The gambler’s dilemma for leaders

According to Amar Dank, his analysis of wars is realistic and does not address moral aspects or the righteousness of the cause, but rather tries to understand the interests and considerations of all sides. The central theoretical framework he presents is the “gambler’s dilemma.” According to this principle, taken from the world of behavioral economics, human beings are loss-averse. As a result, they are willing to take greater risks to avoid a loss or to recoup losses already incurred than the risks they are willing to take to achieve a gain.

At any given moment in a war, a leader faces the decision of whether to continue fighting or to work toward ending it. According to Dank, when a leader perceives the situation as a loss, he may prefer to continue the war, even if the expected utility is doubtful, in the hope that continued fighting will bring an achievement that will allow him to erase the loss.

Putin and the Ukraine war

To demonstrate the model, Boris Gorelik asks to apply it to the Russia-Ukraine war. Amar Dank explains that dictatorial rulers like Putin have a different set of considerations than leaders in democracies. Their main goal is not the welfare of the citizens, but survival in power. Putin, in Dank’s assessment, started the war on the assumption that he would achieve a quick victory and restore a puppet regime in Ukraine. When this gamble failed, he faced a clear loss. Instead of “cutting his losses” and ending the war, he chose to continue gambling. He increased the risk, for example through a large-scale mobilization in September 2022, hoping to change the situation and avoid admitting a failure that could have endangered his rule.

A war of choice in Gaza and Netanyahu’s dilemma

Dank applies the same logic to the war in Gaza. He argues that after the initial and “automatic” phase of the war, which ended around January 2024 with the capture of Khan Yunis and the release of reserve forces, the war became a “war of choice” for Israel. At this stage, the chief decision-maker, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, faced a dilemma. In Dank’s assessment, Netanyahu perceives the events of October 7th as a huge political and personal loss. Out of this loss aversion, and for fear that elections after the war would lead to his defeat, he prefers to continue the war and take additional risks, hoping to achieve a total victory that would allow him to erase the stain of failure.

Boris Gorelik challenges the analysis and asks if the decision to continue does not stem from a substantive security consideration, namely the fear of leaving Hamas in power. Dank replies that the central question in his model is not the objective loss, but the way the leader subjectively frames the situation. In his assessment, Netanyahu frames the situation as a personal political loss, and therefore he acts to avoid it.

The conflict with Iran

The conversation moves to the Israeli-American conflict with Iran. Dank explains how here too, the decision to expand the conflict into an all-out war stemmed from the same dilemma. He thought that an Israeli success in a limited conflict with Iran would be a good opportunity for Netanyahu to “realize gains” and go to elections, but this did not happen. According to his interpretation, the polls showed that the achievement was not enough to guarantee a victory, so Netanyahu chose to raise the stakes and continue the war.

On the other hand, the Iranian regime’s ultimate goal is survival. After the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal, Iran lost faith in agreements. Therefore, its strategy in the war is not to achieve a direct military victory, but a war of economic attrition. By closing the Strait of Hormuz and harming the Gulf states, Iran is putting pressure on the global economy and on the United States’ allies, aiming to force Washington to end the war.

The options for ending the war in Gaza

At the end of the discussion, Dank analyzes the options facing Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Israel has three main alternatives: a full occupation of the Strip and control over two million Palestinians, a move he says is not practical; continuation of the current situation of constant friction; or a unilateral withdrawal to the border line.

For Hamas, the options are to continue ruling the population under the current conditions, while exploiting the humanitarian aid that Israel is forced to let in, or to advance a political process that would lead to an Israeli withdrawal. Finally, Dank explains that the October 7th attack was, from Hamas’s realistic point of view, a rational move designed to shake up the status quo and disrupt the trend of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which had pushed the Palestinian issue to the margins.

The establishment of the Palmar and the “golden hour”

According to Dr. Buk, the Palmar is a new unit established following previous operations in Gaza, based on the understanding that the evacuation time for wounded soldiers from the battlefield needed to be shortened. The unit’s goal is to break the “golden hour,” the critical period in which life-saving treatment must be administered. He explains that the unit has succeeded in reducing the average time from the moment of injury to arrival in the operating room to less than an hour, and sometimes even to forty minutes. According to the data he presents, the unit has so far saved 2,851 soldiers in the current war, 380 of whom were evacuated by helicopter in cooperation with Unit 669.

Methods of operation and innovations

Dr. Buk says that the idea for the unit’s establishment arose from a need identified during Operation “Protective Edge”. An IDF officer, a mutual friend of his and Boris Gorelik’s, recognized that soldiers were dying from injuries that should not have been fatal, and decided to find a solution. The guiding principle is that medical treatment does not begin at the hospital, but continues throughout the entire process, from the moment of injury in the field. One of the main innovations, he says, is the use of real type O-negative blood units in the field, not just plasma. Every ambulance is equipped with blood units at the correct temperature, which aids in rapid recovery. The unit, which began as a small organic team of doctors, paramedics, medics, and combat soldiers, has grown and now comprises eight companies and serves as a new model for emergency medicine in the IDF.

Technology in the service of medicine

Dr. Buk describes a technological tool used by the unit: a digital replacement for Form 101, which allows for continuous documentation of a wounded soldier’s treatment. In a mass casualty event, a soldier records all the data on a phone-like device. The information is transmitted in real time to the evacuation helicopter and the hospital, so all treating parties can monitor the patient’s condition and prepare for further treatment. He gives an example of a case where a wounded soldier needed morphine and ketamine. The team in the field managed to administer morphine before the helicopter arrived, and the paramedic on the helicopter, who had received the data, was waiting with a dose of ketamine to continue the treatment immediately and smoothly.

The human spirit of the unit

Dr. Buk, 58, tells how he volunteered for the unit at the beginning of the war even though he had not served in the reserves since 2006. He arrived at the base without a call-up order, insisted, and was eventually enlisted. He describes the unit as a family made up of people from all corners of Israeli society: religious and secular, Jews, Druze, and Christians, all working together for a common goal. According to him, there is a strong mutual support system, including a WhatsApp group that is also used for personal matters. The unit also takes care of the students serving in it and provides them with quiet study spaces.

Medical evacuation in the northern sector

Boris Gorelik asks if the lessons from the fighting in Gaza, which is relatively close to hospitals, are also being applied in the more distant Lebanon sector. Dr. Buk, who has been serving in the north in recent months, answers in the affirmative. He explains that rapid and efficient evacuation of the wounded is also carried out there, and there is no situation where a wounded soldier is left in the field without evacuation for hours or days, as happened in the Second Lebanon War. The evacuation is carried out by helicopter to Rambam and Ziv hospitals.

Mental health support and coping with trauma

Dr. Buk notes that in every company there are two mental health officers available to soldiers 24/7. They are an organic part of the unit and hold weekly talks with the teams. He tells of difficult incidents, such as a case where a deputy company commander discovered that the critically wounded soldier he was treating was his brother-in-law. He emphasizes the importance of mental health care, both during service and in the transition back to civilian life, and notes that the support continues even when the soldiers are at home.

International recognition

According to Dr. Buk, the Palmar’s methods of operation are generating great interest in the medical world. Doctors come from abroad to learn from the Israeli experience, and he himself has been invited to lecture on the topic in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. He talks about non-Jewish figures, like Colonel Richard Kemp of the British Army, who express great support for the IDF and the unit’s activities.

The riddle of its origins: An ancient settlement or refugees from persecution?

According to Dr. Friedman, the villagers themselves do not know for certain where they came from. Local tradition speaks of a migration from northern Syria in the 16th or 17th centuries, but there is no clear documentation for this. Dr. Friedman presents two main theses regarding the village’s origins.

The first thesis posits that an Alawite community, then called “Nusayri”, already existed in the Galilee region in the Middle Ages. In the 11th century, under the rule of Shiite dynasties, Alawite communities flourished in Greater Syria, including in Tiberias and the Galilee. One of the community’s prominent leaders, Maymun al-Tabarani, was active in Tiberias. However, there is a huge gap of about 600 years, from the 11th to the 18th century, during which there are almost no sources documenting Alawites in the area. It is possible that historians and travelers did not distinguish them from other Shiite communities in the Jabal Amel region of southern Lebanon.

