on the helicopter, who had received the data, was waiting with a dose of ketamine to continue the treatment immediately and smoothly.
Dr. Buk, 58, tells how he volunteered for the unit at the beginning of the war even though he had not served in the reserves since 2006. He arrived at the base without a call-up order, insisted, and was eventually enlisted. He describes the unit as a family made up of people from all corners of Israeli society: religious and secular, Jews, Druze, and Christians, all working together for a common goal. According to him, there is a strong mutual support system, including a WhatsApp group that is also used for personal matters. The unit also takes care of the students serving in it and provides them with quiet study spaces.
Boris Gorelik asks if the lessons from the fighting in Gaza, which is relatively close to hospitals, are also being applied in the more distant Lebanon sector. Dr. Buk, who has been serving in the north in recent months, answers in the affirmative. He explains that rapid and efficient evacuation of the wounded is also carried out there, and there is no situation where a wounded soldier is left in the field without evacuation for hours or days, as happened in the Second Lebanon War. The evacuation is carried out by helicopter to Rambam and Ziv hospitals.
Dr. Buk notes that in every company there are two mental health officers available to soldiers 24/7. They are an organic part of the unit and hold weekly talks with the teams. He tells of difficult incidents, such as a case where a deputy company commander discovered that the critically wounded soldier he was treating was his brother-in-law. He emphasizes the importance of mental health care, both during service and in the transition back to civilian life, and notes that the support continues even when the soldiers are at home.
According to Dr. Buk, the Palmar’s methods of operation are generating great interest in the medical world. Doctors come from abroad to learn from the Israeli experience, and he himself has been invited to lecture on the topic in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. He talks about non-Jewish figures, like Colonel Richard Kemp of the British Army, who express great support for the IDF and the unit’s activities.
The original episode, in Hebrew: גיבורי הפלמ״ר
]]>In this episode, Dr. Yaron Friedman of the University of Haifa joins the podcast to discuss the history and identity of the Alawite village of Ghajar. Following a tour of the village, Dr. Friedman attempts to solve the riddle of its origins, as it constitutes an isolated island of Alawite settlement, some 150 kilometers south of the string of Alawite communities on the Syrian coast.
According to Dr. Friedman, the villagers themselves do not know for certain where they came from. Local tradition speaks of a migration from northern Syria in the 16th or 17th centuries, but there is no clear documentation for this. Dr. Friedman presents two main theses regarding the village’s origins.
The first thesis posits that an Alawite community, then called “Nusayri”, already existed in the Galilee region in the Middle Ages. In the 11th century, under the rule of Shiite dynasties, Alawite communities flourished in Greater Syria, including in Tiberias and the Galilee. One of the community’s prominent leaders, Maymun al-Tabarani, was active in Tiberias. However, there is a huge gap of about 600 years, from the 11th to the 18th century, during which there are almost no sources documenting Alawites in the area. It is possible that historians and travelers did not distinguish them from other Shiite communities in the Jabal Amel region of southern Lebanon.
Dr. Friedman refers to a book by villagers Jamal and Ahmed Khatib, which documented oral traditions. The book presents two seemingly contradictory versions. One version claims the village was founded in the 11th century by the Shiite ruler Sayf al-Dawla to protect caravans. The second version links the village’s establishment to an escape from Ottoman persecution in the 16th century.
Dr. Friedman proposes a thesis that combines the two traditions. It is possible that a small, ancient Alawite settlement from the Middle Ages did exist on the site, and during the Ottoman period, a larger group of migrants arrived, fleeing economic and religious persecution in northern Syria. This would explain how the two traditions were preserved side by side.
Dr. Friedman finds support for the residents’ Syrian origin in the Arabic dialect spoken in the village. According to him, it is a distinct Syrian Arabic, similar to that of Damascus, and not Lebanese. However, it has features that are not typical of most Alawites in Syria, which could indicate local linguistic development and influence from their Shiite neighbors in Lebanon.
Dr. Friedman explains that Ghajar was not an isolated village. Until 1967, there were three Alawite villages in the area: Ghajar, Ein Fit, and Za’ura. Their residents were Syrian citizens and served in the Syrian army. In the Six-Day War, the IDF destroyed Ein Fit and Za’ura, and their inhabitants fled to Syria.
