A narrow view versus a historic opportunity

According to Nitzan David Fuchs, Israelis tend to focus too much on themselves and on immediate arenas like Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. He recounts that after the publication of the US National Security Strategy document, the first question he received from a former senior security official was about the document’s implications for Gaza. Fuchs claims this focus misses a historic opportunity. Instead of asking what the United States can do for Israel in the local arena, we should ask how Israel can help the United States with its global challenges. If Israel succeeds in becoming a more vital partner, its status will be upgraded, and it will be able to solve its local problems more easily.

The Chinese challenge and the problem of allies

Fuchs explains that the main strategic challenge for the United States today is the competition with China. Unlike previous rivals like the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, which were significantly inferior economically, China is a rival of a similar magnitude, with an advanced economy and technological capabilities that compete with America in almost every field. The United States wants to concentrate all its limited resources on confronting China.

The greatest advantage the United States has over China is its extensive network of allies. However, Fuchs argues that most of these allies, especially in Europe and the Gulf, have become a military burden on the United States. After the Cold War, European countries dramatically cut their defense budgets. For example, Germany currently has only about 200 active tanks, compared to about 1,300 for Israel. The Gulf militaries, despite their advanced arms purchases, function more like social welfare projects and their performance is poor, as demonstrated in the war in Yemen. These countries expect that in the moment of truth, the Americans will come to their defense.

Israel as a strategic asset

Israel, according to Fuchs, is an exception in this landscape. It is a loyal ally with proven military capability, able to handle regional threats on its own, without needing American soldiers. The fact that Israel is fighting a war on several fronts without American ground involvement is proof of its exceptionalism. American strategists see Israel as a model for what they want other allies to be: net exporters of security, not just importers. Israel can help stabilize the Middle East, thereby allowing the United States to focus on other arenas.

In addition, Israel can contribute to strengthening other American allies. The sale of the Arrow 3 system to Germany, for example, builds an independent European air defense capability. Fuchs suggests that Israel should not only sell weapons but also transfer knowledge and operational experience to other countries in Europe and the Far East.

A new framework for security aid

The most important contribution Israel can offer, according to Fuchs, is in the technological field. He proposes changing the model of American security aid. Instead of receiving 3.8 billion dollars a year to purchase American weapons, Israel should move to a model of cooperation in research and development. The money would be directed to joint projects in areas like artificial intelligence, unmanned vehicles, and air defense.

According to him, such a change would transform the alliance from one of Israeli dependence to one of mutual dependence. The Pentagon would become dependent on Israeli technology, which would make it harder for future administrations to exert pressure on Israel. The move would also correct distortions in the IDF’s procurement, which tends to prefer “free” American equipment even if it is inferior. In addition, it would strengthen support for Israel in Congress, as Israeli funds would finance factories and jobs in the United States. Fuchs notes that according to reports, this idea is already being discussed between the governments.

In the Western camp: Israel cannot sit on the fence

Boris asks if Israel can bridge the gap between the United States and China. Fuchs rejects the idea outright. He argues that trying to “balance” between the great powers is a failed strategy, which ends with the country sitting on the fence getting hit from both sides. Israel, he emphasizes, is an inseparable part of the Western camp in economic, cultural, and value-based terms. The alternative, the Chinese world order or the “Global South”, sees Israel as a colonialist project and is ideologically hostile to it. The Chinese Communist Party has historically supported the Palestinians.

Therefore, Israel must recognize its place, contribute to strengthening the liberal Western order from which it benefits, and assist the United States in its competition with China. There is no need to take an openly hostile stance, but it is possible to contribute in smart ways, such as cooperating with Taiwan in the field of cyber or providing military advice. As a growing economy and a significant player, Israel must take responsibility and act with an understanding of its place in the international system.

Mythology as a key to understanding the present

In response to a listener’s question about what she would do in President Trump’s place to topple the regime, Dr. Eilam Gindin explains that she is not a strategist, but can offer lines of thought from Iranian mythology. According to these stories, a monster must be killed from the inside. For example, the historical king Ardashir killed a giant, mythological worm by disguising himself as one of its believers and pouring molten lead into it. The mythological prince Zahhak, from whose shoulders two snakes grew, was also defeated only from within. Therefore, she believes that any action to overthrow the regime must come from the inside out, not from the outside in.

According to her, the current situation is different from the past for two reasons. First, the Iranian people themselves are asking for external intervention and help. Second, the Islamic Republic itself is using foreign forces, mercenaries, to suppress its citizens.

Suppression of the protest and bloodshed

Dr. Eilam Gindin describes how in the first week and a half of the demonstrations, local riot police forces were unable to handle the protesters. Following this, the regime imported forces from its proxy network: members of Hashd al-Shaabi from Iraq, Afghans and Pakistanis from the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun militias, and even mercenaries from Sudan. Testimonies from doctors in hospitals, who were forced to treat only wounded security forces, confirm that they treated Iraqis and Sudanese. These forces, who are not trained in crowd control but in field combat, used battlefield weapons against the protesters.

The result, she says, was an ocean of blood. While the regime reports about 3,000 dead, most of them security forces personnel, other estimates speak of tens of thousands of deaths, many of them in a single night. She argues that if the regime’s narrative were true, it would not have shut down the internet. Now, with its partial reopening, horrific videos and photos documenting the scale of the massacre are beginning to emerge.

The fear of the regime’s collapse

Boris raises the argument that the major powers might prefer a weak but stable Iranian regime over the chaos that could ensue from its fall, as happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. Dr. Eilam Gindin agrees that the Iranians themselves fear this, having seen what happened in the Arab Spring and remembering their own experience from 1979, when they replaced the Shah’s dictatorship with a much more murderous regime.

She finds a parallel to this in the myth of King Jamshid, who was a good ruler until power corrupted him. The people grew tired of him and called on the monster, Prince Zahhak, to rule in his place, only to discover that the new situation was much worse. Eventually, the people rose up and crowned a descendant of Jamshid. Similarly, today, after being disillusioned by the Islamic Revolution, protesters are calling for the return of the crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, and shouting Long live the King in the streets.

The alternative: Pahlavi’s reconstruction plan

According to Dr. Eilam Gindin, Reza Pahlavi states that he does not want to be a dictator like his father, but rather to lead Iran in an orderly transition from dictatorship to democracy, while avoiding the chaos that accompanied other revolutions. He has a team of advisors already working on a reconstruction plan for Iran, which is currently a failed state in all areas of infrastructure and economy, even before any change of government. She estimates that such a move would require support and advice from the West.

