From a “both/and” policy to an assertive geopolitical player

According to Mor Shapiro, the United Arab Emirates has abandoned the “both/and” policy that characterized it and the other Gulf states for years. In the past, these countries tried to maintain good relations with all sides: with the axis of resistance and political Islam, as well as with the West, while promoting their economy and trade. Today, Shapiro explains, the UAE is taking a clear and unequivocal stance, thereby becoming the most controversial player in the Middle East.

The criticism against it stems not only from its normalization with Israel, which is now seen as “old news”, but mainly from its actions in other arenas: its involvement in the civil wars in Sudan and Yemen (where it joined forces with Saudi Arabia against the Houthis), and its determined war on what it calls “Islamic terrorism”. The UAE presents itself as an alternative and a new major player in the Arab world, a move that Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the region’s leader, does not like.

A rift with Saudi Arabia

One of the clearest expressions of the tension between the countries is the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC. According to Shapiro, although energy experts might see this as a minor drama, in the realm of inter-Arab relations it is an unprecedented act of defiance against Saudi Arabia, the organization’s leader. The move is seen as a demonstration of independence, especially regarding its policy toward Iran. While Saudi Arabia is pursuing an American-brokered agreement with Tehran, the UAE, which has suffered Iranian attacks, demands a tougher line.

Shapiro explains that leaving OPEC allows the UAE to flood the market with oil, lower prices, and thus directly harm Saudi Arabia’s economic plans, such as “Vision 2030”. The move is perceived as a betrayal, especially after the close cooperation between the two countries in the war in Yemen and the boycott of Qatar. Shapiro adds that there is also a personal dimension, as the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, was once a protégé of the UAE’s ruler, Mohammed bin Zayed.

“The Eastern Israel”

The main reason for the hostility toward the UAE, Shapiro argues, is its normalization with Israel. She quotes the Palestinian academic Azzam Tamimi, who claims that the UAE has always aspired to be an ally of Israel, and that the Arab world and Iran believe it has collaborated with Israel and the United States in the war against Iran. The former president of Tunisia, Moncef Marzouki, even called the UAE “the Eastern Israel whose capital is Abu Dhabi,” and claimed it is a tool in Israel’s hands.

Threats also come from Iran. An Iranian member of parliament stated that after the United States withdraws from the region, Iran will “put the UAE through hell”. Iranian officials often mock the UAE’s tiny size, claiming they could return it to the era when its inhabitants rode camels.

Acquiring strategic assets

Shapiro describes how the UAE uses its economic power not just for donations, but to acquire strategic national assets in other countries to establish its political influence.

• Egypt: The UAE saved the Egyptian economy from collapse through a massive deal to develop a coastal strip near Alexandria. This investment, along with acquiring holdings in companies, banks, and ports, has given Abu Dhabi enormous leverage over Cairo, and it is one of the reasons Egypt refrains from sharp public criticism of Israel.
• Jordan: The UAE is financing the “water for electricity” deal between Israel and Jordan. Jordan’s dependence on Emirati funds prevents King Abdullah from taking steps against the peace agreement with Israel or against the UAE’s normalization moves.
• Sudan: The UAE has signed agreements to build and operate new ports on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, thereby securing control over a vital international shipping lane.

Military intervention and Palestinian ingratitude

Contrary to its past image, the UAE has become militarily involved in regional conflicts. It has used American mercenaries in Yemen, and it actively supports the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Sudanese civil war, which led the Sudanese government to file a genocide complaint against it at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian street, which previously benefited from extensive economic aid from the UAE, now sees it as a traitor. In Gaza, they burn pictures of Mohammed bin Zayed, and humanitarian aid from the UAE is seen as a “Trojan horse” intended to promote Hamas’s enemy, Mohammed Dahlan, who lives in Abu Dhabi and serves as an advisor to bin Zayed.

The beginning of the conflict: The Ba’ath Party and the Shiites

To understand the roots of the war, Baram argues, one must go back to 1968, with the rise of the Ba’ath Party to power in Iraq. Its rise immediately created tension with the Shiite population, which constituted a majority in the country, for several reasons. First, the Ba’ath was an extremely secular party, with atheistic foundations. Its spiritual founder, Michel Aflaq, was a Christian. This secularism was hard for the traditional Shiite public to digest.

Second, Saddam Hussein, who was the strongman of the regime, was paranoid and ruled with an iron fist. He infiltrated intelligence agents into the madrasas (religious schools) in the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala and tightened control over them, which caused great anger.

The third reason was the Ba’ath’s pan-Arab ideology. The Shiites in Iraq, although Arabic speakers, constitute a majority of about 55 percent of the country. However, in a unified pan-Arab state, they would have become a negligible minority of just a few percent within a Sunni Arab world. Therefore, most of them opposed the idea.

The Algiers Agreement and the Shiite opposition

The tension with the Shiites worsened following the intervention of the Iranian Shah. In 1969, the Shah unilaterally canceled the 1936 border agreement concerning the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which was vital for Iraq, and began to undermine the Ba’ath regime through agents who instigated Shiite rebellions. The regime brutally suppressed the rebellions and deported tens of thousands of Shiites to Iran.

In 1975, a surprising turn of events occurred. Saddam Hussein and the Shah signed the “Algiers Agreement,” which resolved the border dispute. In return, the Shah ceased his support for the Kurdish rebels in Iraq and stopped his subversion among the Shiites. However, according to Baram, the Shiite movement against the Ba’ath had already gained its own momentum. The internal opposition was led by a charismatic cleric, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and his party, “Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya.” In 1977, massive demonstrations broke out again and were suppressed. In response, the Ba’ath regime officially declared that the Sharia (Islamic law) was null and void, a step perceived as a grave provocation.

The rise of Khomeini and his personal score with Saddam

The Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979 changed everything. Its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, had a personal score to settle with Saddam Hussein. Khomeini had been living in exile in the Iraqi city of Najaf since the 1960s. As long as Saddam was the Shah’s enemy, Khomeini indirectly supported him. However, the Algiers Agreement made Saddam a friend of the Shah, Khomeini’s bitter enemy.

Worse still, in 1978, at the Shah’s request, Saddam expelled Khomeini from Iraq. Baram explains that this was a stinging insult in Arab tradition, but ironically, the expulsion served Khomeini’s interests. He went to Paris, where he gained global media exposure that allowed him to manage the revolution from afar, free from the surveillance of Iraqi intelligence.

After rising to power, Khomeini became an existential threat to Saddam’s regime. He was a personal enemy, a fundamentalist religious leader versus a secular ruler, and a Shiite leader who called for liberating the Shiite holy sites from Sunni rule. Khomeini also canceled the Algiers Agreement, thereby threatening to choke Iraq’s only sea outlet.