Two traditions and a Syrian Arabic dialect

Dr. Friedman refers to a book by villagers Jamal and Ahmed Khatib, which documented oral traditions. The book presents two seemingly contradictory versions. One version claims the village was founded in the 11th century by the Shiite ruler Sayf al-Dawla to protect caravans. The second version links the village’s establishment to an escape from Ottoman persecution in the 16th century.

Dr. Friedman proposes a thesis that combines the two traditions. It is possible that a small, ancient Alawite settlement from the Middle Ages did exist on the site, and during the Ottoman period, a larger group of migrants arrived, fleeing economic and religious persecution in northern Syria. This would explain how the two traditions were preserved side by side.

Dr. Friedman finds support for the residents’ Syrian origin in the Arabic dialect spoken in the village. According to him, it is a distinct Syrian Arabic, similar to that of Damascus, and not Lebanese. However, it has features that are not typical of most Alawites in Syria, which could indicate local linguistic development and influence from their Shiite neighbors in Lebanon.

Three villages that became one

Dr. Friedman explains that Ghajar was not an isolated village. Until 1967, there were three Alawite villages in the area: Ghajar, Ein Fit, and Za’ura. Their residents were Syrian citizens and served in the Syrian army. In the Six-Day War, the IDF destroyed Ein Fit and Za’ura, and their inhabitants fled to Syria.

Between Syria, Lebanon, and Israel

Ghajar’s fate was more complex. After its capture in 1967, Israel withdrew from it under the mistaken belief that it belonged to Lebanon. The Lebanese army, for its part, believed the village was Syrian and also withdrew. For several months, the residents were left without sovereignty, electricity, or services. After the Lebanese government refused to accept them, they turned to Israel and asked to be annexed as part of the Golan Heights. In 1981, with the passage of the Golan Heights Law, the residents of Ghajar received Israeli identity cards.

The problems did not end there. After the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the UN drew the “Blue Line,” which ran through the heart of the village and divided houses between Israel and Lebanon, based on maps that Dr. Friedman says were incorrect. The absurd situation sparked protests from the residents. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Israel has unified the village with a fence, and the situation has stabilized to the residents’ satisfaction. Since 2022, restrictions on the entry of Israelis have been lifted, and the village has been experiencing a tourism boom.

Challenges and open questions

In conclusion, Dr. Friedman notes several open issues. First, the small and closed community of about 3,000 people faces a problem of intra-family marriage, although recently there have been a few isolated cases of marriage to non-Alawite partners. Second, the origin of the name “Ghajar,” which means “gypsies” in Arabic, is unclear. According to local tradition, it is a derogatory nickname given to them by a Kurdish landowner in the 19th century. Finally, he argues that the Lebanese government’s pressure to recognize the northern part of the village as Lebanese territory stems from the demands of Hezbollah, which is trying to take control of an area that was historically Syrian.

Historical overview: Three stages

According to Dr. Khizran, the history of Arab politics in Israel can be divided into three main stages.

The first stage lasted from the establishment of the state until the abolition of the military government in the mid-1960s. This period was characterized by a struggle between two currents: the Israeli Communist Party, which worked to emphasize national identity and fought against the military government, and opposite it, the traditional leadership (leaders of clans and villages) which organized into “satellite lists” linked to Mapai, the ruling party. Dr. Khizran notes that the Communist Party, which accepted activists from the National Liberation League into its ranks, accepted the partition plan under the influence of the Soviet Union. He adds that in the 1950s, the state considered conscripting all its Arab citizens into the army, but backed down for fear of creating an “army within an army” after about 26,000 Muslim volunteers registered. Instead, the state chose to conscript small minorities like the Druze and to establish local authorities to strengthen clan-based fragmentation.

The second stage began with the end of the military government and lasted until the Arab Spring. The abolition of the military government, alongside processes of modernization and the rise of an educated generation, weakened the status of the traditional leadership. At the same time, a trend of Palestinization and political radicalization grew stronger. This trend found institutional expression in the 1970s with the rise of Hadash in Nazareth and the establishment of public institutions that emphasized Palestinian identity. According to Khizran, this process reached its peak after the Oslo Accords, with the establishment of the Balad party by Azmi Bishara. Balad introduced a new discourse that called for abolishing Israel’s Jewish identity and turning it into a “state of all its citizens.”

The third stage began with the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011. Since then, Dr. Khizran explains, we have witnessed the rise of a new school of thought, which he calls “the local civic political discourse.” This school, led by Ra’am, changes the order of priorities: it decouples the relationship of Arabs with the state from dependence on a solution to the Palestinian problem, and it focuses on the demand to maximize the rights derived from Israeli citizenship.

Integration without identification

Dr. Khizran argues that the new approach, represented by Ra’am, is not Israelization or Zionization, but instrumentalization. He calls this “integration without identification.” According to this approach, integration into the Israeli public sphere is a tool for achieving goals and budgets for the benefit of Arab society, and it has no element of emotional or ideological identification with the state, its symbols, or the Zionist ethos. He says this can be described by the phrase “the heart is with Gaza and the pocket is with Israel.”

He notes that this trend is supported by the Arab public, as shown in public opinion polls that consistently indicate a majority of the public wants to see its representatives in the coalition to obtain budgets and jobs. The state, too, especially since 2011, has recognized the desire for economic integration and has invested large sums through government five-year plans, understanding that the integration of Arab society will contribute to the Israeli economy. The conduct of the Arab public after the events of October 7, which was characterized by political realism, also reinforces this analysis.

Two schools of thought in Arab politics

Today, politics in Arab society is divided between two main schools of thought. The first school is the “mobilizing national discourse,” represented by the Joint List (Hadash, Balad, and Ta’al). It continues to emphasize Palestinian national identity and commitment as a central component. Opposite it stands the school of “local civic discourse,” represented by Ra’am, which emphasizes civic interests and is willing to join a coalition without conditions related to the Palestinian issue. Dr. Khizran emphasizes that Ra’am’s approach is pragmatism, not ideological moderation.

Boris Gorelik asks what options are available to an Arab citizen with right-wing economic views. Dr. Khizran replies that apart from Hadash, which is a communist party, the other parties are mainly nationalist and not economically defined. He believes that citizens and parties have learned to create a balance between emphasizing Palestinian identity and the political realism required to manage daily life.

Ahead of the elections

Despite the ideological disputes, Dr. Khizran explains that the two lists, the Joint List and Ra’am, meet on one point ahead of the upcoming elections: the desire to replace the government and prevent Benjamin Netanyahu from rising to power. He confidently assesses that both lists will recommend a candidate other than Netanyahu, without receiving anything in return, in order to prevent him from forming a government. The campaign of both blocs presents the elections as fateful, arguing that the current government is responsible for most of the problems in Arab society, such as crime and a lack of governance.

The future: Israelization or pragmatism?

Boris Gorelik asks if a scenario of deeper Israelization in Arab society is possible in the future, similar to the Druze model or the one represented by Yoseph Haddad. Dr. Khizran expresses skepticism. In his opinion, Haddad’s model is perceived in the Arab public as a negation of the self and the Palestinian national narrative, and it does not have broad support. He believes that as long as the Palestinian problem is not resolved, deep identification with the state will not occur. The prevailing trend will remain “integration without identification,” meaning, an instrumental integration aimed at benefiting Arab society while preserving its separate national identity.

The world in danger

According to Dr. Eilam Gindin, in many ancient cultures, there was a prevalent belief that the world is in danger before the new year, and a sacrifice is required to save it. The sacrifice could be the god himself or his representative on earth, like the king. She explains that this idea is reflected in various customs, such as the high priest’s entry into the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur, fearing he might not come out alive. Another motif is a symbolic change of rule, where the king steps down from his throne and a criminal sentenced to death is crowned in his place and killed at the end of the festival, as a substitute sacrifice.

The region’s calendars

Boris Gorelik begins by reviewing the four new years in Judaism, and Dr. Eilam Gindin elaborates on the new year for kings, which falls in Nisan and corresponds to the Iranian festival of Nowruz, marking the spring equinox. She explains that the word for “month” is related to the lunar cycle in many languages, including Hebrew, Persian, and Chinese. The discussion covers the various calendars in the region: the Muslim calendar, which is purely lunar and “drifts” across the seasons; the Iranian calendar, which is a precise solar calendar that begins at the exact second of the spring equinox; and the Hebrew calendar, which combines solar and lunar cycles.