Ghajar’s fate was more complex. After its capture in 1967, Israel withdrew from it under the mistaken belief that it belonged to Lebanon. The Lebanese army, for its part, believed the village was Syrian and also withdrew. For several months, the residents were left without sovereignty, electricity, or services. After the Lebanese government refused to accept them, they turned to Israel and asked to be annexed as part of the Golan Heights. In 1981, with the passage of the Golan Heights Law, the residents of Ghajar received Israeli identity cards.
The problems did not end there. After the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the UN drew the “Blue Line,” which ran through the heart of the village and divided houses between Israel and Lebanon, based on maps that Dr. Friedman says were incorrect. The absurd situation sparked protests from the residents. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Israel has unified the village with a fence, and the situation has stabilized to the residents’ satisfaction. Since 2022, restrictions on the entry of Israelis have been lifted, and the village has been experiencing a tourism boom.
In conclusion, Dr. Friedman notes several open issues. First, the small and closed community of about 3,000 people faces a problem of intra-family marriage, although recently there have been a few isolated cases of marriage to non-Alawite partners. Second, the origin of the name “Ghajar,” which means “gypsies” in Arabic, is unclear. According to local tradition, it is a derogatory nickname given to them by a Kurdish landowner in the 19th century. Finally, he argues that the Lebanese government’s pressure to recognize the northern part of the village as Lebanese territory stems from the demands of Hezbollah, which is trying to take control of an area that was historically Syrian.
The original episode, in Hebrew: חידת הכפר העלווי ע׳ג׳ר
]]>In this episode, Dr. Yousri Khizran, from Shalem College and the Truman Institute at the Hebrew University, joins to discuss the development of politics in Arab society in Israel. Dr. Khizran presents a broad historical overview, analyzes the main trends shaping Arab politics today, and addresses the upcoming elections.
According to Dr. Khizran, the history of Arab politics in Israel can be divided into three main stages.
The first stage lasted from the establishment of the state until the abolition of the military government in the mid-1960s. This period was characterized by a struggle between two currents: the Israeli Communist Party, which worked to emphasize national identity and fought against the military government, and opposite it, the traditional leadership (leaders of clans and villages) which organized into “satellite lists” linked to Mapai, the ruling party. Dr. Khizran notes that the Communist Party, which accepted activists from the National Liberation League into its ranks, accepted the partition plan under the influence of the Soviet Union. He adds that in the 1950s, the state considered conscripting all its Arab citizens into the army, but backed down for fear of creating an “army within an army” after about 26,000 Muslim volunteers registered. Instead, the state chose to conscript small minorities like the Druze and to establish local authorities to strengthen clan-based fragmentation.
The second stage began with the end of the military government and lasted until the Arab Spring. The abolition of the military government, alongside processes of modernization and the rise of an educated generation, weakened the status of the traditional leadership. At the same time, a trend of Palestinization and political radicalization grew stronger. This trend found institutional expression in the 1970s with the rise of Hadash in Nazareth and the establishment of public institutions that emphasized Palestinian identity. According to Khizran, this process reached its peak after the Oslo Accords, with the establishment of the Balad party by Azmi Bishara. Balad introduced a new discourse that called for abolishing Israel’s Jewish identity and turning it into a “state of all its citizens.”
The third stage began with the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011. Since then, Dr. Khizran explains, we have witnessed the rise of a new school of thought, which he calls “the local civic political discourse.” This school, led by Ra’am, changes the order of priorities: it decouples the relationship of Arabs with the state from dependence on a solution to the Palestinian problem, and it focuses on the demand to maximize the rights derived from Israeli citizenship.
Dr. Khizran argues that the new approach, represented by Ra’am, is not Israelization or Zionization, but instrumentalization. He calls this “integration without identification.” According to this approach, integration into the Israeli public sphere is a tool for achieving goals and budgets for the benefit of Arab society, and it has no element of emotional or ideological identification with the state, its symbols, or the Zionist ethos. He says this can be described by the phrase “the heart is with Gaza and the pocket is with Israel.”
He notes that this trend is supported by the Arab public, as shown in public opinion polls that consistently indicate a majority of the public wants to see its representatives in the coalition to obtain budgets and jobs. The state, too, especially since 2011, has recognized the desire for economic integration and has invested large sums through government five-year plans, understanding that the integration of Arab society will contribute to the Israeli economy. The conduct of the Arab public after the events of October 7, which was characterized by political realism, also reinforces this analysis.
