Turkey and the fall of the Assad regime

The big winner from the move

According to Dr. Yanarocak, until recently Turkey was seen as the main loser of the Syrian civil war, mainly due to the refugee crisis it created. However, the war in Ukraine, which weakened Russia, and the war in Lebanon, which neutralized Hezbollah, created an opportunity for Turkey. Iranian deterrence against Israel has also been eroded. The Turks, he explains, identified this window of opportunity and pushed the button together with the rebels they support, which led to the collapse of the Assad regime in about a week.

Erdoğan’s motives

Turkish involvement in Syria began as early as 2011, at the height of the Arab Spring. According to Yanarocak, Erdoğan then demanded that Bashar al-Assad hold democratic elections. Erdoğan knew that the Sunnis, who make up about 75% of the population, would win the elections and oust the Alawite Assad. When his demand was rejected, Erdoğan became the main supporter of the Sunni rebel forces. He provided them with logistical support, turned the Hatay province in southern Turkey into their headquarters, and even sent the Turkish army to northern Syria to create a buffer zone for them.

The driving force behind this policy, Yanarocak explains, is a combination of Sunni ideology and neo-Ottoman imperialism. Erdoğan believes in Sunni supremacy and sees the Alawite rule in Syria as an artificial phenomenon, a product of the Sykes-Picot Agreement that dismantled the Ottoman Empire. For him, returning power to the Sunnis is a restoration of a former glory. This move is also directed against Iran. Turkey sees Syria as its historical “backyard” and does not accept the Iranian presence in the region, which it perceives as unnatural.

Implications for Israel

Boris Gorelik asks if Turkey pushing out Iran is a positive development for Israel. Yanarocak replies that the situation has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that Turkey is not defined as an enemy state, unlike Iran. The disadvantage is that for this reason, it is more difficult to act against it militarily. Turkey is also a NATO member, which further complicates the picture. The main risk, he says, is that Turkey will become the main arms supplier for the new Syrian regime. He raises a scenario in which Turkey would supply Syria with UAVs and missiles, and even establish military bases there, which could lead to the presence of Turkish pilots on Israel’s border.

Internal political gain

The future reconstruction of Syria is expected to channel a lot of money to Turkish construction companies, and projects like a gas pipeline from Qatar will strengthen Turkey’s economy. All of this will allow Erdoğan to present himself as a winner to the voters. However, Yanarocak emphasizes that for the Turkish public, symbols of power and sovereignty are more important than economic gain. He gives the example of the inauguration of the Turkish embassy in Damascus and the visit of the Turkish intelligence chief, Ibrahim Kalın, who prayed at the Umayyad Mosque with al-Julani. These images are a tremendous victory picture for Erdoğan, who is fulfilling a promise he made in 2011.

The Kurds and the future of Syria

Boris Gorelik asks why Erdoğan is so opposed to Kurdish autonomy. Yanarocak explains that the Turks have an obsession with the territorial integrity of neighboring countries, and they fear a domino effect. Kurdish autonomy in Syria could, in their view, spark similar demands among the Kurds in Turkey and lead to the country’s disintegration. Therefore, Turkey will oppose any scenario of Syria’s “Balkanization” and will prefer to keep it as a centralized and unified state, or at most a federation. He predicts that the new regime will be conservative-Islamic, but not a Sharia state in the style of the Taliban, but rather closer to the Turkish model.

A chance for peace with Israel

Yanarocak is pessimistic about the possibility of a peace agreement between Israel and the new Syria. He believes that any negotiation will require Turkish mediation, and Turkey, as well as the new Syrian leadership, is expected to demand a withdrawal from the Golan Heights, a condition Israel will not accept. Therefore, he assesses that the best situation one can hope for is not peace, but “non-war” based on deterrence. A breakthrough with Syria, he concludes, will only be possible after a breakthrough in relations with Turkey, something he does not foresee happening under the current leaders.