Is the Iranian public ready for democracy?

She presents a 2011 study by students from the Interdisciplinary Center, which compared Professor Shalom Schwartz’s value index with Freedom House’s democracy index. The study found a high correlation between a people’s degree of conservatism and their regime’s degree of dictatorship. Iran, along with China, was a notable exception: the values of the Iranian people are much more liberal than the dictatorial nature of the regime, which suggests a potential for democracy.

Ethnic minorities and Iran’s integrity

Ethnic identity is very important in Iran, and the regime uses the claim that the protests are driven by separatist desires of minorities to delegitimize them. Dr. Eilam Gindin argues that this is mostly propaganda, pointing to government Twitter accounts posing as separatists. In the recent protests, she emphasizes, ethnic minorities like the Baloch and Azeris are calling for unity under the king, not for the breakup of the state. They are demanding equal rights within a united or federal Iran.

The Book of Esther and Trump’s strategy

Dr. Eilam Gindin, who is writing a historical novel titled “The Advisor” set in the period of the Book of Esther, sees a connection between the story of the scroll and the current situation. She recounts how Queen Vashti was faced with an impossible choice by King Ahasuerus: if she had complied with his demand to appear at the drunken banquet, she would have disgraced herself and been deposed. Because she refused, she was deposed anyway. Similarly, she believes the Trump administration is putting the Iranian regime in a similar situation: if it stops funding its proxies and killing protesters, it will collapse. If it continues, it will be attacked. In either case, its fate is sealed.

Who are the Kurds?

According to Prof. Bengio, the Kurds are the world’s largest ethnic group without a state. Their population is estimated at about 40 million people, although there is no precise data because the countries where they live avoid censuses that recognize them as a separate ethnic group. The vast majority, about 20 million, live in Turkey, where their natural growth rate is higher than that of the Turks, a fact that raises concern in the Turkish government. Other large communities live in Iran (about eight million), Iraq (about six million), and Syria (about two million). Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but there are also Shiites (mainly in Iran), Yazidis, and others among them.

Identity, language, and struggle

Kurdish identity is not based on religion but on ethnic and linguistic affiliation. The Kurdish language belongs to the Indo-European language family, but it is itself fragmented. Due to the political division, three different scripts have developed for it: Latin letters in Turkey and Syria, Arabic letters in Iraq and Iran, and Cyrillic letters in the territories of the former Soviet Union. This fragmentation makes it difficult to create connections and a unified national consciousness. Prof. Bengio explains that throughout history, the various states have tried to commit “linguicide” and suppressed the use of Kurdish, understanding that language is the core component of Kurdish national identity.

The Kurdish autonomy in Syria

The Kurds in Syria, the smallest group, only came to global attention after the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. Unlike the Kurds in other countries who inhabit mountainous regions that are difficult to conquer, the Kurds in Syria live in a flat area. The weakness of the Assad regime and the resulting political vacuum allowed them to establish a unique autonomous entity in the country’s northeast. According to Bengio, this was an extraordinary experiment in the Middle East: a democratic entity where women took an equal part in the military and politics, the education system was multilingual, and a strategic alliance existed with local Arab tribes within the framework of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

The betrayal of allies and the collapse

The cooperation with the Arab tribes, which was supported by the United States, became a stumbling block. In recent events, those same Arab tribes turned their backs on the Kurds and attacked them. Prof. Bengio describes the collapse of the autonomy as the result of the actions of an “unholy trinity” of Turkish President Erdogan, U.S. President Trump, and the Syrian regime led by Bashar al-Assad. She emphasizes the American betrayal of the Kurds, who fought on the front lines against ISIS and lost about 11,000 male and female fighters, thereby saving the lives of American soldiers.

Dream and reality: a united Kurdistan

The historical dream of establishing a united Kurdish state still exists, but the political reality makes its realization difficult. There is no single Kurdish leadership, and a rivalry exists between leaders like Masoud Barzani in Iraqi Kurdistan and Abdullah Öcalan, who is imprisoned in Turkey. Turkey, Bengio explains, is ideologically opposed to any Kurdish entity, viewing it as an existential threat to its territorial integrity and to the concept of “Turkification” on which the state was founded.

The future of the Kurds and the role of the West

Prof. Bengio expresses cautious pessimism about the future of the Kurds in Syria. The situation depends on developments in the Assad regime, which is becoming increasingly Islamist. However, she notes that the crisis has spurred mobilization among Kurds worldwide. She criticizes Western hypocrisy, which helped establish the Christian state of South Sudan but ignores the independence aspirations of the Muslim Kurds, despite the 2017 referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan. According to her, Israel could also have helped, at least morally and diplomatically. She notes that Prime Minister Netanyahu mentioned in a speech the need to protect the Druze and Christians in Syria, but omitted the Kurds, who feel betrayed. Ultimately, the strengthening of Islamist elements in Syria at the expense of the Kurds also poses a threat to Israel.

Asymmetric warfare and the importance of choke points

According to Professor Chorev, the war between Russia and Ukraine clearly demonstrates the principles of asymmetric warfare, where a relatively weak side exploits its advantages to inflict significant damage on a stronger side. He identifies similarities between this arena and challenges Israel faces, such as the shadow war against Iran in the Gulf of Aden, during which the Revolutionary Guards attacked merchant ships with UAVs, and the threat from the Houthis in the Red Sea.

The fighting mainly takes place in coastal areas, which allow for attacking naval targets from the shore. The most prominent example is the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva with a Ukrainian Neptune missile fired from the coast. Professor Chorev emphasizes the growing importance of maritime choke points. Just as Turkey controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, the Houthis control the Bab el-Mandeb, and the Iranians control the Strait of Hormuz. Control over these points allows for influencing global maritime trade, as seen with the closure of the port of Eilat due to the Houthi threat and the delays in grain exports from the Black Sea.

The limitations of large navies

Boris Gorelik asks if the Israeli Navy suffers from budget neglect, but Professor Chorev believes the problem is not rooted in resources. He notes that even the US Navy, despite its power, failed to secure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea against the Houthis, neither in the Biden administration’s Operation Prosperity Guardian nor in an operation by the Trump administration. The high cost of intercepting cheap missiles made the campaign economically unviable for the Americans. According to him, the Chinese, who need the shipping lane for their Belt and Road Initiative, apparently preferred to pay protection money to the Houthis rather than deploy their own navy.