Today, politics in Arab society is divided between two main schools of thought. The first school is the “mobilizing national discourse,” represented by the Joint List (Hadash, Balad, and Ta’al). It continues to emphasize Palestinian national identity and commitment as a central component. Opposite it stands the school of “local civic discourse,” represented by Ra’am, which emphasizes civic interests and is willing to join a coalition without conditions related to the Palestinian issue. Dr. Khizran emphasizes that Ra’am’s approach is pragmatism, not ideological moderation.
Boris Gorelik asks what options are available to an Arab citizen with right-wing economic views. Dr. Khizran replies that apart from Hadash, which is a communist party, the other parties are mainly nationalist and not economically defined. He believes that citizens and parties have learned to create a balance between emphasizing Palestinian identity and the political realism required to manage daily life.
Despite the ideological disputes, Dr. Khizran explains that the two lists, the Joint List and Ra’am, meet on one point ahead of the upcoming elections: the desire to replace the government and prevent Benjamin Netanyahu from rising to power. He confidently assesses that both lists will recommend a candidate other than Netanyahu, without receiving anything in return, in order to prevent him from forming a government. The campaign of both blocs presents the elections as fateful, arguing that the current government is responsible for most of the problems in Arab society, such as crime and a lack of governance.
Boris Gorelik asks if a scenario of deeper Israelization in Arab society is possible in the future, similar to the Druze model or the one represented by Yoseph Haddad. Dr. Khizran expresses skepticism. In his opinion, Haddad’s model is perceived in the Arab public as a negation of the self and the Palestinian national narrative, and it does not have broad support. He believes that as long as the Palestinian problem is not resolved, deep identification with the state will not occur. The prevailing trend will remain “integration without identification,” meaning, an instrumental integration aimed at benefiting Arab society while preserving its separate national identity.
The original episode, in Hebrew: הלב בעזה, הכיס בישראל. הפוליטיקה הערבית ישראלית
]]>In this episode of “This Week in the Middle East,” Dr. Tamar Eilam Gindin, a Middle East scholar and Iran expert, joins the show to discuss the meaning of new years in the region’s cultures. The conversation moves from the myths of the ancient Near East, through the different calendars, to the political and social reality of present-day Iran.
According to Dr. Eilam Gindin, in many ancient cultures, there was a prevalent belief that the world is in danger before the new year, and a sacrifice is required to save it. The sacrifice could be the god himself or his representative on earth, like the king. She explains that this idea is reflected in various customs, such as the high priest’s entry into the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur, fearing he might not come out alive. Another motif is a symbolic change of rule, where the king steps down from his throne and a criminal sentenced to death is crowned in his place and killed at the end of the festival, as a substitute sacrifice.
Boris Gorelik begins by reviewing the four new years in Judaism, and Dr. Eilam Gindin elaborates on the new year for kings, which falls in Nisan and corresponds to the Iranian festival of Nowruz, marking the spring equinox. She explains that the word for “month” is related to the lunar cycle in many languages, including Hebrew, Persian, and Chinese. The discussion covers the various calendars in the region: the Muslim calendar, which is purely lunar and “drifts” across the seasons; the Iranian calendar, which is a precise solar calendar that begins at the exact second of the spring equinox; and the Hebrew calendar, which combines solar and lunar cycles.
Dr. Eilam Gindin argues that many holidays, including the Exodus from Egypt, Purim, and Christmas, are built around the motif of danger and salvation at key astronomical points like the equinoxes or the longest and shortest days of the year. She presents the story of the Book of Esther as an example, noting its surprising similarity to the story of the rise to power of King Darius I, the father of Ahasuerus. The Shia festival of Ashura, which commemorates the death of Imam Hussein at the Battle of Karbala, also falls on the tenth day of the Muslim year. According to her, the death of Hussein, a representative of God, is seen as a sacrifice that saved the Shia from annihilation.
The conversation turns to how people in the Middle East manage with different calendars. Dr. Eilam Gindin explains that Iranians live their lives according to the Persian calendar and often do not know the corresponding Gregorian date. She recounts how in the past, this misunderstanding caused the State of Israel to record incorrect birth dates for immigrants from Iran, which led to bureaucratic problems. In contrast, most Muslims in the region, including in Israel, conduct their daily lives according to the Gregorian calendar, with the Muslim calendar used mainly for religious purposes.