Ancient roots and modern echoes

Dr. Eilam Gindin argues that many holidays, including the Exodus from Egypt, Purim, and Christmas, are built around the motif of danger and salvation at key astronomical points like the equinoxes or the longest and shortest days of the year. She presents the story of the Book of Esther as an example, noting its surprising similarity to the story of the rise to power of King Darius I, the father of Ahasuerus. The Shia festival of Ashura, which commemorates the death of Imam Hussein at the Battle of Karbala, also falls on the tenth day of the Muslim year. According to her, the death of Hussein, a representative of God, is seen as a sacrifice that saved the Shia from annihilation.

Living by multiple calendars

The conversation turns to how people in the Middle East manage with different calendars. Dr. Eilam Gindin explains that Iranians live their lives according to the Persian calendar and often do not know the corresponding Gregorian date. She recounts how in the past, this misunderstanding caused the State of Israel to record incorrect birth dates for immigrants from Iran, which led to bureaucratic problems. In contrast, most Muslims in the region, including in Israel, conduct their daily lives according to the Gregorian calendar, with the Muslim calendar used mainly for religious purposes.

The Iranian people and the regime

In response to listeners’ questions, Dr. Eilam Gindin argues that the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people oppose the Islamic regime. As proof, she compares the millions of protesters who took to the streets in recent protests, knowing they were risking their lives, with the sparse, organized demonstrations of regime supporters, whose participants are bused in and given food. She explains the phenomenon using what she calls the Iranian “pendulum of identities”: the more the government imposes an Islamic identity, the more the people lean toward the ancient, Persian, and secular Iranian identity. She cites a 2020 survey that found that less than a third of Iranians identify as Shia, while many define themselves as having no religion or as Zoroastrians.

The future of the Islamic Republic

Dr. Eilam Gindin describes the Iranian regime as fearful and divided. She points to new laws restricting freedom of expression as evidence of the government’s fear of another wave of protests. She discusses rumors about the health of Supreme Leader Khamenei and leaks that portray his son, Mojtaba, as trying to run the country from behind the scenes. She concludes with a historical comparison: just as Khomeini organized the 1979 revolution from his exile abroad, so too the exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, is now working to rally support inside and outside Iran with the aim of overthrowing the regime.

Behind-the-scenes ties

According to Prof. Eli Podeh, the perception that Israel was completely isolated in the Middle East is inaccurate. Throughout its existence, Israel has maintained extensive and secret ties with many countries in the region. His book, published in 2020, examines this phenomenon. He notes, for example, the United Arab Emirates, which has had ties with Israel since the 1990s, and Morocco, whose ties began as early as the 1950s around Jewish immigration and evolved into extensive intelligence cooperation with the Mossad starting in 1963. The cooperation with Morocco included Israeli assistance in the Ben Barka affair and giving Israel access to listen in on Arab summit conferences held in the country. According to him, most research on Israel’s relations focuses on public documents from official archives, but information on secret activities, most of which were managed by the Mossad, remains classified. He collected the information for his book from various sources, including WikiLeaks documents and interviews with over a hundred people, many of them former Mossad personnel who were willing to talk about their activities.

Why in secret?

The main reason for the secrecy of the relations, explains Prof. Podeh, is the fear of Arab leaders that their legitimacy will be harmed. Public opinion in the Arab world strongly identifies with the Palestinian issue, and rulers, even in non-democratic countries, fear the public’s reaction. He mentions leaders like King Abdullah I, Bachir Gemayel, and Anwar Sadat, who paid with their lives for their ties with Israel. Even Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of the Arab world in the 1950s and 60s, maintained secret contacts with Israel but expressed fear of being assassinated if it were revealed. Therefore, the alternative that Israeli leaders faced was between having secret relations and having no relations at all. They chose the first option out of an understanding that it was in Israel’s interest, even if it involved frustration. Israeli representatives in the Shah’s Iran, for example, complained that Israel was providing a great deal of assistance to the country but was not receiving public recognition.

Leaks and the rules of the game

Sometimes, Israeli leaders are the ones who leak information about secret meetings out of a desire for political gain. Prof. Podeh gives the example of the leak of Benjamin Netanyahu’s meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, in 2020. According to him, such leaks anger the other side and can lead to a freeze in relations. He rejects the speculation that these are coordinated leaks, emphasizing that over the years it was always the Arab side that demanded secrecy be maintained. In the case of the Maronites in Lebanon, for example, they repeatedly asked to avoid publicizing the ties, understanding that they are a minority in the country and such publicity would endanger them. According to Shabtai Shavit, a former head of the Mossad, the secrecy is not absolute. Among intelligence communities, the information about the ties is known and creates deterrence, even if it does not reach the general public.

“A Byzantine court”: Who manages the ties?

The management of secret ties is not the domain of a single body. According to Prof. Podeh, from the late 1950s, a practice developed whereby the Mossad, through its “Tevel” division, is responsible for ties with countries with which Israel does not have diplomatic relations. However, there are other bodies that compete for the management of these relations, in what one of his interviewees called “a Byzantine court.” These bodies include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is also interested in being involved in secret ties; the National Security Council (NSC); personal envoys of prime ministers; and the IDF, mainly Aman (Military Intelligence), which was involved in ties with the Maronites in Lebanon. The rivalry between the various bodies, Prof. Podeh argues, sometimes overcomes cooperation.

The Abraham Accords and the October 7th war

The Abraham Accords, argues Prof. Podeh, were a revolution because they brought the relations out into the open and were based on a new paradigm: peace with Arab states without the need to resolve the Palestinian issue. He admits that at that moment, this concept challenged the accepted assumption in academia that no significant progress could be made without addressing the Palestinian issue. However, the events of October 7th proved, to his regret, that the old assumption is still valid. One of the main reasons for the Hamas attack, as revealed in documents, was the desire to torpedo the emerging normalization with Saudi Arabia. The good news, he says, is that the peace and normalization agreements survived the test of the war. However, they have retreated to the old pattern of action of behind-the-scenes relations, without public meetings.

Ties with other countries

Prof. Podeh reviews secret ties with other countries:

• Saudi Arabia: He sees this as a historic missed opportunity. According to him, the Saudis, under the leadership of King Fahd, sought contact with Israel as early as the 1970s but were rejected by Moshe Dayan. The pattern of Saudi initiatives continued in 1981 and 2002.
• Sudan: A complex story that included ties with both the Muslims in the north and the Christians in the south, whom Israel aided in their rebellions.
• Pakistan: Secret ties existed, partly due to Israeli concern about Pakistan’s nuclear weapon. Israel received assurances that the weapon would not be turned against it.
• Indonesia: Between the 1970s and the 1990s, significant ties existed, including Israeli civilian aid.
• Kuwait: This is a country that almost never tried to establish contact with Israel, probably for fear of getting entangled, especially after the 1990 Iraqi invasion.
• Qatar: Described as the “rebellious child” of the Gulf, which manages ties with all sides and draws its power from its relations with the United States.

Humanitarian aid and support for minorities

Some of the secret ties included humanitarian aid and support for ethnic and religious minorities, like the Kurds in Iraq, the Maronites in Lebanon, and the Christians in South Sudan. According to Prof. Podeh, this aid was sometimes seen as a moral duty for Israel, as a minority in the region, to help other minorities. He mentions Menachem Begin, who believed in the idea of an “alliance of minorities” and saw aiding the Maronites as a duty to prevent them from suffering a fate similar to the Holocaust.

Security diplomacy

According to Dr. Haim Koren, establishing secret contacts between hostile entities is a long-standing diplomatic practice, born out of shared interests, usually security-related. He explains that Israel’s foreign policy was shaped from its inception by David Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine. Ben-Gurion understood that without security, the young state could not survive, and therefore he prioritized security considerations over all others. As a result, the security establishment, led by the Mossad, became a central arm in managing Israel’s foreign relations, especially through secret channels and with actors that are not officially sovereign states.