The decision to go to war

Baram describes a secret recording of a meeting of the Iraqi leadership from September 15, 1980, in which Saddam presented his reasons for going to war. He had four main reasons. The first was the internal problem, meaning the Shiite threat, which was only mentioned implicitly. The second was the strategic threat to the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The third was the desire to humiliate Khomeini, “to rub his face in the mud,” and to prove to the Shiites that their leader was weak.

The fourth reason, and perhaps the decisive one, was the assessment that Iran’s army was dismantled. Khomeini had purged the regular army he inherited from the Shah, and Saddam believed his own strong and well-equipped army would easily win the war. Baram notes that Israeli intelligence also assessed at the time that Saddam was planning an attack, but mistakenly thought the target was Israel.

Another catalyst for the decision was an assassination attempt by the “Dawa” party against the Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, in April 1980. In response, Saddam executed the leader of “Dawa,” Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Khomeini reacted with a public call to the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam’s regime. From Saddam’s perspective, there was no choice but to launch a preemptive strike.

The eve of the invasion: Miscalculations

According to Baram, both sides miscalculated. Saddam and his leadership, with few exceptions, were confident of a quick victory. Even his minister of defense, who was a professional, was forced to answer in the affirmative when asked if the army could win.

On the Iranian side, army commanders asked Khomeini for permission to retreat to the Zagros Mountains to reorganize the army, but he flatly refused. He promised to send the young “Revolutionary Guards,” who he claimed would fight “like lions.” Baram concludes that the Iraqi attack, which was intended to exploit the division in Iran, achieved the opposite result: it united the divided Iranian people behind Khomeini, and the opposition to him almost completely disappeared.

The background to the war

According to Pesach Malovany, the war, which lasted eight years, expressed historical hostility between the two regimes and the two countries. The background to the war is composed of several factors. First, a long-standing border dispute, which focused on the Shatt al-Arab river, a vital sea outlet for both countries for oil exports. Second, traditional hostility between Arabs and Persians and between Sunnis and Shiites. Added to all this was the political rivalry between the secular Ba’ath regime in Iraq and the revolutionary Islamic regime that came to power in Iran in 1979. In the same year, Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq, and he saw the revolution in Iran as an opportunity to exploit its weakness. The new Iranian regime, for its part, worked to destabilize Iraq, supported the Shiite opposition, and was even involved in an assassination attempt against the Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz.

National loyalty versus sectarian identity

Boris asks if national identity overcame ethnic and religious identity in the war. Malovany answers in the affirmative. He explains that the Iraqi leadership assumed that the Arab population in Iran’s Khuzestan province would rise up and join the invading forces, but in reality, the Arab residents of the province fought against the Iraqi army. Similarly, the majority of the Iraqi army was composed of Shiite soldiers, and they fought fiercely against the Iranian Shiites. According to him, loyalty to the state and the flag trumped all other considerations.

The balance of power and the course of the war

Malovany describes the balance of power at the start of the war. Iran had the advantages of a much larger population (39 million versus 14 million) and strategic depth. On the other hand, its army, which was equipped with Western weapons, was greatly weakened following the revolution and the American embargo. The Iraqi army, in contrast, had grown much stronger since 1973 and was the largest army in the Middle East, with 12 divisions and about 3,000 tanks.

The war, according to Malovany, was divided into several stages. It began with a surprise Iraqi attack on September 22, 1980, which included a broad air strike in an attempt to imitate Israel’s “Operation Moked.” The strike failed to neutralize the Iranian air force, and the ground forces struggled to advance and suffered heavy losses, for example in the battle for the city of Khorramshahr.

After the Iraqis were stopped, the initiative passed to the Iranian side. In the spring of 1982, in a successful counter-offensive, the Iranians managed to expel all Iraqi forces from their territory. Saddam Hussein ordered a full withdrawal to the international border and offered to end the war, but the Iranians refused. From then on, the war became a series of Iranian attempts to invade Iraq and topple Saddam’s regime, mainly in the Basra sector. For years, a bloody war of attrition was waged, which included the Iranian use of “human wave attacks” and the recruitment of children to the front.

The decision and the end

An important turning point came in March 1986, when the Iranians managed to surprise the Iraqis and capture the al-Faw Peninsula in southern Iraq. Malovany describes this as Iraq’s biggest intelligence and operational failure of the war. Following this success, Iran declared a “year of decision” and planned huge offensives, but these failed and exacted a terrible price in human lives, which broke the spirit of volunteerism among the Iranian public.

In April 1988, after lengthy preparations, the Iraqi army launched a series of blitzkrieg attacks. Within two days they liberated the al-Faw Peninsula, and in further attacks along the front, they completely collapsed the Iranian military array. Thousands of Iranian soldiers were taken prisoner, and the Iranian army lost its ability to fight. The difficult military situation, along with Iraqi missile attacks on Tehran and other cities, forced Khomeini, in his own words, to “drink the cup of poison” and agree to a ceasefire in August 1988.

Malovany concludes that one of the war’s important legacies was the legitimization of using ballistic missiles against population centers, a phenomenon that influenced future conflicts in the region.

The founding of Pakistan

According to Dr. Reichental, Pakistan is a young country established in 1947 as part of the partition of British India. The demand for a separate Muslim state, led by the Muslim League, gained momentum in the 1940s. Initially, it was seen as a bargaining chip against the Indian National Congress party, which aspired to a united, secular India. However, the British, who were exhausted after World War II and wanted to “pack up shop” and leave, ultimately agreed to the partition.

Boris Gorelik remarks that it is easy to blame the British for all the world’s troubles, but Dr. Reichental clarifies that in this case, the hasty and chaotic manner in which the partition was carried out, in just six weeks, is the root of many of Pakistan’s fundamental problems. The process of transferring authority was flawed, the borders were drawn problematically, creating a state split into two wings (West and East Pakistan, now Bangladesh), and the regions that made up the new country were underdeveloped frontier areas of the empire. The civil establishment was weak, and within about a decade the army, which was the only organized body, seized power in a coup. Since then, Reichental argues, the army has been the dominant factor in Pakistani politics, even more so than in Egypt.

The nuclear program

The decision to develop nuclear weapons was made, according to Dr. Reichental, following the greatest trauma in the country’s history: the 1971 war, in which Pakistan lost its eastern part (Bangladesh) to India. The new prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was obsessed with the idea of the bomb and said that Pakistanis would eat grass if necessary, but they would get a nuclear weapon. India’s nuclear test in 1974 only accelerated the efforts.

Initially, Pakistan tried to pursue the plutonium route, but American pressure on France torpedoed a deal to purchase a plutonium separation facility. Pakistan then turned to the path of uranium enrichment using centrifuges, a technology that was less common at the time. The knowledge was brought by the scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who worked at the European nuclear consortium and offered his services to the Pakistani government. Thanks to him, Pakistan had fissile material as early as the beginning of the 1980s.