In response to listeners’ questions, Dr. Eilam Gindin argues that the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people oppose the Islamic regime. As proof, she compares the millions of protesters who took to the streets in recent protests, knowing they were risking their lives, with the sparse, organized demonstrations of regime supporters, whose participants are bused in and given food. She explains the phenomenon using what she calls the Iranian “pendulum of identities”: the more the government imposes an Islamic identity, the more the people lean toward the ancient, Persian, and secular Iranian identity. She cites a 2020 survey that found that less than a third of Iranians identify as Shia, while many define themselves as having no religion or as Zoroastrians.
Dr. Eilam Gindin describes the Iranian regime as fearful and divided. She points to new laws restricting freedom of expression as evidence of the government’s fear of another wave of protests. She discusses rumors about the health of Supreme Leader Khamenei and leaks that portray his son, Mojtaba, as trying to run the country from behind the scenes. She concludes with a historical comparison: just as Khomeini organized the 1979 revolution from his exile abroad, so too the exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, is now working to rally support inside and outside Iran with the aim of overthrowing the regime.
The original episode, in Hebrew: איראן בין כורש לחומייני
]]>This episode’s guest is Prof. Eli Podeh of the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University and a member of the Mitvim Institute. Prof. Podeh surveys the history of the secret ties Israel maintains with Arab and Islamic states, a topic he wrote about in his book “From Mistress to Common-Law Wife.” He explains why many countries preferred to maintain relations under the radar, why Israel agreed to this, and how the Abraham Accords and the October 7th war have affected this pattern of relations.
According to Prof. Eli Podeh, the perception that Israel was completely isolated in the Middle East is inaccurate. Throughout its existence, Israel has maintained extensive and secret ties with many countries in the region. His book, published in 2020, examines this phenomenon. He notes, for example, the United Arab Emirates, which has had ties with Israel since the 1990s, and Morocco, whose ties began as early as the 1950s around Jewish immigration and evolved into extensive intelligence cooperation with the Mossad starting in 1963. The cooperation with Morocco included Israeli assistance in the Ben Barka affair and giving Israel access to listen in on Arab summit conferences held in the country. According to him, most research on Israel’s relations focuses on public documents from official archives, but information on secret activities, most of which were managed by the Mossad, remains classified. He collected the information for his book from various sources, including WikiLeaks documents and interviews with over a hundred people, many of them former Mossad personnel who were willing to talk about their activities.
The main reason for the secrecy of the relations, explains Prof. Podeh, is the fear of Arab leaders that their legitimacy will be harmed. Public opinion in the Arab world strongly identifies with the Palestinian issue, and rulers, even in non-democratic countries, fear the public’s reaction. He mentions leaders like King Abdullah I, Bachir Gemayel, and Anwar Sadat, who paid with their lives for their ties with Israel. Even Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of the Arab world in the 1950s and 60s, maintained secret contacts with Israel but expressed fear of being assassinated if it were revealed. Therefore, the alternative that Israeli leaders faced was between having secret relations and having no relations at all. They chose the first option out of an understanding that it was in Israel’s interest, even if it involved frustration. Israeli representatives in the Shah’s Iran, for example, complained that Israel was providing a great deal of assistance to the country but was not receiving public recognition.
Sometimes, Israeli leaders are the ones who leak information about secret meetings out of a desire for political gain. Prof. Podeh gives the example of the leak of Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, in 2020. According to him, such leaks anger the other side and can lead to a freeze in relations. He rejects the speculation that these are coordinated leaks, emphasizing that over the years it was always the Arab side that demanded secrecy be maintained. In the case of the Maronites in Lebanon, for example, they repeatedly asked to avoid publicizing the ties, understanding that they are a minority in the country and such publicity would endanger them. According to Shabtai Shavit, a former head of the Mossad, the secrecy is not absolute. Among intelligence communities, the information about the ties is known and creates deterrence, even if it does not reach the general public.
The management of secret ties is not the domain of a single body. According to Prof. Podeh, from the late 1950s, a practice developed whereby the Mossad, through its “Tevel” division, is responsible for ties with countries with which Israel does not have diplomatic relations. However, there are other bodies that compete for the management of these relations, in what one of his interviewees called “a Byzantine court.” These bodies include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is also interested in being involved in secret ties; the National Security Council (NSC); personal envoys of prime ministers; and the IDF, mainly Aman (Military Intelligence), which was involved in ties with the Maronites in Lebanon. The rivalry between the various bodies, Prof. Podeh argues, sometimes overcomes cooperation.