The lesson, Professor Chorev argues, is that large navies struggle to cope with this new type of warfare. Ukraine, a country with almost no navy of its own, managed to destroy about a third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet using relatively cheap and simple means.

Israel’s lag in the field of uncrewed vehicles

In Professor Chorev’s opinion, Israel’s naval arm is lagging behind the air and ground forces in adopting uncrewed vehicles. He recalls that the navy was a pioneer in the approach of small, fast platforms, like the missile boats in the Yom Kippur War, but today it is not a leader in the field of uncrewed vehicles.

As an example, he brings up the Protector, an uncrewed surface vehicle (USV) by Rafael, which proved itself but was abandoned by the navy for irrelevant reasons. Furthermore, the navy chose to equip its Sa’ar 6-class corvettes with a heavy, crewed naval helicopter instead of developing uncrewed platforms. Professor Chorev explains that the barrier is mainly conceptual and doctrinal. Officers in the navy find it hard to accept the idea that an operator on shore would be authorized to open fire from an uncrewed vessel, even though all the technological means exist.

The undersea threat to infrastructure

The conversation then turns to the threat from the undersea domain. Professor Chorev explains that in addition to USVs, a significant threat is developing from uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs). Hamas has already shown the beginnings of such capabilities. The threat is not only to vessels, but to critical infrastructure on the seabed, such as communication cables, gas pipelines, and power cables from offshore wind farms.

He notes that this is hybrid warfare, which is difficult to attribute to a specific state. As examples, he cites the explosion of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, an act he attributes to the Ukrainians, and the cutting of communication cables in the Baltic Sea by the Russians. According to him, countries like China are developing underwater vehicles, under the pretext of resource exploration, that could be used to damage strategic infrastructure, for example by cutting Taiwan off from its communication cables.

The future: Integrating crewed and uncrewed vehicles

Professor Chorev describes how the Ukrainians are refining their capabilities, shifting from the use of surface vehicles, which the Russians have learned to defend against, to the use of underwater vehicles that penetrate protected ports and hit strategic targets like submarines and bridges.

He argues that the future lies in an integrated approach of crewed and uncrewed vehicles, or Man-Unmanned Teaming. In this method, a large, crewed platform, such as a submarine or a ship, serves as a mothership and carries smaller, uncrewed vehicles. Thus, the submarine can launch an underwater vehicle on a dangerous mission, like damaging an undersea cable, without endangering itself. According to him, leading navies around the world, foremost among them the US Navy, are already moving in this direction.

The surprising Saudi position

According to Dr. Yaron Friedman, various sources indicate that Saudi Arabia is the one pressuring the United States to refrain from attacking Iran or taking any action that would lead to the regime’s overthrow. This position seems puzzling, especially given the deep and long-standing hostility between the two countries.

The roots of the hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Dr. Friedman explains that the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran exists on several levels. On the economic level, both countries are oil powers competing for control of the markets. On the political level, both aspire to regional hegemony. He emphasizes that it is not just Iran trying to take over the Middle East, but also Saudi Arabia, which acts through economic and military means, as can be seen in its involvement in Yemen. The most acute level is the religious one. Saudi Arabia represents the extremist Wahhabi stream, which views Shi’ism as heresy. This hostility is deeply rooted in history and is based on the concepts of thinkers like Ibn Taymiyyah, which were adopted by the founders of the Saudi kingdom. The Shi’ites, for their part, see the Wahhabis as the fathers of Sunni terror and as those who usurped control of Islam’s holy places.

The four reasons for the Saudi change of direction

Dr. Friedman presents four main reasons why Saudi Arabia now prefers the survival of the Iranian regime:

1. Failure of the belligerent policy: The aggressive line led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, manifested in the war in Yemen, has failed. The war did not lead to a decisive outcome, the Arab coalition fell apart, and Saudi Arabia’s international image was damaged. The 2019 attack on Aramco’s oil facilities proved the kingdom’s vulnerability. Consequently, in 2023, Saudi Arabia decided to change direction, and inspired by countries like the UAE and Qatar, it turned to reconciliation with Iran. This reconciliation led to calm on the border with Yemen and allowed the Saudis to focus on their economy.
2. Iranian threats: Friedman estimates that Iran has sent a clear message to the Gulf states, a kind of threat in the vein of “Let me die with the Philistines.” According to this scenario, if the Iranian regime faces the danger of collapse, it will attack its neighbors, strike their oil facilities, and drag the entire region into chaos. This threat pressures the Gulf states to persuade the United States to avoid decisive action.
3. Fear of the Shah’s Iran returning: The Saudis fear the fall of the current regime and the rise of a strong, secular, and Western-allied Iran, similar to pre-revolutionary Iran. Such an Iran, freed from sanctions, would become an economic and military power that would overshadow Saudi Arabia and relegate it to a secondary status in the region.
4. The democratic domino effect: Friedman argues that the 2011 Arab Spring was influenced by the 2009 protests in Iran. The rise of a democracy in Iran could export ideas of human rights and political freedom to the autocratic Gulf states, creating internal pressure for regime change. For the Gulf monarchies, the threat of democratization is no less serious than a military threat.

Survival equals victory

According to Dr. Friedman, if the Iranian regime survives the current wave of protests, it will become much stronger. In the Middle East, survival is perceived as victory. A regime that has survived will feel secure enough to suppress its opponents with greater brutality. Friedman predicts that the Iranians will return to the nuclear negotiating table only to buy time, unfreeze funds, and continue secretly developing nuclear weapons. Their goal, he says, is to become a North Korea, a country with nuclear weapons that no one can attack, thereby ensuring the regime’s survival forever. He adds that the Iranian threat to destroy Israel is real and not just a slogan.

A look to the future

Friedman concludes that the fall of the regime in Iran is in the American and Israeli interest, as it would cause the collapse of the “axis of evil” and the militias supported by Tehran. However, he warns of a new axis of power forming around Turkey and Qatar, identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, which could become the next threat in the region.

The situation in the Palestinian arena

According to Dr. Friedman, Hamas is in a state of stagnation, partly due to a leadership struggle. There is a rivalry between Khaled Mashal, who is identified with the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatari axis, and Khalil al-Hayya, who is close to the Iranian axis. Dr. Friedman explains that a possible collapse of the regime in Iran could strengthen Mashal’s position. Meanwhile, negotiations for the release of the hostages in Gaza are stalled. Israel demands Hamas’s disarmament as a condition for withdrawal, while Hamas demands an Israeli withdrawal. This stalemate, Friedman argues, may force Israel to launch another military operation in the Strip to eliminate Hamas’s rule.