The periphery doctrine

Dr. Koren explains that Ben-Gurion initiated a strategy known as the “periphery doctrine,” aimed at breaking the political isolation imposed on Israel by the Arab states. The idea was to establish ties with non-Arab states and entities in the second and third circles around Israel. Through a process of elimination, potential partners were identified, such as Iran and Turkey (non-Arab Muslim countries) and Ethiopia (a Christian country). In addition, Israel established ties with minority groups in the region, such as the Maronites in Lebanon and the Christians in South Sudan. According to him, some of these contacts were successful, like with pre-revolutionary Iran, while others were less so, like with the Christians in Lebanon. These ties, even if they did not mature into full relations, created a basis for future cooperation. For example, the ties with Morocco allowed it to host the secret meetings between Moshe Dayan and Sadat’s representatives, which paved the way for the peace agreement with Egypt.

The Mossad as a diplomatic arm: the story of South Sudan

To illustrate these processes, Dr. Koren shares the story of South Sudan. In 1968, after the Six-Day War, the leader of the South Sudanese rebels, Joseph Lago, approached the head of the Mossad station in Kenya. He asked for Israel’s help in their struggle against the Sudanese government, arguing that the Sudanese Arabs wanted to destroy them just as the Arabs wanted to destroy Israel. The head of the Mossad at the time secretly brought Lago to a meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir.

Following the meeting, Israel sent a delegation led by Mossad officer David Ben-Uziel (nicknamed “Tarzan”) to assess the situation on the ground. The delegation recommended assisting the rebels. Israel’s interest was to keep Egypt, which supported the Sudanese regime, busy on another front, thereby diverting its resources from the War of Attrition against Israel. The connection was maintained for decades, and in 2011, when the establishment of the independent state of South Sudan became possible, Israel was one of the first countries to recognize it. According to Dr. Koren, the process took 43 years, and it demonstrates the importance of patience and long-term vision in diplomacy. To this day, South Sudan is one of the few countries that consistently supports Israel in UN votes.

Contacts with Syria and the evolution of Jolani

In the current Syrian context, Dr. Koren argues that the contacts with Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, are not new. He explains that Israel had cooperated with Jolani back when he was the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. As part of this, Israel provided medical aid to his wounded fighters. According to him, Jolani remembers this assistance, and this early acquaintance, based on a shared interest against the Assad regime, is the foundation for the current contacts.

Dr. Koren believes that Jolani is undergoing a process of rebranding, trying to present himself as a Syrian national leader rather than an Islamist terrorist. He is not a puppet of Turkey, but a leader who understands Syrian interests and tries to advance them, even if it involves dialogue with Israel.

From mistress to common-law wife

Dr. Koren describes the development of Israel’s secret relations using the metaphor of a transition from the status of a mistress to that of a common-law wife. In the past, many countries preferred to maintain secret ties with Israel for fear of the Arab world’s reaction. The Abraham Accords, he says, changed the situation, and today countries like the United Arab Emirates and Morocco are not ashamed of their public ties with Israel. Israel’s status has changed, and it is no longer seen as a pariah. Therefore, even countries that previously avoided open ties are now willing to consider them. He emphasizes that the key to the success of such processes is patience, secrecy, and avoiding leaks that could destroy the trust-building process.

What is Islam

According to Dr. Friedman, to understand Islam, one must start with the basics. He begins by explaining the ‘misbaha’, the Muslim prayer beads. It consists of 33 beads, and each bead symbolizes one of the 99 names of Allah. According to the belief, the 100th name is the explicit name of God, and it is hidden. Mystical streams in Islam, such as the Sufis or the Baha’is, claim to know the explicit name.

Dr. Friedman explains that the meaning of the word ‘Islam’ is submission or devotion to God, not peace. A Muslim is a person who submits to God’s will. The prime example in the Quran is Abraham, who is called a Muslim because he obeyed God without question, even when required to sacrifice his son. This submission is expressed physically in prayer, by prostrating before God.

From a legal perspective, Islam is defined by the Five Pillars of Islam:

1. The ‘shahada’: the declaration of faith that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is his messenger.
2. The ‘salat’: prayer, five times a day.
3. The ‘zakat’: giving charity to the poor.
4. The ‘sawm’: fasting during the month of Ramadan.
5. The ‘hajj’: the pilgrimage to Mecca, for those who can afford it.

The spread of Islam: persuasion or coercion?

Boris Gorelik asks how the claim that Islam is a ‘religion of peace’ reconciles with its spread through wars. According to Dr. Friedman, Islam is a missionary religion that has always sought to spread throughout the world. He notes that most Muslims today are not Arabs.

The spread occurred in two ways. One way is war and conquest, which characterized the Middle Ages, similar to Christianity in the same period. However, Dr. Friedman argues that most converts to Islam throughout history did so willingly and not by force. The reason for this is that the Islamic civilization in the Middle Ages was the most advanced in the world. Converting to Islam was a gateway to social mobility, economic opportunities, and belonging to the dominant and developed culture of the time. However, there were also cases of coercion, such as the forced recruitment of boys (devshirme) in the Ottoman Empire or the forced conversion of Iran to Shi’ism in the 16th century.

Today, Dr. Friedman explains, major Muslim countries like Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates are actively fighting radical Islam and organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood. According to him, that is where moderate Islam is found.

Streams and communities in Islam

Sunni Islam, which constitutes the majority in the Muslim world, has hardly split. However, there are nuances within it as well. Alongside rational and legalistic Islam, a mystical stream known as ‘Sufism’ developed. Sufis emphasize the importance of love for God and use music, dance, and mantras to draw closer to him. They believe in the ‘jihad of the soul’, the internal struggle against evil inclinations, as the most important jihad.

In Sunni Islam, there are four schools of law (madhhab), with relatively minor differences between them: the Hanafi (considered the most moderate), the Shafi’i (common in our region), the Maliki (conservative), and the Hanbali (the strictest, common in Saudi Arabia).

The Shi’a, in contrast, believe that the leadership was usurped from Muhammad’s rightful heir, Ali ibn Abi Talib. They have a separate school of law, the Ja’fari, and there are certain differences between them and the Sunnis in commandments and customs.

Dr. Friedman clarifies that the Kurds are not a separate religious stream but an ethnic group. Most of them are Sunnis, and some belong to the Sufi stream. Another community mentioned is the Ahmadis, a stream that developed from Islam and advocates spreading the religion only by peaceful means, with a total opposition to violence.

A secular Muslim state

In response to the question of whether a secular Muslim state can exist, Dr. Friedman cites Atatürk’s Turkey as a successful example, and the Shah’s Iran as a failed attempt. He notes that most Arab dictatorships in the 20th century (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) were secular in their laws, even if the constitution stipulated that the president must be a Muslim. However, it is difficult to determine if a secular Muslim state can also be democratic, as there are almost no democracies in the Arab world.

Alliances on a religious basis

Dr. Friedman expresses great skepticism about the effectiveness of political alliances in the Middle East based on religion, such as the emerging alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. According to him, such alliances do not last because each country has different and sometimes conflicting interests. He notes that there is no united Sunni front against Iran, and that even the Shi’ite ‘Axis of Resistance’ led by Iran has proven unreliable, with each party looking out for itself. The history of the region, he concludes, is full of failed alliances and betrayals.

Kohen, not komer

At the beginning of the conversation, Father David Neuhaus explains why he insists on the title “kohen dat” and not “komer.” According to him, the word “komer” appears in the Hebrew Bible about seven times, and each time it is used as a pejorative term for idolaters. In contrast, the word “kohen” is a neutral term describing a role. Hebrew-speaking Christians prefer the title “kohen” because they see themselves as worshipers of one God, not idolaters.

Neuhaus also addresses the issue of the Holy Trinity. He explains that Hebrew- and Arabic-speaking Christians prefer to speak of “the mystery of the one God,” who is revealed to human beings as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, to emphasize God’s unity in the face of Jewish and Muslim polemics.

The Vatican’s position before the state’s establishment

According to Neuhaus, to understand the Catholic Church’s attitude toward Israel, one must go back to the period after the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Since the Church is a hierarchical institution, its official position is determined by the Pope and the Holy See. As early as 1922, in response to plans presented to the League of Nations, the Vatican expressed a clear position: it had no objection to granting equal rights to Jews in the Land of Israel, but it could not support a situation where they would have privileged rights over other groups.