Involvement in the Middle East

Dr. Reichental explains that all of Pakistan’s foreign policy stems from the conflict with India. Pakistan is at an inherent disadvantage against its giant neighbor and always fears an existential threat from it. Its aspiration is to achieve a strategic balance with India, a goal it will probably never achieve. One of the ways to overcome this disadvantage is to recruit support from Middle Eastern countries.

After 1971, Pakistan turned to the Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia, and developed close ties with them: it received extensive economic aid, and in return provided military assistance, training, and even stationed forces to defend the Saudi kingdom. At the same time, it used its nuclear technology to gain strategic depth. It provided nuclear knowledge to Iran, hoping Iran would support it against India, and Saudi Arabia also generously funded the nuclear program, likely in exchange for a future nuclear umbrella.

Mediation in the Iranian crisis

In the current crisis between Iran and the United States, Pakistan has become a mediator almost by default, after Iran attacked other potential mediators. According to Dr. Reichental, Pakistan is very afraid of a war, which could lead to a catastrophe for it. One scenario is the fall of the regime in Iran and the rise of a pro-Western regime, which would become another hostile front for Pakistan. A second scenario is the dismantling of the Iranian nuclear program, a move that Pakistanis believe would make them the next target of nuclear disarmament efforts, due to their problematic history of proliferating nuclear technology. In addition, the war creates internal tensions in Pakistan, which is home to the world’s largest Shia minority outside of Iran.

Therefore, the goal of the mediation is to prevent the renewal of the war. Pakistan’s influence on the parties is limited, but it can convey messages and help de-escalate tensions. Success in mediation would allow it to score points in Washington, which are essential for receiving economic and military aid, and also to prove to Saudi Arabia that it is fulfilling its part of their defense pact through diplomatic means.

Relations with Israel

To the question about the chance of normalization with Israel, Dr. Reichental responds in the negative. He tells of a missed window of opportunity in 2005, when the foreign ministers of the two countries met, but the move was not realized. Today, public opinion in Pakistan is very hostile to Israel, and the country is one of the most antisemitic in the world. The main obstacle, he says, is Israel’s close strategic ties with India. Pakistanis see Israel as a factor that helped their great enemy, especially in the 1999 Kargil War, when Israel provided India with critical military aid that decided the campaign.

What is OPEC?

According to Eran Efrat, OPEC is a cartel of oil-producing countries founded in 1960 by Iraq, Kuwait, Venezuela, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates joined in 1967 (as Abu Dhabi) and became the organization’s third-largest producer. The cartel’s goal is to advance the interests of its member states, mainly by coordinating production quantities and prices, to prevent competition that would lower prices and hurt their profits. Efrat explains that unlike the United States, where energy companies are private, OPEC member states have state-owned oil companies. This allows them to use oil not just as a source of income, but also as geopolitical leverage, as happened during the 1973 Arab oil embargo. Later, “OPEC Plus” was established, a cooperation agreement with additional countries, led by Russia.

The United States enters the market

Efrat describes how the entry of the United States as a major player in the oil market in 2015 changed the rules of the game. The American interest, he explains, is the opposite of OPEC’s: the United States wants a low oil price because it is both a large producer and a large consumer, and the price of fuel directly affects its economy. Efrat details why the United States both exports and imports oil. In the 1970s, Americans believed their light, sweet crude was about to run out, so they built refineries suited for heavy, sour crude from Canada and Mexico. Later, shale oil technology uncovered vast reserves of light crude, but the refineries were already adapted for the other type. Therefore, the United States exports its light crude and imports heavy crude that is suitable for its refineries.

The reasons for the UAE’s withdrawal

The main reason for the United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from the cartel, according to Efrat, is the production limits OPEC imposes on it. The UAE has invested large sums to increase its production capacity, understanding that the future of fossil fuels is limited. The country’s Vision 2071 foresees a world with no need for these fuels, so its interest is to sell as much oil as possible while it is still in demand. As a member of the cartel, it cannot sell as it wishes and depends on quotas set by the organization, which is largely controlled by Saudi Arabia. Withdrawing from OPEC would allow the UAE to sell its oil independently, without depending on the Saudis, and even to sign private agreements based on other interests, such as arms deals. Efrat notes that there are no sanctions for leaving the organization, as proven by Qatar and Angola, which left in recent years.

Implications of the move

According to Efrat, the departure of the UAE, such a central producer, could be the first step toward the cartel’s dissolution. For consumers, such a dissolution is good news, because it would increase competition and lead to lower prices. He emphasizes that relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE were particularly close, and they used to make joint decisions. Therefore, this separation is more significant than similar moves in the past. Against the backdrop of the global transition to renewable energy, especially in China, other countries might conclude that they should also withdraw and sell their oil before the market disappears. However, Efrat estimates that in the immediate term, the effect on the price of gas at the pump will not be significant.

Nuclear energy and the future of energy in Israel

Boris Gorelik asks about nuclear energy in the Gulf. Efrat confirms that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are indeed advancing in the development of nuclear energy, alongside solar power and green hydrogen, as part of their preparations for the post-oil era. In contrast, he argues that Israel is lagging in this field. Efrat suggests that Israel should promote joint projects with its neighbors, such as Jordan, in areas like water desalination or nuclear energy. He believes that such a project, based on small, modern nuclear reactors, would be more beneficial than turning Israel into a land corridor for transporting oil, an idea he sharply criticizes. According to him, cooperation on infrastructure and energy is the key to advancing geopolitical interests in the region.

The Arabs’ opening position in 1947

According to Prof. Benny Morris, the Arabs of Palestine entered the 1947-48 conflict with a clear demographic advantage, outnumbering the Jews two to one, and enjoyed potential support from the Arab and Muslim world. They felt self-confident. However, they did not recognize and did not want to recognize the Jewish claims to the land, and Jewish history or the Holocaust did not interest them. As early as the late 19th century, Prof. Morris explains, Arab intellectuals warned that Zionism aimed to take over the land and displace the Arabs. This fear, combined with the lack of recognition of Jewish aspirations, led them to believe that Arab and Muslim power would prevent the establishment of a Jewish state.

The development of Palestinian identity

Boris asks when the Arabs of the land began to see themselves as a separate Palestinian people. Prof. Morris believes the process began in the 1920s. According to him, it was a byproduct of geopolitical changes: the British conquest of the land and its separation from Greater Syria, which fell under French rule. The Arabs in the land understood that their political future was tied to the British and the Zionist challenge, not to what was happening in Damascus. From that moment, they began to think of themselves less as “Southern Syrians” and more as Palestinians. He emphasizes that most of the population was not political, but this national consciousness finally crystallized around 1948.