Lebanon, Syria, and the Muslim Brotherhood

The situation in Lebanon, according to Dr. Friedman, is similar to the situation in Gaza. There too, there is a stalemate, because Hezbollah is not willing to disarm. He notes that Arab commentators estimate that Israel may start a war and even a ground invasion of Lebanon after the winter. However, the fall of the Iranian regime could cause Hezbollah to collapse and change the rules of the game. At the same time, the global Muslim Brotherhood movement is in one of the biggest crises in its history, with American and European sanctions, the closure of offices in Arab countries, and a split in its leadership. The only axis that still supports them is the Turkish-Qatari axis, which is now also strengthening in Syria at the expense of the Iranians. In Syria itself, the new regime is unstable and is carrying out massacres against minorities, including Alawites, Druze, and Kurds.

The hidden rivalry in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia vs. the UAE

Dr. Friedman elaborates on the growing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. According to him, the Saudis feel that the Emiratis are “stepping on their toes” in various arenas, such as Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. In Yemen, the situation has reached a boiling point. The Southern Transitional Council, supported by the UAE, took advantage of the ceasefire that the Saudis worked hard to achieve (including through reconciliation with Iran) to expand its control. In response, the Saudi air force bombed its own allies, that is, the council’s forces, and made it clear that it would not tolerate any challenge to stability. Friedman explains that the Emiratis backed down and disavowed this move, because relations with Saudi Arabia are more important to them than control over Yemen. Saudi Arabia, for its part, made it clear that it is the “boss” in the Gulf and will not allow any country, not even a close ally, to undermine its security interests in its backyard. Now, the Saudis are working to unite southern Yemen under their patronage.

Jordan, Iran, and the chance of war

Boris Gorelik asks about the situation in Jordan. Dr. Friedman notes that one of the positive developments of the year is the blow dealt to the drug trade from Syria, which has had a positive effect on Jordan. However, he warns about the long and porous border with Jordan and about extremist elements in the kingdom. Regarding Iran, Friedman raises the possibility that the regime, in a desperate move, will attack Israel. He also quotes Arab commentators who claim that the Israeli government may have a political interest in going to war on several fronts to strengthen its public standing ahead of elections. Finally, he expresses hope that in 2026 the Iranian axis, Hamas, and Hezbollah will collapse, perhaps as an unexpected result of the wars Israel is waging, despite the heavy price.

The current state of the protests

According to Alex Grinberg, the protest in Iran is indeed expanding and the regime is struggling to contain it, but it has not yet reached the intensity of the protests that erupted after the murder of Mahsa Amini. However, the situation today is different. The Iranian regime, which is a smart regime, is using a method of targeted repression: it does not shoot everyone, but rather locates the protest leaders and neutralizes them, partly by monitoring social media. On the other hand, it seems that many Iranians have reached a point where they have nothing to lose. The protest is not about a specific issue, but stems from an impossible economic situation, with extreme inflation.

The conditions for a revolution

Boris Gorelik mentions the classic conditions for a revolution, and Grinberg adds two crucial factors: the regime’s willingness to use force to suppress, and the people’s willingness to fight. According to him, if people indeed have nothing to lose, they become more determined. However, he quotes an anonymous Iranian writer who claims that Iranians are not like Arabs, and that Iranian youth, who see themselves as European, will not take up arms and fight the government. Grinberg emphasizes that in 20th-century history, no regime has fallen solely due to popular protest. He gives the example of the suppression of the demonstration in Novocherkassk in the Soviet Union in 1962. Iran is not North Korea, and protesting is permitted there under limitations, but the situation is complex.

National identity and minorities

In response to Boris Gorelik’s question about ethnic minorities, who make up about half the population, Grinberg states unequivocally that a strong Iranian identity exists. He explains that the use of the term “minorities” is misleading. The Azeris, for example, are a very large group, but they are Shiites and are integrated into the government. They have no separatist aspirations, and their main demand is for cultural recognition, such as the right to teach their language in schools. He emphasizes that during the protests, all ethnic groups feel Iranian and share in the general suffering.

The regime’s fears and weaknesses

According to Grinberg, the regime fears internal collapse more than mass demonstrations. Unlike in Syria, there is no deep sectarian divide in Iran between the government and the people. The regime’s main fear is a proliferation of small protest hotspots in the periphery, which are difficult to control all at once. In addition, the regime is operating from a position of military weakness, and it fears an American or Israeli strike that it would be unable to prevent.

The Chinese reform scenario

Boris Gorelik raises the possibility of a China-like scenario, in which a new leader would carry out deep economic reforms while preserving the framework of the Islamic Republic. Grinberg believes such a scenario is unlikely. According to him, the Iranian regime is too ideological and cannot afford to carry out such a reform, as it would be interpreted as succumbing to pressure and would expose its failure. Such a move would seem cynical and would damage the legitimacy of the government, which cannot afford a visible gap between its stated ideology and reality.

The Israeli interest and external intervention

Grinberg rejects the claim that Israel has an interest in the Iranian regime’s survival in order to unite the Gulf states against it. He explains that Israel’s clear interest is for the regime, which poses an existential threat, to disappear. However, he distinguishes between overthrowing the regime, which he believes is not possible through external intervention, and “neutralizing” it. The goal should be to exact an unbearable price from the regime for its aggression. He warns against the narrative that the Iranians are spreading in the West, according to which the fall of the regime would lead to greater chaos than in Iraq or Syria. He claims this is a propaganda tool, and that Iran, as a nation-state, is not similar to those countries.

On the term “opposition”

Finally, Grinberg clarifies that in Iran there is no “opposition” in the conventional sense of democratic countries, meaning a body that can legally replace the government. What exists are dissidents, mainly abroad, who are not organized as a political force that could serve as a governing alternative.

The background of Somaliland

According to Dr. Koren, the region known as the Horn of Africa is composed of three main entities. The first is Somalia, a failed state that has been dysfunctional for many years. The second is Puntland, which is ostensibly part of Somalia but in practice operates separately and has a different tribal composition. The third, the northernmost, is Somaliland.

The split was created following the colonial race of the 19th century. Italy controlled Somalia and Puntland, while Britain controlled Somaliland. The different colonial heritage created cultural and administrative gaps. In 1960, Somaliland gained independence from Britain and was required to unite with Somalia, but the union quickly failed and it began to operate as an independent entity. In contrast to chaotic Somalia, Somaliland is described by Dr. Koren as a relatively stable, democratic state with an orderly, though not wealthy, economy.