Neuhaus emphasizes that the opposition did not stem from fundamental theological reasons against Jewish sovereignty, but from a fear of inequality. According to him, the Church had three main interests in the Holy Land: interpretation of the scriptures, care for the holy places, and protection of the local Christian communities. The establishment of the State of Israel and the 1948 war, which caused many Christians to leave, were perceived as a threat to these interests.

After the Holocaust: Reconciliation with the Jewish people

After World War II, the Church began to confront its role in the Holocaust. This process led to a deep desire for reconciliation with the Jewish people. The significant turning point occurred after the death of Pope Pius XII and the accession of John XXIII, who was known for his warm attitude toward Jews. He convened the Second Vatican Council, which led in 1965 to the publication of the document “Nostra aetate.” This document brought about a revolution and changed the Church’s attitude toward the Jewish people from a theology of contempt to a theology of respect. However, the document did not address the State of Israel, and the Vatican continued to withhold official recognition, arguing that its borders were not recognized.

Establishing diplomatic relations

The change in attitude toward the State of Israel began in the 1990s, following the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. According to Neuhaus, when the parties began to talk, the Church saw an opportunity. In 1994, full diplomatic relations were established between Israel and the Holy See. In parallel, the Vatican worked to establish relations with the PLO, and in 2015 it recognized the State of Palestine.

The visit of Pope John Paul II in 2000 expressed the Vatican’s new position. The visit was carefully planned to show concern and respect for both sides: the Pope visited Yad Vashem and the Western Wall, but also met with Yasser Arafat and visited a refugee camp.

The Church’s role: A language of peace

Boris asks if the Church can serve as a mediator in the conflict. Neuhaus replies that the Church does not see itself as a political power, but a spiritual one. Its role is not political mediation, but the formulation of a language of respect, recognition, and equality that will enable a better future. He mentions the prayer for peace held by Pope Francis at the Vatican in 2014 with Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas as an example of these efforts.

Contrary to Boris’s opinion, Neuhaus argues that the conflict is not essentially religious but national, between Jewish nationalism and Palestinian nationalism, both of which were born in the 19th century. In his view, religious nationalism is particularly dangerous because it attributes its claims to the will of God. In conclusion, he shares his personal story: he was born into a Jewish family in South Africa, immigrated to Israel, and as an adult became a believer in Jesus and joined the Catholic Church.

The series “Qabdat al-Ahrar”

Avi Shalev begins by describing the series “Qabdat al-Ahrar” (“The Grip of the Free”), a Ramadan series produced by Hamas that aired in the spring of 2022. The 30-episode series deals with Hamas’s preparations for war with Israel. The final episode depicts a surprise attack on the communities of the western Negev, strikingly similar to the October 7 attack. It shows, among other things, Nukhba terrorists in IDF uniforms, ambushes on roads, the use of pickup trucks, the kidnapping of soldiers, and the capture of the Gaza Division headquarters. The series ends with the Israeli flag being taken down from the base and the Palestinian flag being raised.

Shalev notes that about six months after the series aired, Yahya Sinwar awarded it a prize at a festive ceremony in Gaza. In his speech, Sinwar said that everything seen in the series was the military wing’s plan, and that he intended to make it a reality. In response to a question from Boris, Shalev confirms that Fatah officials criticized the series in real time, claiming it was far-fetched and imaginary.

The failure of intentions intelligence

According to Shalev, the series is a key example of the Israeli intelligence failure, which focused on “capabilities intelligence” (locating targets, identifying the enemy) and neglected “intentions intelligence” (understanding the mentality, culture, and perceptions of the other side). The Israeli security establishment clung to the conception that Hamas was deterred and primarily interested in economic welfare and improving the lives of Gaza’s residents. Shalev mentions the former head of Military Intelligence, Aharon Haliva, who said after the attack that even if he had received concrete information about an impending war, he would not have believed it because it contradicted the prevailing view.

Boris remarks that it is easy to analyze things in hindsight, and that the intelligence community is flooded with information and cannot change its worldview based on every single piece of data. Shalev agrees that the matter is complex, but argues that the main problem is in the way Israel analyzes information.

The gap between open-source and secret intelligence

Shalev explains that the Israeli intelligence community, reflecting a Western culture, gives supreme importance to secret information obtained through technological means (cyber, wiretaps) and dismisses open-source intelligence (OSINT). The perception is that the truth is spoken behind closed doors, while public statements are merely “Arab waffling,” exaggerations, and lies.

In contrast, traditional Arab culture is a “shame culture” with an “external locus of control.” In such a culture, what is said and done in the public sphere carries decisive weight, sometimes more than the factual truth. The Israeli conception was based on one-on-one talks between COGAT officers and Gazan figures, while public statements by senior Hamas officials, sermons in mosques, and productions like the series “Qabdat al-Ahrar” were ignored.

Deception and internal messaging

According to Shalev, the series was not only meant to threaten Israel, but served mainly as an internal messaging tool for Hamas towards its supporters. It was intended to explain the contradiction between the organization’s jihadist ideology and the reality of security calm and coordination with Israel. The series’s message to the Gazan audience was that all the quiet and economic easements were part of a sophisticated deception plan, which would end in a surprise attack.

Shalev provides examples from the series: the villain is a Gazan merchant who collaborates with the Shin Bet, drinks alcohol, and abuses his sister. He represents the corruption of economic ties with Israel, and Hamas sends a message that it will settle the score with him. Another character is a senior Hamas cyber operative, whose wife and mother-in-law suspect he is working late because he has married a second wife. He explains to them that there is a secret plan he cannot reveal. The message is: trust us, we have a big plan.

Cultural gaps and their consequences

Shalev argues that the cultural gap is the heart of the problem. He points to the dismantling of Unit “Hatsav” (8200’s open-source collection unit) as an example of the disdain for open-source intelligence. He explains that in Israeli culture, information “leaked” from a private conversation is perceived as more credible than an official statement. In contrast, in Arab culture, a public statement has a binding effect. The classic example is Yasser Arafat, who used to say different things in English and Arabic, because only his words in Arabic had real meaning for his audience.

In conclusion, Shalev claims that the disregard for Hamas’s public messages, such as those that appeared in the series, stemmed from a deep misunderstanding of Arab culture. Instead of seeing them as a plan of action and a declaration of intent, Israel dismissed them as insignificant background noise.

The death blow to pan-Arabism

According to Prof. Baram, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, was a death blow to the idea of secular pan-Arabism, which had dominated the Arab world since the 1950s. He explains that there were previous blows to the idea, such as the dissolution of the union between Egypt and Syria in 1961 and the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979, which removed Egypt from pan-Arab solidarity. However, the invasion of Kuwait was particularly fatal because it replaced the vision of a voluntary and idyllic union with a forceful Arab imperialism of one Arab state against another. The dream of unity out of free will was shattered.

The shock in the Arab world was so deep that Arab countries like Syria and Egypt sent military forces to fight alongside the United States against the Iraqi army. In addition, the war led Syria, under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad, to enter into direct negotiations with Israel at the Madrid Conference in 1991. In doing so, Syria also abandoned pan-Arab solidarity in favor of Syrian national interest. Prof. Baram argues that as secular pan-Arabism declined, the power of political Islam rose.

The reasons for the invasion

Prof. Baram details a series of reasons that led Saddam Hussein to the decision to invade Kuwait.

• Economic distress: The Iran-Iraq War ended in an Iraqi victory, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. Iraq emerged from the war with a debt of 80 billion dollars, a ruined economy, soaring unemployment, and destroyed infrastructure, especially in the Shiite areas in the south. The state’s oil revenues dropped dramatically.
• Kuwait’s conduct: Saddam was desperate for money. He asked Kuwait to forgive a 10 billion dollar debt that Iraq owed it, but the Kuwaitis refused. At the same time, Kuwait and the Emirates flooded the oil market, thereby lowering its prices, which further harmed Iraq’s revenues. Saddam saw this as a personal insult and a hostile act.
• Strategic considerations: Saddam saw the occupation of Kuwait as a solution to two strategic problems. First, he aspired to obtain a serious deep-water port on the Persian Gulf, as Iraq’s coastline was narrow and vulnerable. Second, he planned to take control of Kuwait’s assets, then estimated at about 100 billion dollars, and thus solve his country’s debt crisis.
• A supposed green light from the United States: In a meeting with the United States ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, shortly before the invasion, Saddam told her that if diplomacy failed, he would use force against Kuwait. According to Prof. Baram, the ambassador replied that the United States does not interfere in border disputes between Arab states. Saddam apparently interpreted this as permission for military action.
• Saddam’s personality: Prof. Baram describes Saddam as an evil genius who solves problems violently. He recounts how in a psycho-historical profile of Saddam he conducted back in 1988, he and the psychiatrist Eli Weiztum concluded that Saddam would soon seek a new war.