The choice of war

Prof. Morris explains that the war did not begin with a central order from the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, but rather spontaneously, with local violent incidents that escalated into a civil war. The Arab leadership faced three options: accept the UN partition plan, accept Jewish rule, or go to war. They chose war. According to him, given their state of mind at the time, they probably could not have chosen differently. Their mindset was not built for compromise with the Jews.

The advantages of the Yishuv

The Jewish side, in contrast, enjoyed several crucial advantages. The Yishuv had succeeded in establishing a “state within a state” with functioning institutions. Additionally, it had great economic superiority, which was strengthened during the war by extensive donations from American Jewry. These funds enabled the purchase of weapons and the continuation of civilian functions. The Arab armies, except for the well-trained Jordanian Legion, lacked the resources, equipment, or training for a war beyond their borders. They were primarily designed to protect the regimes at home.

After the 1948 war

The defeat in the war left the Arab world with a sense of humiliation and a desire for revenge. At the same time, they recognized that Israel was strong. Prof. Morris notes that the establishment of the Jewish state also created a geographical disconnect between the eastern and western parts of the Arab world, which greatly bothered them. The “Three Nos” resolution at the 1967 Khartoum Summit was an expression of this humiliation, but according to him, this stance did not last long. After the 1973 war, which was perceived in the Arab world as an achievement, it was psychologically easier for leaders like Anwar Sadat to accept Israel’s existence and turn to peace.

Prospects for peace and the pessimistic future

Prof. Morris is pessimistic about the future. He argues that a true regional peace is not possible without a solution to the Palestinian problem, meaning the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. He believes this is a necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, condition for ending the conflict. According to him, Israel has rarely offered such a solution over the years, and even when it did (during the Barak and Olmert eras), the Palestinians refused. He adds another pessimistic layer: Jewish society in Israel is becoming more religious and right-wing, and support for the two-state solution is eroding. Meanwhile, Palestinian terrorism and rejectionism on the Arab side reinforce this trend. Without peace with the Palestinians, he warns, the existence of the State of Israel will ultimately be endangered.

The civil war in Sudan

According to Dr. Koren, since April 15, 2023, a war has been raging in Sudan between the two generals who have led the country since the 2019 coup: the de facto president, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his former deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. Hemedti, who was Burhan’s partner in the coup and also in signing the Abraham Accords, launched a rebellion to seize power. The war has already claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, created millions of refugees, and led to severe famine and massacres defined as genocide. The country’s economic situation is on the verge of collapse.

International involvement: Who supports whom

Dr. Koren explains that each of the warring sides has enlisted international support. General Burhan, the incumbent president, is supported by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. In contrast, the rebel Hemedti is backed by the United Arab Emirates.

A turning point occurred in October 2023, when Burhan, after Israel and other countries refused to supply him with weapons, turned to Iran for help. He justified this by saying he would take weapons even from the devil. Iran supplied him with UAVs and other weapons, which led to military successes for his forces.

The Iranian involvement caused a shift in Russia’s position. Russia, which initially supported Hemedti (who had provided it with financial aid at the start of the invasion of Ukraine), switched sides and began supporting Burhan. Thus, Burhan now enjoys a broad coalition of supporters that includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Russia.

Regional rivalries: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar

The conflict in Sudan, according to Dr. Koren, is also an arena for regional power struggles. Qatar, which supports Burhan, is running a media campaign against the United Arab Emirates, partly through cartoons and fake news on the Al Jazeera network. In one cartoon, for example, Israel was depicted as a puppeteer controlling the UAE, thereby being falsely accused of complicity in the genocide in Sudan.

Dr. Koren notes that there is also a rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which was previously evident in the war in Yemen. However, recent Iranian aggression has caused them to reduce their disagreements and focus on the common threat.

Sudan as a gateway to Africa

Dr. Koren emphasizes Sudan’s strategic importance as a gateway to the Sahel region, a strip of 11 countries crossing Africa. Russia, through the Wagner Group, has used its foothold in Sudan to expand its influence into countries like Chad and Niger, while ousting traditional French influence through a series of military coups.

This takeover is part of an effort by an axis that includes Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Iran, for example, has a clear interest in reaching Niger, one of the world’s largest uranium producers.

The implications for Israel

Sudan’s rapprochement with Iran represents a reversal of the trend of recent years, which included disengaging from the axis of terror and joining the Abraham Accords. Dr. Koren warns that one of the conditions for lifting sanctions on Sudan was combating terrorist elements, chief among them the Muslim Brotherhood. Now, there are reports of Muslim Brotherhood members returning to Burhan’s army. This combination, along with support from Iran and Pakistan, could turn Sudan back into a state sponsor of terrorism.

According to him, the situation in Sudan cannot be resolved separately from the broader regional conflict. As long as the international picture, particularly the confrontation between Iran and the West, does not become clearer, no significant change is expected in Sudan.

Support from Israel’s friends in Africa

At the end of the conversation, Boris asks about the pro-Israel statements of a senior official in the Ugandan army. Dr. Koren explains this in the context of the widespread Christian Evangelical faith in Africa. Many Christian communities in Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia believe in the Bible and the Jewish people’s right to the Land of Israel. This support also stems from the common struggle against radical Islam, which threatens Christians in Africa. Therefore, when Iran threatens Israel, these voices rally to its defense, sometimes in creative ways.

A historical pattern of changing enemies

Dr. Friedman begins by explaining a historical pattern in which the elimination of one enemy leads to the emergence of a new one. He provides several examples: the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, which marked the decline of the “Sunni axis,” occurred concurrently with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which created a new enemy. In Lebanon, the expulsion of the PLO led to the rise of Amal and Hezbollah. In the Palestinian arena, the Oslo Accords with Fatah led to the strengthening of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Now, he asks, who will rise after Iran and Hezbollah are weakened in the current war.

Syria under Julani: A new old threat

In Dr. Friedman’s view, the answer is Syria under the leadership of Ahmed al-Shara (al-Julani). He describes Julani as a veteran, multifaceted terrorist, a former senior al-Qaeda figure, who is merely changing his form to gain international legitimacy. Friedman rejects the notion that Julani has moderated, pointing to the growing jihadist atmosphere in Syria, extremist educational content, and demonstrations at Damascus University reminiscent of ISIS.

To understand the roots of the current regime, Friedman goes back to the Syrian civil war that broke out in 2011. The revolution began as a popular uprising of citizens demanding change, and a moderate, secular opposition even emerged. However, according to him, Islamist elements, led by Julani, who was then the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, “stole the revolution.” Julani was sent to Syria by the leader of al-Qaeda to exploit the chaos and establish a jihadist force. The ideological difference between him and ISIS was small, but Julani adopted a more pragmatic tactic of cooperating with other organizations. In every area his forces conquered, he violently deposed the local committees and established committees that imposed Sharia law.