Strategic importance and regional powers

The main importance of the region stems from its strategic location at the junction of the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, on one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes. This location attracts many powers with diverse interests. China maintains a base in nearby Djibouti, Turkey operates in Somalia, and Russia has a presence in Sudan. The United Arab Emirates and Taiwan have also maintained close ties with Somaliland for years, although they have not officially recognized it.

The Israeli interest

Dr. Koren explains that Israeli recognition of Somaliland has several clear strategic advantages. First, it gives Israel a foothold in a critical point near Yemen, which could help in dealing with the Houthi threat. Second, the move strengthens the Israeli-Emirati axis and allows for cooperation in Africa and Yemen. Third, it serves as a counterweight to the expansionist ambitions of Turkey and Iran in the region. And finally, it gives Israel influence along the entire Red Sea shipping lane, from the Suez Canal to the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a significant geostrategic asset.

Global reactions and the risks

Alongside the advantages, there are also risks. According to Dr. Koren, the move could anger China, which sees Somaliland as an ally of Taiwan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as the African Union, are opposed in principle to the splitting of states and see it as a dangerous precedent. An example of this is Egypt’s harsh reaction to the recent agreement signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland, under which Ethiopia was supposed to recognize Somaliland in exchange for port access.

On the other hand, Dr. Koren notes that Muslim countries like Morocco and Indonesia did not react negatively. He also mentions the hypocrisy of Turkish President Erdogan, who condemns the move while Turkey itself occupies northern Cyprus.

Sovereignty and borders in the new world order

Boris asks about the general reluctance in the world to change borders. Dr. Koren argues that since the 1990s, the world order has been changing. The principle of the sanctity of borders is eroding in favor of interests. Examples include the rise of non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas, and the conduct of powers like Russia, which uses the Wagner Group to take over large areas in Africa and disregards the sovereignty of local states. In his view, the recognition of Somaliland is not an exceptional move but a reflection of a changing global reality, where states act according to their interests.

Weighing the benefits against the harm

In conclusion, Dr. Koren believes that on balance, the advantages of recognizing Somaliland outweigh the disadvantages. Somaliland is a stable, democratic, and Muslim country that is not hostile to Israel, and it constitutes a strategic anchor in an important location. Israel can contribute a great deal to it in areas like agriculture, solar energy, and maritime management. However, he emphasizes that Israel must manage the move wisely, realize its interests, and at the same time avoid antagonizing partner states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Artificial intelligence is the new oil

According to Mor Shapira, the Middle East is no longer a technologically backward region. The Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, understand that global competition is shifting from control over energy sources like oil and gas to control over information. They see artificial intelligence as the “modern oil” and understand that their future depends on their ability to lead in this field. These countries are investing huge sums, over 100 billion dollars in the last two years, in building infrastructure, dedicated AI universities (the UAE even has a minister for artificial intelligence), and attracting talent from all over the world.

According to Shapira, the Gulf states are aware that they lack the skilled workforce and technological ecosystem that exists in Israel. They see Israel, the “start-up nation,” as a natural partner and want to harness the “Jewish brain” to advance their goals. However, she warns that Israel itself is beginning to lag behind the Gulf states in long-term strategic thinking and investment in the field.

The narrative is stronger than the facts

Shapira argues that to understand the Middle East, one must grasp that the narrative, the story, and the image are the most powerful weapons, sometimes more so than bullets. According to her, in the Arab world, facts and objective truth are less relevant. What matters is who disseminates the information first, and whether the information serves the existing narrative. Therefore, Israeli attempts to debunk fake news through fact-checking are doomed to fail. The Arab consumer is not looking for factual truth, but for what aligns with their worldview, for example the Palestinian victimhood narrative. Even if presented with conclusive proof that a particular video is fake, they will choose to believe it as long as it serves their narrative. Shapira compares this to trying to convince a believer that there is no God using evidence.

Artificial intelligence in the service of regimes

Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, Shapira explains, fear loss of control and stability. The fear of “fitna,” meaning civil war or chaos, is an existential fear, so they do everything in their power to prevent the free flow of information that could undermine their rule. They take measures like blocking the internet during crises, as Iran has done, to prevent the spread of information that contradicts the state-run media. The use of fake news and artificial intelligence becomes a legitimate tool for them to maintain governmental legitimacy, unite the people around the leadership, and divert attention from internal problems.

Islamic law and artificial intelligence

The emergence of artificial intelligence is sparking an Islamic legal debate in the Muslim world. Clerics at institutions like Al-Azhar University in Egypt are debating whether AI is a “bid’ah,” a forbidden innovation, or a tool that can be used. Some religious jurists approve the use of chatbots to get legal rulings, similar to the past approval of coffee after it was understood to help believers stay awake for night prayers. On the other hand, there are concerns, for example about receiving “cold” and irresponsible legal answers from a robot that does not understand the human context. In conservative Sunni Islam, there is strong opposition to creating images using AI, especially of holy figures like the Prophet Muhammad, because this is considered forbidden anthropomorphism.

The ends justify the means

According to Shapira, organizations like Hezbollah and regimes like Iran’s see artificial intelligence and fake news as legitimate tools in their struggle. As long as the means serves the narrative and sanctifies the goal, its use is permitted. She gives the example of a Hezbollah ruling that permits drug trafficking as long as it harms the “enemy” and not Muslims. Similarly, spreading a fake video about “Zionist crimes” is considered legitimate because it serves the resistance narrative. Media outlets like Al Mayadeen and Al-Manar, Hezbollah’s mouthpieces, make extensive and unlimited use of fake news, while Saudi channels like Al Arabiya and Al Hadath are more careful, in line with the narrative they promote.

Voices of change

Alongside the propaganda, Shapira notes that there are growing voices in the Arab world, mainly among intellectuals from Lebanon and Iraq, who are calling for realism. They argue that Israel is an established fact and that insisting on the narrative of “the Zionist entity that will pass from the world” only harms the Arab world and prevents it from progressing. Countries like the United Arab Emirates are leading a conceptual change, for example by introducing Holocaust studies into the curriculum and establishing a museum on the subject. According to Shapira, these voices understand that it is better to learn to live alongside Israel and enjoy the fruits of peace and normalization, instead of continuing to live by the sword.