The war and the defeat

Saddam planned the invasion in absolute secrecy. He did not share the plan with the minister of defense or the chief of staff, but only with the commander of the Republican Guard, the elite force of his army. The forces were sent to the border under the guise of an exercise and conquered Kuwait in about 36 hours.

The invasion led to an international intervention headed by the United States. Prof. Baram notes that the Americans refrained from continuing to Baghdad and toppling Saddam’s regime for two main reasons, as former U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger explained to him: fear of a long military entanglement in Iraq, and the lack of international legitimacy for such a move, which exceeded the UN mandate to liberate Kuwait.

The Shiite rebellion and the Islamic turn

Immediately after the defeat, a massive Shiite uprising broke out in southern Iraq. The rebels, who heard a false report on the BBC that Saddam had fled the country with its treasures, believed the regime had collapsed. Saddam suppressed the rebellion with immense brutality, and between 100,000 and 200,000 people, mostly Shiites, were killed in the massacre.

The deep rift with the Shiite population, along with the economic crisis and international isolation, led Saddam to abandon the secular ideology of the Ba’ath Party and launch a new faith campaign, a campaign of Islamization in the country. His goal was mainly to appease the Shiites and find a new common basis for his rule. Prof. Baram believes that this turn did not stem from Saddam’s genuine religious faith, but was an instrumental move. He offers as evidence a secret document in which Saddam wrote a personal letter to God, while at the same time he was documented drinking a beverage that looked like arak with senior officials of his regime, to signal to his secular friends that he was still one of them.

Three competing authorities in Iran

According to Dr. Friedman, after the assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei, the era of “Velayat-e Faqih”, the rule of the senior cleric, has come to an end. A power struggle is now underway in Iran between three main centers. The first is the moderate president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who prioritizes the economy and seeks a quick agreement with the United States to alleviate the country’s severe crisis. Opposing him is the hawkish line of the Revolutionary Guards, led by Ahmad Vahidi, currently the strongman in Iran. Vahidi opposes negotiations and tries to sabotage them, for example, by firing on oil tankers. Between these two poles is the speaker of parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who is leading the negotiations but sets strict demands: he wants sanctions lifted, but also wants to keep the nuclear program and control of the Strait of Hormuz in Iranian hands.

Dr. Friedman believes the negotiations are a “dialogue of the deaf”, as the United States demands concessions that Iran is unwilling to make. Meanwhile, the American siege is strangling the Iranian economy, and the situation is so dire that there may soon be no money even for medicine. He also expresses distrust in the mediating countries: Oman, which he says collaborates with Iran, Pakistan, and pro-Hamas Qatar.

Was the military strike in Iran the right move

In response to a listener’s question, Dr. Friedman argues that the military action in Iran was unavoidable, both because of Iran’s progress toward a nuclear bomb and because of its vast missile arsenal. He compares the situation to medical treatment: the initial strikes were like an urgent dose of antibiotics, and the joint war with the United States was a stronger dose. But now, the treatment has stopped, and the Iranian “cancer”, meaning the regime, continues to develop. According to him, stopping antibiotic treatment midway is dangerous, and the same is true in Iran’s case.

The Iranian people and the regime

Boris asks why the regime, which has been significantly weakened, has not yet fallen despite the protests. Dr. Friedman explains that the military blows were not enough to undermine the militias’ control of the streets. The regime still suppresses protests and also brings supporters out into the streets, who sometimes receive payment or food to participate in pro-regime demonstrations. He adds that the regime still has a loyal support base, mainly among the poor, religious, and rural classes, so it cannot be said that the majority in Iran opposes the regime.

Syria under Ahmed al-Sharaa

Dr. Friedman believes that Syria under the new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is more stable than it was under Assad’s rule. While Assad represented an Alawite minority that was completely dependent on Russia and Iran, al-Sharaa represents the country’s Sunni majority. Although he was a jihadist in the past, he presents himself as a moderate and is trying to unite the Syrian people. His stability rests on support from Turkey, and he has achieved successes such as overthrowing the Assad regime, taking control of Damascus and the coastal region, and eliminating the Kurdish autonomy. His main enemies today are more extreme jihadist organizations, like ISIS, who see him as a collaborator with the United States.

Syria, Lebanon, and Hezbollah

Contrary to fears that Hezbollah forces would enter Syria, Dr. Friedman estimates that the more likely scenario is that Ahmed al-Sharaa will try to enter Lebanon. Hezbollah is at a historic low: its budget from Iran has been cut, the land corridor through Syria is closed, and it has been forced to recruit young boys into its ranks. However, al-Sharaa is a cautious leader, and according to Dr. Friedman, he will not risk an invasion of Lebanon as long as he is not completely certain of Hezbollah’s weakness. Such an invasion could ignite a brutal civil war in which jihadists would slaughter Shias, which would trigger a harsh Iranian response with missile fire on Damascus. Such a scenario could plunge the entire region into a wider war. Meanwhile, the new regime in Syria has signed an agreement with the Lebanese government to cooperate in the war on drugs and terror, a move aimed at paralyzing Hezbollah’s operational channels.

The future of the refugees and the Alawite community

According to Dr. Friedman, Syria’s reconstruction is beginning slowly, with funds flowing from Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Qatar. The country has a chance to recover economically, unlike Iran, which is choked by sanctions. The return of refugees from Europe is slow, as the country cannot yet absorb them, and many of them are warning others on social media not to return.

At the same time, the situation of the Alawite community in Syria is catastrophic. After the fall of the Assad regime, a brutal campaign of revenge began against them, which included massacres, mass firings, and property confiscation. Dr. Friedman describes this as a “creeping murder”. The Alawites have no patron state to protect them. The small communities in Turkey and Lebanon are also threatened. The only community that is in a safe situation is the one in the village of Ghajar in Israel, whose members are Israeli citizens. According to him, the Alawite community is now paying the price for 50 years of rule by the Assad family, which promoted them and has now brought revenge upon them.

Geography before Middle East studies

Dr. Zaga begins by explaining why she defines herself first as a geographer and only then as a Middle East scholar. According to her, her main discipline is geography, and she examines how space, territory, borders, and trade and migration routes have influenced history. Culture and historical development are tools for understanding the space, and vice versa. She claims that the map provides many answers that are hard to find in historical texts. She emphasizes that a map is always a political document, since every decision, such as whom to include or exclude, or what to call a place (for example, the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf), is a political decision.

The historical importance of the strait

According to Dr. Zaga, the Strait of Hormuz has always been a major commercial crossroads through which trade between East and West passed. The strait is named after the island of Hormuz, which was one of the richest places in the world from the 11th to the 13th centuries. Traders there dealt in textiles, spices, gold, and especially pearls. She explains that the pearl industry was the region’s “ancient oil.” The shallow, warm water conditions on the Arabian side of the Gulf created an ideal environment for pearl cultivation, and pearl diving was the main source of income for the region’s tribes for centuries.

The strait’s strategic importance has attracted many powers throughout history. After the local Kingdom of Hormuz, the Portuguese took control of the area, followed by the Safavid Empire, the Omanis, the Qawasim tribe from the Arabian side, and finally the British.

The rise and fall of Julfar (Ras Al Khaimah)

Dr. Zaga notes that on ancient Muslim maps from the ninth and tenth centuries, familiar names like Hormuz and Musandam (the Omani peninsula) appear. Another important name was Julfar, which was a port city on the Arabian side, opposite Hormuz. Julfar is in fact modern-day Ras Al Khaimah, the northernmost emirate of the United Arab Emirates.