The anti-Israeli radicalization in the new Syria

Dr. Friedman notes that the proposed Israeli law to impose the death penalty on terrorists sparked an unprecedented wave of demonstrations in Syria. The protesters chanted distinctly anti-Jewish slogans, such as “Khaybar, Khaybar, ya Yahud,” and calls for the liberation of al-Aqsa. The demonstrations spread throughout the country, from Damascus to Aleppo, which, he claims, indicates direction from the regime. Julani, he says, could have stopped the protests but chose not to.

Friedman wonders why the Syrians are not expressing gratitude to Israel for weakening their common enemies, the Assad regime and the Shiite axis. He recalls that Israel even provided humanitarian aid to wounded Syrians, including jihadists, as part of the “Good Neighbor” project. However, he also presents the Syrian perspective, which includes complaints about the Israeli presence in the Golan, the IDF’s takeover of the UN buffer zone after the fall of Assad, and the harm to local farmers. Additionally, there is a perception that Israel supports the Druze and encourages the breakup of Syria into cantons.

The “Syrian solution” to the Hezbollah problem

The discussion moves to the Lebanese front and the question of how to defeat Hezbollah. Since Israel does not want to enter Beirut and the Lebanese army is incapable of doing so, a dangerous idea arises: allowing Julani’s army to enter Lebanon and eliminate Hezbollah, his bitter enemy from the civil war. According to Friedman, there are suspicions of cooperation between Julani and elements in Lebanon, and he might receive international legitimacy for such a move.

But Friedman warns that this is a catastrophic scenario. Iran and the Shiite militias in Iraq have already threatened to invade Syria if such a move occurs. It is more likely that Julani will wait for Israel to exhaust Hezbollah, and only then will he seize the opportunity to take over not just Damascus but also Beirut. The result would be the expansion of a hostile jihadist regime’s rule to the Mediterranean Sea, a move that would fulfill the vision of “Greater Syria” and pose a far more severe threat than a weakened Hezbollah.

No magic solutions

The host, Boris Gorelik, asks about alternatives, such as the rise of the Amal movement in place of Hezbollah or the establishment of a Druze-Christian buffer state. Dr. Friedman is pessimistic. He argues that decades of brainwashing by Hezbollah have created a deep-seated hatred that is difficult to uproot, similar to the extremist education now provided by the Syrian regime. As for a Druze state, he explains that the Druze would not agree to rule over Shiite areas in southern Lebanon to gain access to the sea. In conclusion, he notes that the only optimistic point at the moment is the United States joining the war against the Iranian axis, and he expresses hope that an era of agreements will follow the wars.

Turkey’s position on the conflict with Iran

According to Dr. Levy-Daphny, Turkey is not silent about the war, and the issue receives extensive coverage in the Turkish press. However, in Israel, the discourse on Turkey tends to be superficial. Turkey issued a stern warning to Iran after Iranian missiles fired at Israel were intercepted in its airspace by NATO batteries. Iran, for its part, denied that the missiles were fired from its territory toward Turkey.

Despite the incident, Turkey is not interested in a military escalation with Iran. According to Dr. Levy-Daphny, this has been a consistent policy for the last 20 years. The two countries have disagreements and conflicts in various arenas, such as Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, but they operate mechanisms to contain the conflicts to prevent a direct military confrontation. Turkey has more to lose than to gain from such a confrontation. Therefore, despite its criticism of the Iranian attacks, Turkey will not join a military effort against Iran alongside the United States.

Pragmatic foreign policy

Boris asks if Turkey aspires to be not only a diplomatic power but also a military player, and how this aligns with its desire to avoid confrontations. Dr. Levy-Daphny explains that Turkish foreign policy is pragmatic and multi-layered. There are arenas where Turkey uses military force, such as in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, and arenas where it refrains from doing so, as in the case of Iran.

Turkey’s membership in NATO is a key factor. The alliance restricts Turkey, which cannot side with Iran, but it also provides it with protection, as demonstrated by the NATO air defense batteries stationed on its territory. Turkey sees itself as an important part of the alliance and is not considering leaving it, despite past tensions, such as those surrounding the purchase of the Russian defense system.

In northern Syria, for example, Turkey has maintained military bases since the beginning of the civil war to protect its long border, mainly in the Kurdish context. It remains a significant military, political, and diplomatic force in Syria.

Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran

In the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Turkey provided significant military assistance to Azerbaijan, including drones. The bond between the two countries is deep and goes beyond military support. It is based on identity, cultural, and linguistic proximity, under the slogan “two states, one nation.” This bond began to strengthen after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Boris notes Israel’s strong ties with Azerbaijan and asks why Iran refrains from attacking it, despite claims that Israeli aircraft might take off from its territory to attack Iran. Dr. Levy-Daphny notes that this is an interesting question and explains that the Iranian attacks were mainly aimed at targets identified with the United States.

The fear of a refugee crisis

One of Turkey’s biggest fears regarding an escalation with Iran is a stream of refugees. The border between the countries is long and difficult to fully secure. Turkey is still dealing with the economic and political consequences of absorbing over three million refugees from Syria, a crisis that has caused severe social tensions. Despite the aid it received from Europe, absorbing the refugees was a heavy burden. Therefore, Turkey is working to prevent a similar flow of refugees from Iran.

Economic relations and the future of the Iranian regime

Sanctions on Iran have harmed trade between it and Turkey, and its volume stands at only about three percent of total Turkish trade. However, trade has not ceased and includes strategic components like gas: 13% of Turkey’s gas consumption comes from Iran.

According to Dr. Levy-Daphny, Turkey’s interest is the fall of the ayatollahs’ regime. A different regime in Iran, one that is more open to the West, would allow Turkey to realize the immense economic potential inherent in the relations between the two countries. She emphasizes that Turkey and Iran should not be compared. Despite the problems in the Turkish regime, it is a country that operates completely differently from Iran and does not try to export its state model in the same ways.

Turkey as a regional mediator

In Turkey, there is strong anti-Israeli public opinion, directed mainly at the policies of the current leadership. The prevailing perception is that Israel is dragging the region into a dangerous escalation. Accordingly, Turkey opposes the war and offers itself as a mediator. Dr. Levy-Daphny explains that Turkey sees itself as a player that can talk to all sides, and it does indeed pass messages between the Americans and the Iranians. This role is not new, and Turkey has served as a mediator in the past, for example in negotiations between Israel and Syria during the Olmert era.

Methodology: Understanding Iran

According to Alex Grinberg, the media narrative of the regime’s imminent fall is a misrepresentation. He emphasizes that no official, neither in Israel nor in the United States, has set the overthrow of the regime as a war objective. The stated goal is to remove the existential threat, and in the process, create conditions that will allow the Iranian people to act.