The Roots initiative and Rabbi Menachem Froman

Rabbi Schlesinger begins by introducing the “Roots Initiative”, which he defines as a local Jewish-Palestinian initiative for understanding, non-violence, and transformation. He emphasizes that the initiative does not “bypass the government” but rather complements what the government should be doing, namely, bottom-up work from the ground. According to him, the settlements are not just an obstacle to peace, but can also be a key, depending on how the settlers act.

The initiative was founded in 2014, partly to continue the path of the late Rabbi Menachem Froman, who was the rabbi of the settlement of Tekoa and a well-known peace activist. Rabbi Froman, Schlesinger explains, was a controversial Zionist figure who met with Palestinian leaders like Yasser Arafat and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, out of a deep Jewish religious conviction. Most of the founders of “Roots”, both Israelis and Palestinians, were his students. The founders include Shaul Judelman, the poet Eliaz Cohen, and on the Palestinian side, members of the Abu Awwad family from the village of Beit Ummar.

The personal journey from ignorance to encounter

Rabbi Schlesinger talks about the personal process he went through. During his nearly 40 years living in Alon Shvut, he had almost no contact with Palestinians. He describes them as the “background” in the movie of his life, transparent figures who could be ignored. The turning point occurred when the penny dropped and he realized he was lying to himself when he claimed to pick up every hitchhiker, while in reality he only picked up Jews. The realization that he was not even aware he was ignoring Palestinians made him feel like a racist, and he decided to embark on a journey to get to know them and to see them as human beings.

After several failed attempts to make contact, he was invited to a meeting of Israelis and Palestinians near his home. He describes the fear that gripped him and his wife as he left the house, and the shock he experienced when he discovered a group of 15 Israelis and 15 Palestinians talking among themselves at the meeting place, a sight he was not used to. In retrospect, it turned out to be the founding meeting of “Roots”.

The root of the conflict: a struggle of identities

According to Rabbi Schlesinger, meeting Palestinians changed his life. He understood that in the Land of Israel, there is another story alongside the Jewish story, and whoever lives only one story is living a lie. He quotes his Palestinian partner, Ali Abu Awwad, who says that the path to peace is to hold “two truths in one heart”.

The root of the conflict, he claims, is a struggle of identities. The Palestinian people do not recognize the legitimacy of the Jewish identity and its connection to the land, and the Jewish people do not recognize the legitimacy of the Palestinian identity and its connection to the land. He argues that the Palestinian people are indeed a people, even if they are a new people formed partly in reaction to Zionism, and the denial of this by Israelis is the heart of the problem. Similarly, many Palestinians deny that the Jews are a people. The solution, therefore, must focus on mutual recognition of the identities and narratives of both sides.

A vision for the future: a confederation of two states

Rabbi Schlesinger presents his political vision, which is based on the plan of the “A Land for All” movement, of which he is a member. The plan, called “Two States, One Homeland”, proposes a confederation solution. According to the model, two sovereign states, Israel and Palestine, would be established, but they would be linked in a confederal superstructure, similar to the European Union. The borders would be open for free movement, and free residency would be permitted.

In such a situation, a Jew could live in Ma’ale Adumim, be an Israeli citizen (and vote in Israel’s national elections), but be a resident of the Palestinian state (and vote in its local elections). Similarly, a Palestinian could live in Tel Aviv, be a Palestinian citizen, but a resident of Israel. Such a solution, he says, recognizes the connection of both peoples to the entire land, and allows the settlers to remain in their homes.

The activities of ‘Roots’ and dealing with extremists

The activities of “Roots” include listening circles, photography and music workshops, language studies, and lectures. The goal is twofold: first, to get to know the person in front of you and not see them as a monster. Second, and more importantly, to recognize the collective identity they carry, even if it contradicts your own. In addition, the organization engages in activism against violence from both sides, including educational activities in Palestinian schools and activities among the Israeli public against “Jewish terror”.

Rabbi Schlesinger painfully admits that Jewish violence sometimes stems from a religious ideology. He does not claim that his Judaism is more “real” than that of the extremists. According to his method, many possibilities exist within Jewish sources, including a violent Judaism and a tolerant Judaism. He cannot claim that his interpretation is more authentic, only that it is more correct for the current reality. The choice, he says, is which direction to take hold of.

A small chance, a great responsibility

To the question of optimism, Rabbi Schlesinger answers that he believes there is a small chance of reaching reconciliation and peace. But precisely because a chance exists, however small, the responsibility falls on him and on everyone to act to make it a reality. If everyone acts, the small chance will become a reality.

Syria after Assad

According to Khalifa Khalifa, Syria has ceased to exist as a functioning state and has become a collection of geographic areas controlled by tribes, terrorist organizations, and gangs. The civil war, which lasted almost 15 years, created an entire generation that grew up in a reality of all-out war and extreme demographic changes. Within this chaos, the Druze in the Bashan mountains tried to maintain relative isolation and not take part in the war, but they paid a heavy price for it. According to him, all the fighting organizations, including Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Syrian regime itself, turned the Druze into a target and a source of income through kidnappings for ransom.

Jolani’s rule, “Gaza on steroids”

Khalifa Khalifa argues that although the new leader, al-Jolani, has legitimacy from large parts of the population and is trying to present a moderate facade to the West, the ideological backbone of his rule remains radically Islamist. His base, he says, still adheres to the logic of “either you convert to Islam or we will kill you” and aspires to establish a caliphate. He describes the new state that is forming as “Gaza on steroids”: a vast territory of 185,000 sq km (compared to 365 sq km in the Gaza Strip), with access to the sea, access to Saudi and Qatari money, and Turkish intelligence backing.

The massacre of the Druze and the existential danger

Khalifa mentions the 2018 massacre of the Druze carried out by ISIS and their allied Bedouin tribes. He reports that there were nearly 4,000 victims in the massacre, including more than 500 men who were executed and over 120 women who were abducted as sex slaves. He emphasizes that relative to the Druze population in Syria, which numbers less than a million people, this is a tremendous blow, more severe than the October 7th attack relative to Israel’s population. According to him, parallel to the massacre, Turkish archaeology teams entered the area to loot antiquities and erase the local history, especially the historical connection between Jews and Druze. Today, 32 Druze villages are still occupied and there are more than 200,000 displaced people in Suwayda, with no economy, education, or future. Their only lifeline, he claims, is Israel, whose intervention prevented an even larger massacre.

Can Jolani moderate?