She explains that in the past, Julfar was the regional capital and the most important place in the northern part of the Arabian Gulf. Dubai and Abu Dhabi did not appear on maps at all until the 18th century. The Qawasim tribe, whose capital was Julfar, possessed the largest navy in the region after the fall of the Portuguese. Their power allowed them to expand, to chip away at territories loyal to the Sultan of Oman, and even to take control of parts of the Persian coast. This expansion is the historical reason why the Musandam Peninsula is today an Omani exclave, with no territorial contiguity with Oman.

Julfar’s fall came in 1820, when the British destroyed the Qawasim’s fleet. The British called the Qawasim’s collection of taxes from passing ships “piracy,” while the Qawasim saw it as their legitimate source of livelihood. The destruction of the fleet broke the power of the Al Qasimi family, and today their emirates, Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah, are considered weaker within the UAE.

Borders, tribes, and enclaves

Boris Gorelik asks about the situation of the tribes currently split between the UAE and Oman. Dr. Zaga replies that the border between the countries is a controlled international border with passport checks, unlike in the past. However, she notes a unique case of an enclave within an enclave called Madha-Nahwa, an area where the border is open and passage is free, based on the understanding that there is no point in conducting a full border procedure for a single settlement.

The Gulf states’ response to Iranian aggression

Towards the end of the episode, Boris Gorelik asks about recent Iranian attacks and the moderate response of the Gulf states, which appears to be a sign of weakness. Dr. Zaga explains that there was no united Gulf coalition against Iran. Saudi Arabia, as the region’s leader, was afraid of opening another front against the Houthis in Yemen. Qatar did not cooperate, and there was general disappointment with the United States’ defense capabilities. She adds that Israel’s involvement in the conflict was a complicating factor, as countries like Saudi Arabia did not want to be publicly identified with an Israeli action, unlike the UAE, which preferred security cooperation.

A temporary and non-final agreement

According to Mor Shapira, there are almost no significant voices in the Arab media who see the agreement as an American achievement. Most countries in the Arab world are not at peace with the agreement, and the only thing that slightly reassures them is the fact that it is a temporary agreement for a period of sixty days, which is not finally signed. The perception is that many things can still change during this period.

The Gulf states’ bear hug

Shapira explains that the Gulf states, led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, are experiencing deep disappointment with the United States, which they perceive as a “paper tiger.” They felt that the Americans did not adequately protect them from Iranian attacks, which hit not only American bases but also civilian infrastructure like hotels and airports.

As a result, these countries are recalculating their course. They cannot afford to give up American patronage, but they also understand that they cannot fight Iran directly. Their new strategy is what Shapira calls a “bear hug”: creating mutual economic dependence with Iran to deter it from future attacks.

Economic peace as a tool of deterrence

The Gulf perception, as Shapira describes it, is that if Iran’s economy, which is on the verge of collapse, becomes dependent on the funds, ports, and investments of the Gulf states, Tehran will have a lot to lose in the event of a conflict. Therefore, countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have rushed to offer Iran trade, investment, and tourism agreements. The goal is to make an attack against them unprofitable for Iran itself.

Qatar’s role as a mediator

Qatar, according to Shapira, is an excellent example of a country that has successfully implemented this strategy. It has fortified its position as an economic and political bridge between Iran and the Arab world, and as a result, has suffered the least damage. Qatar operates extensively behind the scenes, but also knows how to take center stage when necessary, as demonstrated by the prominent presence of its prime minister at the agreement’s signing ceremony, while the American vice president was pushed aside.

Coverage on Al Jazeera and in the Saudi media

Boris Gorelik asks about the coverage on the Qatari network Al Jazeera. Shapira replies that the coverage has become more complex than in the past. The network still gives an extensive platform to Iranian figures, but today its reporters also challenge them with tough questions about the harm to Arab countries.

In the Saudi media, by contrast, the general line is more cautious. There are voices criticizing the decision not to attack Iran, but they are not in the mainstream. The strong economic interest and the understanding that Iran is militarily stronger lead Saudi Arabia to adopt a line of relative silence and not to criticize the agreement publicly.

The Lebanese issue

The conversation turns to Iran’s linking of the Lebanese issue to the agreement. Shapira notes that contrary to the perception that Iran shows loyalty to its allies, there are Shiites in Lebanon who feel exploited. They claim that Iran is primarily concerned with its proxy, Hezbollah, and not with the broader Lebanese interest. They see the move as “too little, too late.”

The idea of sending Syria into Lebanon

Shapira analyzes the idea raised by Trump, that Syria should be allowed to “deal with” Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to her, this idea demonstrates a profound lack of understanding of the Middle East. She explains that such a move would ignore the Lebanese trauma from the Syrian occupation and could ignite a civil war that would actually serve Hezbollah, which would present itself as the protector of the Shiites against the “Sunni invaders.” In addition, she argues that the new Syrian regime does not have the military capability to confront an organization like Hezbollah.

The crisis of confidence in the United States

Boris Gorelik points to a series of American moves in recent decades that were perceived as a betrayal of allies. Shapira confirms that this is a widespread perception in the Arab world. The United States is seen as a fickle partner, motivated by short-term political considerations like gas prices and elections in the United States, rather than by long-term security in the region. President Trump, in particular, is perceived as a non-serious figure, and in the Arab media, he is even called “a dog that barks but doesn’t bite.”

“The poisoned chalice”: Survival as an Iranian victory

From an Iranian perspective, the agreement is compared to Khomeini’s famous “poisoned chalice,” when he was forced to agree to a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War to ensure the regime’s survival. Shapira explains that for the Iranians, survival itself is the victory. They call this “heroic flexibility.” The word for “surrender” (istislam) does not exist in their lexicon, and the guiding principle is that the regime’s survival comes before all else, even at the cost of painful compromises. Therefore, even if it appears outwardly that they have surrendered, from their perspective, they have won because the regime survived.

The rift at the top of the Iranian leadership

According to Dr. Eilam Gindin, Ashura is particularly relevant for understanding current events in Iran. She points to the uncertainty surrounding the condition of Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the late Supreme Leader. Since the assassination attempt on his life, Mojtaba has not been seen in public, and there are conflicting reports about his condition. While sources identified with the Revolutionary Guards leak that his face was disfigured, official channels continue to publish messages in his name.

She explains that this vacuum contributes to a visible rift between the government, headed by President Pezeshkian, and the Revolutionary Guards. She provides examples of this: the president apologized to the Gulf states for rocket fire, and a few hours later the Revolutionary Guards launched another barrage. Similarly, after a memorandum of understanding was reached to open the Strait of Hormuz, the Revolutionary Guards fired at ships in the Gulf. Hardline figures like Saeed Jalili, who expresses the position of the Revolutionary Guards, have even publicly questioned whether Mojtaba is behind the decisions made in his name, and demanded audio or video proof of his consent to the negotiations.

Negotiation as surrender

Boris asks why the Iranians see the recent memorandum of understanding with the West as a humiliating concession, while in the West it is perceived as a complete Iranian surrender. Dr. Eilam Gindin explains that for the hardline faction, the very act of conducting negotiations with the murderers of the leader is a deep humiliation and a betrayal of the promise to avenge his blood.

She describes an Iranian tactic known as “goldsmith’s haggling”. In this method, one side, the Revolutionary Guards, presents an extreme position to make the other side’s position, the government, seem like a reasonable compromise, even if it is still very high. It is possible that the protests against the agreement in Iran are part of such a performance, designed to show the West the internal pressure the government is under. However, she believes the rift at the top is also real, and is based on actual friction between the two bodies.

The mythological roots of Ashura

Dr. Eilam Gindin argues that the story of the Battle of Karbala is not just a historical event, but is constructed as a mythological story. She points to similarities to ancient Iranian mythology, such as the story of Iraj, the righteous youngest son who was murdered by his jealous brothers.

According to her, the story contains universal mythological motifs: the battle takes place on the tenth day of the year, Hussein has 72 companions, a typological number, like the 72 virgins, and he embodies the idea of the god or king who sacrifices himself to save the world at the new year. She finds connections to ancient Mesopotamian myths and even to Jewish traditions like Yom Kippur, in which the High Priest would risk his life by entering the Holy of Holies.