Grinberg adds that a necessary condition for understanding Iranian society and politics is knowledge of the Persian language. He compares this to a physicist, who cannot practice their field without knowing mathematics. He claims that assessments of Iranian society by experts who do not speak Persian are worthless.

Eliminating the regime, not overthrowing it

Boris Gorelik asks if the Iranian threat can be removed without overthrowing the regime, and who is expected to sign a surrender. Grinberg replies that one should not expect a formal surrender or a white flag, as happened with Nazi Germany, nor an orderly transfer of power like in Spain after Franco or in the Soviet Union. According to him, military and political terms are not mathematical formulas, but are context-dependent.

He distinguishes between “overthrowing a regime” and “eliminating a regime.” While the regime will not be officially overthrown, it will be eliminated in practice. The strategic threat, such as the ballistic missiles, has already been largely removed, and the IDF continues to hunt the few remaining launchers.

The Iranian regime as a mafia organization

To explain the logic behind eliminating the regime, Grinberg compares its conduct to that of a mafia organization. According to him, the mafia has several rules of conduct:

1. It does not plan for the long term and does not prepare an alternative plan. Presenting a plan B is seen as a challenge to the leadership.
2. All its members are partners in crime and mutually responsible for one another. They have nowhere to run, so they fight to the end.
3. It goes for broke, and ultimately loses.

This comparison explains why the regime will not surrender, but also why it is expected to crumble under sustained pressure.

Damaging the regime’s capabilities

Grinberg describes how military activity systematically damages the regime’s capabilities for control and oppression. He notes that air force strikes focus, among other things, on stadiums used as assembly areas for the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards. Hitting these places prevents them from organizing and disperses their forces.

Additionally, he points to a phenomenon of Basij and Revolutionary Guards personnel being eliminated by small drones. Since these are short-range tools, the conclusion is that the operators are inside Iran. This indicates extensive cooperation by Iranian citizens with the attacking forces, including providing real-time coordinates of targets.

Will Iran break apart?

Boris Gorelik asks if Iran might break apart into separate ethnic states, as some commentators claim. Grinberg firmly rejects this possibility. He explains that most ethnic minorities in Iran, such as the Azeris, Kurds, and Baloch, see themselves first and foremost as Iranians. He gives the example of the Iran-Iraq War, in which the Arabs of Khuzestan province fought for Iran against Saddam Hussein’s army, and the Shiites in Iraq fought for their country against Iran.

Furthermore, neighboring countries have no interest in Iran’s breakup. Azerbaijan, for example, would not want to absorb tens of millions of Azeris from Iran, and Iraqi Kurdistan would not support the establishment of another Kurdish state.

The inability to recover

In conclusion, Grinberg argues that the Iranian regime has suffered severe blows from which it cannot recover. It has lost the support of the Arab world and Russia, it lacks the necessary resources, and it has no legitimacy or cooperation from the population. In this situation, it will not be able to restore its nuclear program or its military capabilities. Iran might become an isolated ghost state like North Korea, but it will no longer pose a strategic threat.

A question from the audience: Broadcasting impact maps

In response to a listener’s question, Grinberg recounts an incident in a television studio where he protested the display of maps of launches from Iran alongside maps of impact sites in Israel. He claims that broadcasting such information constitutes aiding the enemy, as it allows them to improve their missile accuracy. He clarifies that he did not attribute malicious intent to the presenters, but pointed out a dangerous practice that should be avoided.

No unified Gulf response

According to Dr. Admoni, one of the common misconceptions is the existence of a unified “Gulf response” to crises. In reality, the recent war highlighted that each Gulf state acted according to its own narrow interests, sometimes in opposition to its neighbors. For example, Oman took an anti-American and anti-Israeli line, while the United Arab Emirates leaned more in their direction. Qatar, as usual, tried to maneuver in the middle and not commit to either side. The division was also reflected in the level of physical damage: while hotels were hit in the UAE and a port was hit in Oman, Qatar suffered almost no damage until the attack on the gas facilities in Ras Laffan.

Leaders’ reactions and damage to image

The division was also evident in the conduct of the leaders. The rulers of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates conducted public tours to project a sense of security to the public. In contrast, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad made few public appearances, likely out of concern for their personal safety. Dr. Admoni notes that the Qatari emir avoided appearing at open-air events, and the absence of a pan-Gulf leaders’ meeting or even a coordinated statement highlighted the lack of unity and solidarity.

The Gulf “hub” concept in danger

One of the most significant impacts of the war, argues Dr. Admoni, is on the concept that the Gulf states, and Qatar in particular, have cultivated for decades: their image as a safe and stable international hub for business, finance, education, and tourism. The departure of foreign workers, the evacuation of citizens by embassies, and recommendations for foreign students to leave universities in Qatar all undermine the image of a “safe place.” According to him, the damage to energy facilities is only part of the harm. The main damage is to the concept of an open and immune Gulf, whose vast wealth is supposed to guarantee its security.

Qatar’s hedging policy under pressure

Qatar’s traditional hedging policy, in which it maintains ties with all sides simultaneously, came under severe distress during the war. On the one hand, Qatar tried to empower its security forces and present itself as having protected the American base on its territory. On the other hand, it used the first minor hit on its facilities to announce the shutdown of QatarEnergy, a move that caused global gas prices to jump by more than 50%. Dr. Admoni adds that Qatar began to take draconian internal measures, such as arresting hundreds of people and restricting social networks, which indicates a significant crack in its sense of security.

Why a “Gulf NATO” is not feasible

In response to a question from Boris Gorelik about whether the war might actually lead to a unification of Gulf forces, Dr. Admoni dismisses the possibility. He mentions the proposal by former Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim to establish a “Gulf NATO,” but argues it is not feasible due to the deep rivalries between the countries regarding political Islam, Turkey, and Iran. As an example, he points to the distinctly pro-Iranian line of the Al Jazeera network, which even raised eyebrows in Qatar itself and anger in the other Gulf states. The proxy struggles between Qatar and the UAE, for example in Sudan and Somalia, continued even during the war and demonstrated the inability to create a united front.

Listeners’ questions

At the end of the episode, Dr. Admoni answers listeners’ questions. Regarding the connection with the Taliban, he explains that Qatar will not be quick to give up its asset of mediating with the organization, as it strengthens its position in the Sunni-Islamist axis. However, the connection is intended for communication, not for wielding power against Iran.

Regarding education in the Gulf, he clarifies that there is a big difference between the countries. While the UAE and Saudi Arabia have changed their curricula, in Qatar there is still anti-Israeli and even antisemitic content in the humanities.

Regarding Israel-Qatar relations, Dr. Admoni warns against a return to the pattern of covert cooperation under the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” However, he believes that the current toxic public atmosphere, both in Israel and in Qatar, makes such a move more difficult than in the past.