Boris Gorelik asks if there is a chance that Jolani will choose a more moderate model, like Erdogan’s Turkey, and allow the existence of minorities. Khalifa Khalifa expresses deep skepticism. He argues that the dynamics of political Islam always drag the leader to more extreme positions, because there will always be someone more extreme who will claim he is “not Muslim enough.” He gives the example of Hamas, which came to power in democratic elections and led Gaza into constant decline. According to him, slogans heard in recent military parades in Syria, such as “Khaybar, Khaybar, O Jews,” prove that the direction remains extremist and dangerous for Israel.

A vision for the Bashan region: A Druze buffer state

Khalifa proposes a possible solution to the situation, which includes population exchanges. According to his vision, the Sunni tribes from the Daraa and Bashan area, who participated in the massacre, would receive compensation and move to the Damascus area. In their place, the Druze living in Damascus, who live as a scattered and threatened minority, would move to the Bashan region. Such a move would create a homogeneous Druze territorial continuity. He believes this can be financed with the help of Saudi Arabia, as part of a comprehensive deal that would include normalization and giving the Saudis access to Israeli technology. The fertile Bashan region, with the help of knowledge and technology from Israel, could become the “breadbasket of the Middle East” and create a stable and prosperous buffer zone between Israel and Syria.

The Jewish-Druze alliance

Khalifa emphasizes the importance of the alliance between Jews and Druze. He notes that the spiritual leader of the Druze in Syria, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, conditioned their partnership in a future Syria on it being a secular, liberal, and democratic state, a revolutionary position in the Arab world. He adds that during the massacre, Israel’s intervention came after a call from the spiritual leader of the Druze in Israel, Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif. According to him, this fact shows that the voice of the Druze leadership in Israel was stronger than the directives of the American administration, which had been charmed by Jolani. Khalifa calls on Israel to abandon its “diaspora mentality,” recognize its power as a regional power, and formulate a long-term strategic vision in which the Druze can be key partners.

The “Arab Jew” tactic

At the beginning of the conversation, Tal Oran explains that he does not define himself or Mizrahi Jews as Arabs, but he uses this label intentionally and defiantly toward his Arab audience. According to him, when a Palestinian activist claimed he was an Arab, he adopted the title sarcastically. His logic is that if he is an Arab, then any conflict between him and a Palestinian is an internal Arab matter, similar to internal conflicts in Syria or Lebanon, and therefore cannot be defined as colonialism or apartheid. Following the same line of reasoning, he argues that if he is an Arab, he can decide that Ashkenazi and Ethiopian Jews are also Arabs, and therefore they too have a full right to live in the land.

The transition from travel to advocacy

Oran talks about his career as a successful travel blogger for about ten years. He admits that during that time he avoided dealing with politics or sharing his family’s stories from Arab countries, because he felt it did not fit the lighthearted atmosphere of the travel world. He describes a sense of shame for not having used his platform for advocacy earlier.

The change began in 2022, when he created a series of videos about different communities in Israel. He later tried to replicate the format in Asia but failed. With the outbreak of the war, while he was in the Philippines, he felt helpless. After three months of deliberation, he decided to leave everything, sell his belongings, and fly to Israel on a one-way ticket to devote himself to advocacy. The transition came at a personal and professional cost. He lost sponsorship deals, many friends who did not understand the change he went through, and many followers who left him at the beginning. He describes a difficult period when he was almost homeless and survived financially thanks to the support of his followers.

Methods of operation and reaching the Arab world

Oran’s main goal is to reach audiences in the Arab and Muslim world. He uses platforms like OmeTV to enter into confrontations and discussions with young people from Arab countries. He usually opens his conversations with the greeting “salam alaikum” and sometimes wears a keffiyeh, according to him, to attract the desired audience and confuse them. He edits the recorded conversations and uploads them to social media, sometimes in a humorous way. He tells of a viral conversation with a young Iraqi woman, in which he managed to change her opinion about Israel thanks to their shared background as people of Iraqi origin.

According to him, he receives thousands of messages of support from Arabs and Muslims around the world, who tell him they agree with him but are afraid to speak out publicly. He believes that his videos, in which he confronts the Palestinian narrative and presents historical facts, create a wide resonance in the Arab world.

A vision for a new Mizrahi advocacy

Oran argues that Israeli advocacy, which for the last hundred years has been led mainly by Ashkenazi Jews from the West, has failed. In his view, the attempt to brand Israel solely as a democratic and liberal state was a mistake, as proven by the rise of antisemitism in the world. The solution, in his opinion, lies in the story of Mizrahi and Ethiopian Jews. He believes the Mizrahi story shatters antisemitic stereotypes and provides an effective answer to anti-Israeli propaganda. His goal is to build a “digital army” of content creators who will spread the Mizrahi and Ethiopian narrative worldwide.

Deconstructing the “Arab” identity

Oran presents a theory according to which most people in the Middle East who define themselves as Arabs are not actually ethnically Arab. He claims they are descendants of ancient indigenous peoples, such as Copts, Arameans, or Phoenicians, who underwent a process of colonization and Arabization. He believes that most Palestinians are descendants of ancient Israelites or Samaritans. However, he emphasizes that a Jewish genetic identity does not absolve them of responsibility for their actions if they choose a jihadist ideology.

He believes that helping these populations rediscover their original, non-Arab identity can dismantle the vast pan-Arab collective and create a basis for peace between smaller communities.

The conflict in Judea and Samaria

At the end of the conversation, Oran addresses the situation in Judea and Samaria. He argues that the responsibility for the ongoing violence lies with the Israeli government, which for years has avoided making a decision about the future of the territory. According to him, the government must decide whether the area will become a Palestinian state, an option he considers a grave mistake, or be fully annexed to Israel. He emphasizes that despite the picture presented in the media, many relationships of coexistence and cooperation also exist on the ground between Jews and Arabs.

Appropriating Iranian nationalism

According to Dr. Tamar Eilam Gindin, the Islamic Republic branded the war as a victory, but it actually emerged wounded and humiliated. This situation led to increased domestic repression, including arrests and executions, and also to a new propaganda phenomenon: the appropriation of Iranian national symbols from the pre-Islamic period. The regime, which usually disdains this heritage and even closes the roads to the Tomb of Cyrus on Cyrus Day, has begun to enlist it for its own purposes.