The Abraham Accords, argues Prof. Podeh, were a revolution because they brought the relations out into the open and were based on a new paradigm: peace with Arab states without the need to resolve the Palestinian issue. He admits that at that moment, this concept challenged the accepted assumption in academia that no significant progress could be made without addressing the Palestinian issue. However, the events of October 7th proved, to his regret, that the old assumption is still valid. One of the main reasons for the Hamas attack, as revealed in documents, was the desire to torpedo the emerging normalization with Saudi Arabia. The good news, he says, is that the peace and normalization agreements survived the test of the war. However, they have retreated to the old pattern of action of behind-the-scenes relations, without public meetings.
Prof. Podeh reviews secret ties with other countries:
Some of the secret ties included humanitarian aid and support for ethnic and religious minorities, like the Kurds in Iraq, the Maronites in Lebanon, and the Christians in South Sudan. According to Prof. Podeh, this aid was sometimes seen as a moral duty for Israel, as a minority in the region, to help other minorities. He mentions Menachem Begin, who believed in the idea of an “alliance of minorities” and saw aiding the Maronites as a duty to prevent them from suffering a fate similar to the Holocaust.
The original episode, in Hebrew: שלום מתחת לשולחן
]]>In this episode, based on listener questions, Dr. Yaron Friedman of the University of Haifa joins the podcast to discuss the fundamentals of the religion of Islam. The conversation covers the definition of Islam, its historical spread, its various streams and factions, and the possibility of a secular Muslim state.
According to Dr. Friedman, to understand Islam, one must start with the basics. He begins by explaining the ‘misbaha’, the Muslim prayer beads. It consists of 33 beads, and each bead symbolizes one of the 99 names of Allah. According to the belief, the 100th name is the explicit name of God, and it is hidden. Mystical streams in Islam, such as the Sufis or the Baha’is, claim to know the explicit name.
Dr. Friedman explains that the meaning of the word ‘Islam’ is submission or devotion to God, not peace. A Muslim is a person who submits to God’s will. The prime example in the Quran is Abraham, who is called a Muslim because he obeyed God without question, even when required to sacrifice his son. This submission is expressed physically in prayer, by prostrating before God.
From a legal perspective, Islam is defined by the Five Pillars of Islam:
Boris Gorelik asks how the claim that Islam is a ‘religion of peace’ reconciles with its spread through wars. According to Dr. Friedman, Islam is a missionary religion that has always sought to spread throughout the world. He notes that most Muslims today are not Arabs.
The spread occurred in two ways. One way is war and conquest, which characterized the Middle Ages, similar to Christianity in the same period. However, Dr. Friedman argues that most converts to Islam throughout history did so willingly and not by force. The reason for this is that the Islamic civilization in the Middle Ages was the most advanced in the world. Converting to Islam was a gateway to social mobility, economic opportunities, and belonging to the dominant and developed culture of the time. However, there were also cases of coercion, such as the forced recruitment of boys (devshirme) in the Ottoman Empire or the forced conversion of Iran to Shi’ism in the 16th century.
Today, Dr. Friedman explains, major Muslim countries like Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates are actively fighting radical Islam and organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood. According to him, that is where moderate Islam is found.
Sunni Islam, which constitutes the majority in the Muslim world, has hardly split. However, there are nuances within it as well. Alongside rational and legalistic Islam, a mystical stream known as ‘Sufism’ developed. Sufis emphasize the importance of love for God and use music, dance, and mantras to draw closer to him. They believe in the ‘jihad of the soul’, the internal struggle against evil inclinations, as the most important jihad.
In Sunni Islam, there are four schools of law (madhhab), with relatively minor differences between them: the Hanafi (considered the most moderate), the Shafi’i (common in our region), the Maliki (conservative), and the Hanbali (the strictest, common in Saudi Arabia).
The Shi’a, in contrast, believe that the leadership was usurped from Muhammad’s rightful heir, Ali ibn Abi Talib. They have a separate school of law, the Ja’fari, and there are certain differences between them and the Sunnis in commandments and customs.
Dr. Friedman clarifies that the Kurds are not a separate religious stream but an ethnic group. Most of them are Sunnis, and some belong to the Sufi stream. Another community mentioned is the Ahmadis, a stream that developed from Islam and advocates spreading the religion only by peaceful means, with a total opposition to violence.