Martyrdom as victory

The central message of the Battle of Karbala, according to Dr. Eilam Gindin, is that an honorable death is preferable to a life of humiliation and surrender. This is the ethos of Imam Hussein, who chose to die rather than submit to the corrupt Caliph Yazid. This mentality gives the Iranian regime a significant advantage in negotiations. They are not afraid to lose in the conventional sense, because martyrdom (shahada) is considered the ultimate victory. According to Shi’a belief, a martyr’s (shahid’s) sins are forgiven, his body is pure, and he joins the Hidden Imam (the Mahdi) to return with him at the end of days. This belief is expressed in official mourning announcements about members of the Revolutionary Guards, which speak of their promotion to the rank of shahid and the date of their future return.

Constitution and political maneuvers

The conversation also touches on the Iranian constitution and succession struggles. Dr. Eilam Gindin explains that when Ali Khamenei was chosen to succeed Khomeini, he did not meet the constitutional requirements, since he was not a senior ayatollah. The constitution was amended and changed to suit him, in a move led by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who wanted to place a weak figure at the head of the state whom he could manipulate.

Rafsanjani’s plan failed. He forgot that the president’s term is limited to eight years, while the Supreme Leader serves for life. Over time, Khamenei accumulated power and it became clear that the president has no real authority. The current situation, in which Mojtaba Khamenei is positioned as the successor despite not meeting the religious and political criteria, is another example of how the constitution is bent for political needs.

A history of coexistence and enmity

According to Yisca Harani, the current phenomenon of contempt for Christians on the streets of Jerusalem is relatively new. She explains that although there were difficult days of violent conflict between Jews and Christians throughout history, there were also two thousand years of neighborliness and shared life. She argues that collective memory tends to sideline the positive periods, like economic and cultural cooperation, and to focus only on traumas and negative events. Harani emphasizes that Jews and Christians did not “bleed” for two thousand years without a break, and that Jewish communities flourished in Christian lands.

The theological root: Is Christianity idolatry?

Harani explains that Judaism’s account with Christianity is unique, and different from its relationship with Islam. While Islam is perceived in Judaism as a monotheistic faith, Christianity is perceived by many as idolatry. The reason for this lies in two central elements. The first is the idea that God was incarnated in a human body, Jesus, which contradicts the Jewish and Muslim concept of a transcendent God who has no physical form. The second is the principle of the Holy Trinity, which is perceived in Judaism as a plurality of gods, even though Christians themselves see it as different manifestations of one God. The use of statues and images in many Christian denominations reinforces this image of idolatry. Harani notes that the terminology Judaism used to fight paganism, like “you shall hew down the graven images of their gods,” is now directed at Christianity.

An internal Jewish dispute

However, Harani argues that Jewish legal ruling is not uniform on the subject. She presents quotes from rabbis throughout the generations who offered a more moderate approach. For example, she mentions a 12th-century legal authority who ruled that Christians of his time were not idolaters but held a belief of “shituf,” meaning, they believe in the God of Israel but associate another power with him. According to her, while shituf is forbidden for Jews, it is considered less severe than classic idolatry. She also quotes Nachmanides, who called Christians “inheritors of the Torah” because they adopted parts of it. Maimonides, she says, ruled that one should visit the sick of idolaters and assist them “for the sake of peace.” Harani emphasizes that the question is which sources one chooses to use.

The increase in the phenomenon in recent years

Harani reports a dramatic and shocking increase in the scope of harassment against Christians. According to her, not a day goes by in Jerusalem without a spitting incident. The phenomenon is not limited to the Old City and occurs in other places as well. She recounts incidents of slurs, disruption of religious processions, systematic vandalism of signs directing people to Christian sites, and even physical assaults. She claims that the vast majority of attackers are kippah-wearing Jews from all streams: Haredim, Hasidim, Litvaks, Shas supporters, and in recent years, also National-Religious Jews, including soldiers. She adds that labeling Christians as missionaries is a common way to justify harming them, even though only small groups, mainly Evangelicals, engage in active missionary work.

The response of the authorities and civil society

Boris asks why the police do not enforce the law, especially in the Old City which is covered with cameras. Harani replies that the police usually do not use their full capabilities, and many complaints are closed for lack of public interest or on the grounds that no suspect was found. She claims that only when there is international pressure do the police act effectively. She also criticizes the rabbinic leadership, which she says does not issue an unequivocal directive against the phenomenon, and the Jerusalem municipality, which does not act to put up signs against spitting or to increase the visibility of the Christian presence in the city. Faced with this inaction, she founded a volunteer organization whose goal is to protect Christians from harassment, document incidents, file complaints, and escort clergy who are afraid to walk alone. She sees this civil society activity as an optimistic bright spot.

The hostages: from asset to liability

According to Noa Shusterman Dvir, the abduction of the captives on October 7 was originally intended to secure the release of prisoners, but during the war they became a bargaining chip for Hamas’s self-preservation and an attempt to moderate the Israeli response. The dynamic changed when Hamas realized that holding the hostages was becoming a liability for its image and made it difficult to rally the international community to its side. Once it received sufficient guarantees that Israel would not return to intense fighting, the organization preferred to “get rid of” the hostages, return them to Israel, and receive the prisoners in return, as was its original goal.

The negotiations and guarantees for the cessation of fighting

Shusterman Dvir explains that after the first ceasefire, from which Israel returned to fighting, Hamas understood that the hostages were not a sufficient guarantee. Therefore, in all subsequent rounds of negotiations, it insisted on receiving international guarantees, mainly from the United States, that Israel would not resume fighting. The current framework, known as “President Trump’s 20-point plan,” is very similar to a previous framework from the Biden administration that Israel rejected. According to her, Netanyahu agreed to the current framework only after heavy American pressure. The agreement includes an Israeli commitment to the mediators, Egypt and Turkey, not to return to intense fighting, and this is why Hamas felt secure enough to release the hostages.

Why is Hamas still in power?

The main reason Hamas is still on its feet, Shusterman Dvir argues, is the lack of an alternative. In a place where the average wage is very low, whoever holds the power, resources, and weapons sets the agenda. Currently, there is no actor, military or administrative, capable of challenging Hamas in the Gaza Strip. She adds that another IDF ground incursion into the areas remaining under Hamas control is a difficult and dangerous mission, especially when the organization mainly holds light weapons and there is a significant buffer zone separating the Gazan population from Israel.

Hamas’s willingness to give up civilian control

From her conversations with Palestinian officials, Shusterman Dvir understands that Hamas has already given its consent in principle to transfer the administrative reins of the Strip. The organization understands that it is incapable of managing the reconstruction of the Strip, the cost of which is estimated at over 50 billion dollars. As a designated terrorist organization, Hamas will not receive the necessary funds from the international community, including from countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, it is willing to give up civilian administration, but the question is on what terms and what assets, mainly weapons, it wants to retain. Talks on the demilitarization of the Strip are taking place in Cairo, but Hamas refuses to discuss the mechanisms before Israel fulfills all its obligations under the “20-point plan.”

Humanitarian aid and the economy in the Strip

Hamas claims that Israel is not meeting its obligations under the agreement. For example, it is not allowing the entry of 600 aid trucks per day and is not permitting free movement at the Rafah crossing as it committed to do. The Strip’s economy today is almost entirely dependent on international humanitarian aid. International organizations purchase goods, sometimes in Israel, and bring them into the Strip. In the past, Israel tried to “dry up” the Strip of cash, which led to the development of a barter economy based on goods like cigarettes. Regarding weapons smuggling, Shusterman Dvir claims, based on conversations with security officials, that contrary to popular belief, most of the tunnels between Egypt and Gaza were already sealed in 2016.

An international stabilization force and Egypt’s role

As part of the “20-point plan,” discussions are being held about an international stabilization force. Turkey, which is involved in the mediation, will not be part of such a force, at Israel’s demand. The countries whose names have been raised as candidates to send troops are Morocco, Albania, Kosovo, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia. However, Indonesia, which was supposed to be the main contributor, has frozen its contacts, and there is a large gap between the number of soldiers required and the existing commitments. Shusterman Dvir emphasizes the importance of Egypt, which refuses to accept refugees for fear of importing terrorism into its territory and harming the peace agreement with Israel. She notes a worrying phenomenon of the formation of a new “Sunni quartet,” which includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. This axis, which is not a formal alliance, is intended to challenge Israel’s policy, and Israel needs to take it seriously to prevent a crisis in relations.