Seven ways to end a war

According to Omer Dank, since the 19th century, seven main ways of ending wars between nation-states have taken shape.

1. Surrender: One side announces its total surrender, as Japan did at the end of World War II. Dank emphasizes that he is dealing with ending wars, not ending conflicts, since surrender does not always bring an end to the conflict, as the resistance movement in France showed after its surrender to Germany.
2. Conquest: One state conquers another, usually with the goal of imposing a new regime and then withdrawing. In the modern era, conquest for the purpose of territorial annexation has become rare. Examples include China’s conquest of Tibet or the American invasion of Iraq.
3. Ceasefire: This is the most common way to end wars since World War II. A ceasefire can be the result of an agreement, but it is sometimes achieved without a formal agreement. Negotiations can take place before, during, or after the ceasefire, as was the case between Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur War. Those negotiations led to the 1978 peace treaty.
4. External coercion: World powers, usually through the UN Security Council, impose a ceasefire on the warring parties. Most of Israel’s wars have ended this way.
5. Unilateral withdrawal: A state that has invaded foreign territory decides to withdraw on its own initiative. Examples include China’s withdrawal from Vietnam in 1979 and Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip after Operation Cast Lead in 2009.
6. Fading out: The war gradually subsides and the violence drops below the threshold defined as war, without a formal ending event. Dank presents the Second Intifada as a prominent example of this phenomenon.

Dank is careful not to determine which way is preferable to another for ensuring long-term peace. He notes that conquest and the installation of an alternative regime, as in Iran in 1953, can provide temporary quiet, but can also sow the seeds of the next conflict.

The issue of legitimacy

Boris raises the question of the legitimacy of the party that decides to end the war. For example, after World War I, it was argued in Germany that whoever signed the surrender agreement was not authorized to do so. Dank argues that legitimacy is a subjective concept, in the eye of the beholder, and is related to the national narrative a nation tells itself. Legitimacy is indeed a factor of internal and external pressure on decision-makers, but it cannot be measured objectively.

Scenarios for ending the war in Iran

Dank analyzes the possible scenarios for ending the current war with Iran. He rules out the possibility of external coercion, because it is impossible to force a superpower like the United States to end a war through the UN due to its veto power.

A scenario of aerial bombings that would cause the Iranian people to overthrow the regime seems unlikely to Dank. He explains that there is no historical precedent for such a situation. Heavy bombing of Germany and Japan in World War II did not cause a popular uprising. In addition, Iran is not a one-man dictatorship but is controlled by a broad elite of the Revolutionary Guards, which enjoys a considerable base of support. Therefore, overthrowing the regime is more complex than ousting a single dictator.

Another obstacle to an agreement is what Dank calls the commitment dilemma. The Iranian regime has no reason to believe that the current American administration will abide by any agreement, given past experience. Therefore, the chance that Iran would agree to surrender in exchange for a promise that the regime will continue to exist is slim. Such a surrender would only be possible if Iran reaches a state where it completely loses the ability to hurt its rivals, a process that could take a long time.

Internal chaos or a ceasefire?

In conclusion, Dank outlines three main possibilities for ending the war:

1. A mediated ceasefire: This is the most likely scenario in his view. Such an agreement, reached through the mediation of a third country (like Oman or Qatar), would allow both sides to present some achievement and save face, even if it does not resolve the tensions in the region.
2. Iranian surrender: A possible scenario only after a long and exhausting war that depletes Iran of its military and economic capabilities.
3. Internal chaos in Iran: The war could lead to the outbreak of mass protests, as have occurred in the past, which would lead to the collapse of the regime and a period of uncertainty about Iran’s future.

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and partial solutions

According to Yaron Friedman, a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is a move that would paralyze 20 percent of the global oil market as well as all gas exports from Qatar. Despite this, oil prices are not crossing the $100 per barrel mark. Friedman explains this by noting that two countries, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, prepared in advance for such a possibility. Saudi Arabia laid a 1,200-kilometer oil pipeline, the Abqaiq-Yanbu line, which transports oil from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. From there, the oil is transported north to Egypt in another pipeline, and from there to the Mediterranean Sea. The United Arab Emirates built a shorter pipeline from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah, which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz overland. Friedman notes that the Saudi pipeline can transport about 80 percent of Saudi oil, and the Emirati one about 60 percent of Emirati oil. These solutions, although partial, alleviate the situation.

The biggest losers from the blockade

Friedman details which countries are most affected by the situation. The first loser is Iran itself. All of its oil exports are sea-based and pass through the Strait of Hormuz, mainly via Kharg Island. An attack on this island, as happened in the Iran-Iraq War, or an American takeover of it, could completely paralyze Iran’s economy. The second biggest loser is Iraq. Its economy relies on oil for 90 percent of its revenue, and 99 percent of its exports pass through Hormuz. Unlike the Gulf states, Iraq has no plans to diversify its economy, and it is almost completely paralyzed. A northern pipeline to Turkey and overland transport through Jordan solve only a few percent of the problem. In addition, the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, which receive government funding, are also suffering from a cash shortage. Other countries that are severely affected are Kuwait and Qatar, which have no alternative export solutions. Friedman notes that the impact on Qatar also indirectly affects Hamas, which benefits from Qatari funding, especially as Iranian funding for Islamic Jihad has stopped.

The economic blow to Hezbollah

Hezbollah is suffering a severe economic blow from several directions. According to Friedman, Iran, which is under attack, cannot send it funds. The Syrian border is closed, Venezuela is no longer a source of funding, and airports are not a safe channel for transferring suitcases of dollars. In addition, enforcement campaigns against drug trafficking in Syria and Lebanon are hitting another source of the organization’s income. To all this is added internal pressure from the Shiite community, which demands the reconstruction of villages destroyed in the war, as well as pressure from the families of the “martyrs.” Recently, Friedman explains, buildings belonging to the Al-Qard al-Hasan bank, which is used for money laundering and financing Hezbollah, were also bombed. He quotes Naim Qassem, Nasrallah’s deputy, who complained in a speech about the bombing of the bank “that helps the poor and needy.”

Other effects on the region and the world

Friedman notes that China, which bought 90 percent of Iranian oil at rock-bottom prices, is severely affected by the situation, although it has alternatives like Russia. Other Asian countries that bought Iranian oil while bypassing sanctions are also in distress. Turkey fears a wave of refugees from Iran and has suffered attacks near the Ceyhan oil terminal, which also receives oil from Azerbaijan destined for Israel. In contrast, Europe and the United States are less affected. The United States has large oil reserves, and Europe has alternatives like oil and gas from Algeria and Norway. According to Friedman, Iran’s only way to end the war is to create economic and strategic pressure on the Gulf states, even at the cost of burning all ties with them.