In response to the question of whether a secular Muslim state can exist, Dr. Friedman cites Atatürk’s Turkey as a successful example, and the Shah’s Iran as a failed attempt. He notes that most Arab dictatorships in the 20th century (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) were secular in their laws, even if the constitution stipulated that the president must be a Muslim. However, it is difficult to determine if a secular Muslim state can also be democratic, as there are almost no democracies in the Arab world.
Dr. Friedman expresses great skepticism about the effectiveness of political alliances in the Middle East based on religion, such as the emerging alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. According to him, such alliances do not last because each country has different and sometimes conflicting interests. He notes that there is no united Sunni front against Iran, and that even the Shi’ite ‘Axis of Resistance’ led by Iran has proven unreliable, with each party looking out for itself. The history of the region, he concludes, is full of failed alliances and betrayals.
The original episode, in Hebrew: שלום וחרב באסלאם
]]>This episode’s guest is Dr. Haim Koren, a veteran diplomat from Reichman University who served as Israel’s ambassador to Egypt and South Sudan. The episode discusses the mechanisms for establishing initial ties between hostile states, and how secret contacts mature into diplomatic relations. The discussion follows a report of a secret meeting between the head of the Mossad and the Syrian foreign minister.
According to Dr. Haim Koren, establishing secret contacts between hostile entities is a long-standing diplomatic practice, born out of shared interests, usually security-related. He explains that Israel’s foreign policy was shaped from its inception by David Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine. Ben-Gurion understood that without security, the young state could not survive, and therefore he prioritized security considerations over all others. As a result, the security establishment, led by the Mossad, became a central arm in managing Israel’s foreign relations, especially through secret channels and with actors that are not officially sovereign states.
Dr. Koren explains that Ben-Gurion initiated a strategy known as the “periphery doctrine,” aimed at breaking the political isolation imposed on Israel by the Arab states. The idea was to establish ties with non-Arab states and entities in the second and third circles around Israel. Through a process of elimination, potential partners were identified, such as Iran and Turkey (non-Arab Muslim countries) and Ethiopia (a Christian country). In addition, Israel established ties with minority groups in the region, such as the Maronites in Lebanon and the Christians in South Sudan. According to him, some of these contacts were successful, like with pre-revolutionary Iran, while others were less so, like with the Christians in Lebanon. These ties, even if they did not mature into full relations, created a basis for future cooperation. For example, the ties with Morocco allowed it to host the secret meetings between Moshe Dayan and Sadat’s representatives, which paved the way for the peace agreement with Egypt.
To illustrate these processes, Dr. Koren shares the story of South Sudan. In 1968, after the Six-Day War, the leader of the South Sudanese rebels, Joseph Lago, approached the head of the Mossad station in Kenya. He asked for Israel’s help in their struggle against the Sudanese government, arguing that the Sudanese Arabs wanted to destroy them just as the Arabs wanted to destroy Israel. The head of the Mossad at the time secretly brought Lago to a meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir.
Following the meeting, Israel sent a delegation led by Mossad officer David Ben-Uziel (nicknamed “Tarzan”) to assess the situation on the ground. The delegation recommended assisting the rebels. Israel’s interest was to keep Egypt, which supported the Sudanese regime, busy on another front, thereby diverting its resources from the War of Attrition against Israel. The connection was maintained for decades, and in 2011, when the establishment of the independent state of South Sudan became possible, Israel was one of the first countries to recognize it. According to Dr. Koren, the process took 43 years, and it demonstrates the importance of patience and long-term vision in diplomacy. To this day, South Sudan is one of the few countries that consistently supports Israel in UN votes.
In the current Syrian context, Dr. Koren argues that the contacts with Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, are not new. He explains that Israel had cooperated with Jolani back when he was the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. As part of this, Israel provided medical aid to his wounded fighters. According to him, Jolani remembers this assistance, and this early acquaintance, based on a shared interest against the Assad regime, is the foundation for the current contacts.
Dr. Koren believes that Jolani is undergoing a process of rebranding, trying to present himself as a Syrian national leader rather than an Islamist terrorist. He is not a puppet of Turkey, but a leader who understands Syrian interests and tries to advance them, even if it involves dialogue with Israel.
Dr. Koren describes the development of Israel’s secret relations using the metaphor of a transition from the status of a mistress to that of a common-law wife. In the past, many countries preferred to maintain secret ties with Israel for fear of the Arab world’s reaction. The Abraham Accords, he says, changed the situation, and today countries like the United Arab Emirates and Morocco are not ashamed of their public ties with Israel. Israel’s status has changed, and it is no longer seen as a pariah. Therefore, even countries that previously avoided open ties are now willing to consider them. He emphasizes that the key to the success of such processes is patience, secrecy, and avoiding leaks that could destroy the trust-building process.
The original episode, in Hebrew: מסודאן ועד סוריה: כך רוכשים בעלי ברית בחשאי
]]>The guest on the episode is Father David Neuhaus, a Catholic priest and lecturer on the Bible. In a conversation with Boris Gorelik, he reviews the development of relations between the Catholic Church and the State of Israel, from the Balfour Declaration to the present day, and explains the Vatican’s spiritual and political position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
At the beginning of the conversation, Father David Neuhaus explains why he insists on the title “kohen dat” and not “komer.” According to him, the word “komer” appears in the Hebrew Bible about seven times, and each time it is used as a pejorative term for idolaters. In contrast, the word “kohen” is a neutral term describing a role. Hebrew-speaking Christians prefer the title “kohen” because they see themselves as worshipers of one God, not idolaters.
Neuhaus also addresses the issue of the Holy Trinity. He explains that Hebrew- and Arabic-speaking Christians prefer to speak of “the mystery of the one God,” who is revealed to human beings as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, to emphasize God’s unity in the face of Jewish and Muslim polemics.
According to Neuhaus, to understand the Catholic Church’s attitude toward Israel, one must go back to the period after the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Since the Church is a hierarchical institution, its official position is determined by the Pope and the Holy See. As early as 1922, in response to plans presented to the League of Nations, the Vatican expressed a clear position: it had no objection to granting equal rights to Jews in the Land of Israel, but it could not support a situation where they would have privileged rights over other groups.
Neuhaus emphasizes that the opposition did not stem from fundamental theological reasons against Jewish sovereignty, but from a fear of inequality. According to him, the Church had three main interests in the Holy Land: interpretation of the scriptures, care for the holy places, and protection of the local Christian communities. The establishment of the State of Israel and the 1948 war, which caused many Christians to leave, were perceived as a threat to these interests.
After World War II, the Church began to confront its role in the Holocaust. This process led to a deep desire for reconciliation with the Jewish people. The significant turning point occurred after the death of Pope Pius XII and the accession of John XXIII, who was known for his warm attitude toward Jews. He convened the Second Vatican Council, which led in 1965 to the publication of the document “Nostra aetate.” This document brought about a revolution and changed the Church’s attitude toward the Jewish people from a theology of contempt to a theology of respect. However, the document did not address the State of Israel, and the Vatican continued to withhold official recognition, arguing that its borders were not recognized.
The change in attitude toward the State of Israel began in the 1990s, following the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. According to Neuhaus, when the parties began to talk, the Church saw an opportunity. In 1994, full diplomatic relations were established between Israel and the Holy See. In parallel, the Vatican worked to establish relations with the PLO, and in 2015 it recognized the State of Palestine.
The visit of Pope John Paul II in 2000 expressed the Vatican’s new position. The visit was carefully planned to show concern and respect for both sides: the Pope visited Yad Vashem and the Western Wall, but also met with Yasser Arafat and visited a refugee camp.
Boris asks if the Church can serve as a mediator in the conflict. Neuhaus replies that the Church does not see itself as a political power, but a spiritual one. Its role is not political mediation, but the formulation of a language of respect, recognition, and equality that will enable a better future. He mentions the prayer for peace held by Pope Francis at the Vatican in 2014 with Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas as an example of these efforts.
Contrary to Boris’s opinion, Neuhaus argues that the conflict is not essentially religious but national, between Jewish nationalism and Palestinian nationalism, both of which were born in the 19th century. In his view, religious nationalism is particularly dangerous because it attributes its claims to the will of God. In conclusion, he shares his personal story: he was born into a Jewish family in South Africa, immigrated to Israel, and as an adult became a believer in Jesus and joined the Catholic Church.