The position of the Gulf states and the chance of a decisive outcome

In the Arab media, Friedman explains, there are dual messages. The Gulf states cannot express open support for Israel, but they are interested in the war continuing in order to weaken Iran. Even Qatar, which was a close ally of Iran, was attacked, proving that no one is immune. Friedman believes that economic warfare alone cannot decide a campaign or topple regimes. However, it can erode them from within and weaken them. If the war ends with Iran’s coffers empty, it will accelerate the loosening of the ayatollahs’ rule and the weakening of Hezbollah. He mentions the fall of the Soviet Union as an example of a superpower that collapsed partly due to economic pressure. Finally, he estimates that a military decision would require a ground operation that reaches Tehran, the center of Iranian power.

The modern Battle of Karbala

According to Dr. Friedman, Naim Qassem, Hassan Nasrallah’s deputy, predicted a war in the style of the Battle of Karbala, and the prophecy was fulfilled. The original Battle of Karbala, in 680 AD, was a pre-lost war waged by Hussein ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, against the corrupt Umayyad dynasty. He went into battle out of a sense of justice, even though he knew he would lose. Khomeini, during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, presented this battle as a model of sacrifice and inspiration for future generations, and thus justified the Iran-Iraq War. However, Friedman argues, the current war is a “fake Karbala.” This is not a just struggle, but the result of 40 years of Iranian propaganda, which the leaders began to believe to the point of launching a suicidal war.

Revenge on the Sunni world

Friedman explains that Iran’s attacks on the Gulf states stem from a desire for revenge. In the long term, this is historical Shiite revenge on the Sunni world for centuries of oppression. In the short term, it is revenge on the Gulf states for supporting Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War, for hosting American bases, and for normalizing their relations with Israel. He points to 1979 as a turning point: while Iran became an enemy of Israel and the US, Egypt, the leader of the Sunni world, signed a peace treaty with Israel. These opposing trends fueled Iranian anger.

Iran’s parade of folly

Dr. Friedman lists a series of grave mistakes made by the Iranian leadership. First, it ignored the deep intelligence penetration by the Mossad and the CIA into its ranks, which allowed for the easy elimination of its top command. Second, it did not take the threats of US President Donald Trump seriously, even though he eliminated Qasem Soleimani in 2020. The Iranians thought they could stall for time in negotiations, while the Americans were preparing for war. Another mistake was carrying out the threat to attack its neighbors in the Gulf. The move, intended to pressure the US, turned the entire Muslim world against Iran and gave leaders like Mohammed bin Salman an opportunity to lead an Arab coalition against it.

Activating the militias

The order Iran gave its militias to attack was, according to Friedman, another act of folly that was suicidal for them. Hezbollah, for example, gave Israel legitimacy to attack it forcefully and weaken it for “the day after” the Iranian regime’s collapse. Friedman explains that Hezbollah fears revenge will come from Syria and other actors after it loses Iranian support. The Shiite militias in Iraq are also now suffering American attacks, and they even fired missiles toward Israel that landed in Jordanian territory. As for the Houthis in Yemen, they remained out of the picture, likely due to their difficult economic situation. Meanwhile, the shared Iranian threat has led to a reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and they are investing in Yemen’s reconstruction, a move expected to weaken the Houthis even further.

Between a fake Karbala and moderate Shiite hope

Friedman reiterates his claim that the war Iran is waging in the name of religion is a “fake Karbala,” managed by terrorists who cynically use religious concepts to accumulate power, similar to ISIS. In response to Boris’s question of whether the Iranian leadership believes itself, Friedman replies that it is possible, but notes that Supreme Leader Khamenei is not a true supreme religious authority. The real senior authority, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who resides in Najaf, Iraq, calls for calm, introspection, and a focus on religion rather than wars. Friedman hopes that after the regime’s collapse, the moderate and quietist Shiite stream, known as “Taqiyya,” is what will prevail.

Iran has no friends

To conclude, Dr. Friedman states that Iran has no real allies. Russia and China have betrayed it. According to him, the Chinese exploited Iran economically and bought its oil and resources at rock-bottom prices, and the Russians received military aid from it in the form of UAVs for their war in Ukraine, but gave nothing in return.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz

According to Eran Efrat, in the event of a military incident in the Persian Gulf, it does not matter who declares the Strait of Hormuz closed. Insurance companies will not allow ships to pass through the area, and traffic will effectively stop. He explains that most of Saudi Arabia’s oil production has no real alternative to passing through the strait, as the pipeline leading to the Red Sea has limited capacity.

Blocking the strait, which he describes as the global shipping equivalent of the Ayalon Highway at 8 a.m., will cause severe delays in the global energy supply. The result will be an immediate rise in oil and gas prices. Efrat adds that if the Houthis join the campaign and also close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the world will face a severe trade crisis. Boris Gorelik notes that the immense economic pressure created could spur the United States to act for a swift end to the conflict.

Iran’s regional isolation

Efrat notes that the Iranian attack targeted almost all of its neighbors, including Qatar, its partner in the world’s largest gas field, as well as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Emirates. According to him, even if the regime survives the military attack, it will be very difficult for it to restore its standing. Iran depends on its neighbors for trade and assistance, and the attacks have created a geopolitical rift that will make it difficult for it to recover.

The day after the regime’s fall

Efrat, who says he has never known an Iran not under sanctions, describes the enormous economic potential inherent in the country. Iran has vast oil reserves, is second only to Russia in its gas reserves, and holds deposits of minerals and precious metals estimated to be worth a trillion dollars.

However, he emphasizes that the country’s infrastructure, from the refining industry to production, is in a dilapidated state and will require huge investments to realize this potential. If the regime falls and sanctions are lifted, Iran will become a major energy player in the global market. Its entry will flood the market with supply and lead to a significant drop in prices.

Who would oppose the change?

According to Efrat, there are countries that would not be happy to see Iran freed from sanctions. Chief among them is China, whose small refineries, known as “teapots,” rely on buying discounted Iranian oil. If Iran starts trading on the open market, China will have to pay a higher price. Russia and Turkey also benefit from the current situation.

However, Efrat does not believe that China will intervene militarily to prevent the regime’s fall. He explains that China has no history of military intervention far from its borders and tends to adapt to new realities. He gives the example of Venezuela, where China dramatically reduced its oil purchases after the United States began managing the sales.

The country’s future and relations with Israel

The conversation also touches on the fear of a power vacuum in Iran. Efrat expresses skepticism about the ability of the exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, to lead the country, and raises the concern of a civil war.

Despite this, he is optimistic about the future. According to him, a post-regime Iran could become a tremendous partner for Israel. He argues that in terms of human capital and capabilities, the Iranian people are perhaps the most similar to Israel in the Middle East. Efrat believes that a stable, Western-oriented Iran, similar to a well-managed Turkey, could be a positive engine of growth that would propel the entire region forward.