The original episode, in Hebrew: הוותיקן מול מדינת ישראל
]]>This episode’s guest is Lt. Col. (res.) Avi Shalev, author of the book “Yoman al-Qasmi” and a researcher of Arab culture. Shalev analyzes the October 7 events through the prism of a Palestinian television series titled “Qabdat al-Ahrar,” which aired about a year and a half before the attack. According to him, the series not only offered a chilling prediction of the attack’s details, but also exposes the depth of the Israeli intelligence failure, which stemmed from a profound cultural misunderstanding of Palestinian society and Hamas.
Avi Shalev begins by describing the series “Qabdat al-Ahrar” (“The Grip of the Free”), a Ramadan series produced by Hamas that aired in the spring of 2022. The 30-episode series deals with Hamas’s preparations for war with Israel. The final episode depicts a surprise attack on the communities of the western Negev, strikingly similar to the October 7 attack. It shows, among other things, Nukhba terrorists in IDF uniforms, ambushes on roads, the use of pickup trucks, the kidnapping of soldiers, and the capture of the Gaza Division headquarters. The series ends with the Israeli flag being taken down from the base and the Palestinian flag being raised.
Shalev notes that about six months after the series aired, Yahya Sinwar awarded it a prize at a festive ceremony in Gaza. In his speech, Sinwar said that everything seen in the series was the military wing’s plan, and that he intended to make it a reality. In response to a question from Boris, Shalev confirms that Fatah officials criticized the series in real time, claiming it was far-fetched and imaginary.
According to Shalev, the series is a key example of the Israeli intelligence failure, which focused on “capabilities intelligence” (locating targets, identifying the enemy) and neglected “intentions intelligence” (understanding the mentality, culture, and perceptions of the other side). The Israeli security establishment clung to the conception that Hamas was deterred and primarily interested in economic welfare and improving the lives of Gaza’s residents. Shalev mentions the former head of Military Intelligence, Aharon Haliva, who said after the attack that even if he had received concrete information about an impending war, he would not have believed it because it contradicted the prevailing view.
Boris remarks that it is easy to analyze things in hindsight, and that the intelligence community is flooded with information and cannot change its worldview based on every single piece of data. Shalev agrees that the matter is complex, but argues that the main problem is in the way Israel analyzes information.
Shalev explains that the Israeli intelligence community, reflecting a Western culture, gives supreme importance to secret information obtained through technological means (cyber, wiretaps) and dismisses open-source intelligence (OSINT). The perception is that the truth is spoken behind closed doors, while public statements are merely “Arab waffling,” exaggerations, and lies.
In contrast, traditional Arab culture is a “shame culture” with an “external locus of control.” In such a culture, what is said and done in the public sphere carries decisive weight, sometimes more than the factual truth. The Israeli conception was based on one-on-one talks between COGAT officers and Gazan figures, while public statements by senior Hamas officials, sermons in mosques, and productions like the series “Qabdat al-Ahrar” were ignored.
According to Shalev, the series was not only meant to threaten Israel, but served mainly as an internal messaging tool for Hamas towards its supporters. It was intended to explain the contradiction between the organization’s jihadist ideology and the reality of security calm and coordination with Israel. The series’s message to the Gazan audience was that all the quiet and economic easements were part of a sophisticated deception plan, which would end in a surprise attack.
Shalev provides examples from the series: the villain is a Gazan merchant who collaborates with the Shin Bet, drinks alcohol, and abuses his sister. He represents the corruption of economic ties with Israel, and Hamas sends a message that it will settle the score with him. Another character is a senior Hamas cyber operative, whose wife and mother-in-law suspect he is working late because he has married a second wife. He explains to them that there is a secret plan he cannot reveal. The message is: trust us, we have a big plan.
Shalev argues that the cultural gap is the heart of the problem. He points to the dismantling of Unit “Hatsav” (8200’s open-source collection unit) as an example of the disdain for open-source intelligence. He explains that in Israeli culture, information “leaked” from a private conversation is perceived as more credible than an official statement. In contrast, in Arab culture, a public statement has a binding effect. The classic example is Yasser Arafat, who used to say different things in English and Arabic, because only his words in Arabic had real meaning for his audience.
In conclusion, Shalev claims that the disregard for Hamas’s public messages, such as those that appeared in the series, stemmed from a deep misunderstanding of Arab culture. Instead of seeing them as a plan of action and a declaration of intent, Israel dismissed them as insignificant background noise.
The original episode, in Hebrew: הסרט שניבא את הטבח
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