As an example, she mentions a billboard that depicted Benjamin Netanyahu kneeling before the Sasanian king Shapur I, inspired by an ancient rock relief showing the surrender of the Roman emperor Valerian. The message was clear: this is what happens to those who mess with Iran. In another instance, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei asked a religious singer (a maddah) to sing the national song “Ey Iran”. Even the state broadcasting authority changed its name in its on-screen captions from “Broadcasting Authority of the Islamic Republic” to “Broadcasting Authority of Iran”. Dr. Eilam Gindin compares this to Stalin’s use of the Orthodox Church during World War II to rally the people.

The public’s reaction

According to Dr. Eilam Gindin, the Iranian public is not buying this propaganda. On social media, attempts to harness nationalist sentiment are met with cynicism and ridicule. Many users respond to messages like “You will yet kneel before Iran” by arguing that the Islamic Republic, which they perceive as a foreign “Arab” regime, is the one that will kneel before the Iranian people. Every attempt by the regime to create unity around the flag blows up in its face and becomes a joke online.

War on social media

Dr. Eilam Gindin explains how to identify on Twitter who are regime agents and who are opponents. According to her, users tweeting from inside Iran without a VPN, a practice nicknamed the “white line”, are likely regime agents, since the networks are blocked for ordinary citizens. Surprisingly, it was discovered that even separatist accounts, for instance those of pan-Kurdish groups, operate with a “white line”. This reinforces the suspicion that the regime runs them itself to delegitimize the protests and frighten the public with the prospect of the state’s collapse.

The future of the regime and scenarios for the day after Khamenei

Boris asks what would have happened if Khamenei, an elderly and sick man, had been killed in the war. Dr. Eilam Gindin presents several possible scenarios. One scenario is that the regime would have been weakened enough for the people to overthrow it. Another is a takeover by a hostile entity, such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, which is considered worse than the current regime. Another plausible scenario is that the Assembly of Experts would have quickly appointed a successor, possibly from a list Khamenei himself had prepared. Such a successor, younger and more pragmatic, could have actually saved the Islamic Republic. Finally, there is also the “Chinese scenario”, in which the regime remains in power but carries out slow economic and social reforms to ensure its survival.

The failure of the popular uprising

According to Dr. Eilam Gindin, the expectation in Israel for a popular uprising in Iran during the war did not materialize for several reasons. First, the regime completely shut down the internet, which prevented any ability to organize. Second, many residents fled Tehran during the bombing, so most potential protesters were not even in the city. Third, it is difficult to organize a mass demonstration under the threat of bombing. It also appears there was no coordination between Israel and opposition figures such as the exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi.

Unity and division

The regime tries to portray the protests as an initiative of separatist minorities, but according to Dr. Eilam Gindin, the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protest was characterized by pan-Iranian unity. The protest, which began after the death of a young Kurdish woman, swept up all the country’s ethnic groups, including the Baloch, Azeris, and Persians, and spread to every remote village.

The water crisis in Tehran

Dr. Eilam Gindin describes another severe crisis: the water crisis. Tehran, a capital over two hundred years old, was built when Iran’s entire population was less than ten million people. Today, more than ten million live in Tehran alone, and the infrastructure cannot handle the load. Years of drought, over-pumping of groundwater for wasteful agriculture, and poor education on water conservation have depleted the underground water reserves. The result is severe land subsidence, with certain neighborhoods in Tehran sinking at a rate of more than 30 centimeters a year, and the appearance of sinkholes. The only solution to these phenomena is to evacuate cities, an almost impossible task in the case of a huge metropolis like Tehran.

The need for an Israeli majority for peace

According to Sinijlawi, peace is always one Israeli election away. A political solution will only be possible when 51 percent of the Israeli public votes for such an option. Therefore, the Palestinian side must work to rebuild trust with Israelis and persuade them to support the two-state solution. He believes that any other solution means the victory of one side over the other, which he considers impossible. The recent war, which he says has returned the situation to the starting point of October 6, only proves this.

The need for a Palestinian “Ben-Gurion”

Boris remarks that peace is a “tango” that requires change on the Palestinian side as well. Sinijlawi agrees, adding that alongside one election in Israel, the Palestinians need one leader to change the situation. He says the Palestinians lack their own “Ben-Gurion”: a leader with a vision for building state institutions and the internal strength to exert authority even against internal opponents, as Ben-Gurion did in the Altalena affair. He also mentions Menachem Begin, a right-wing figure who evacuated settlements in Sinai in exchange for peace.

Failures in the Palestinian leadership

Sinijlawi argues that the Palestinian leadership throughout history, from Hajj Amin al-Husseini to Mahmoud Abbas, has not understood the conflict from the other side’s perspective. In the 1990s, the Palestinian leadership adopted a strategy of applying pressure and violence, thinking it would achieve gains. Sinijlawi maintains that pressure does not work on Israelis, and the only way to move forward is through persuasion and speaking to their hearts.

Why Abu Mazen rejected Olmert’s offer

The most important missed opportunity, according to Sinijlawi, was Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s peace offer to Mahmoud Abbas in 2008. Sinijlawi explains the rejection for two reasons. The first was political timing: the Americans advised Abbas to wait for Tzipi Livni, who was expected to win the elections and sign a similar agreement. The second, more significant reason lies in Abbas’s personality. He preferred to leave a legacy as a leader who gave up nothing, especially on the right of return, rather than a legacy as a leader who achieved 90 percent of the Palestinian goals.

Abu Mazen’s role in the rise of Hamas

Sinijlawi accuses Abbas of “stealing 20 years” from the lives of the Palestinian people. He claims that Abbas made strategic mistakes that helped Hamas take over Gaza. First, he allowed Ismail Haniyeh to establish an internal security force in the Strip. After the Hamas takeover, he ordered 50,000 Palestinian Authority employees in Gaza to stay home, thereby vacating the institutions of government and handing them to Hamas on a silver platter.

The peace movement and the younger generation

Boris asks about the existence of a Palestinian peace movement, and Sinijlawi explains that he represents a generation that sees Israel as a successful model to emulate, not an enemy. He aspires to establish a Palestinian state with a parliamentary democracy and a free-market economy, similar to Israel. His activism, he emphasizes, stems from a Palestinian national interest. According to him, the younger Palestinian generation is connected to the world through social media, wants to live well, and is less interested in national symbols. He sees this as an opening for a new leadership that will offer hope.

Deradicalization and mutual recognition

Sinijlawi argues that demilitarizing Gaza is not enough. The will to use weapons must be addressed through a process of deradicalization and changing the narrative. Both sides, he says, face a difficult decision. Israelis must choose between annexation and separation. The Palestinians must choose between a two-state solution and exercising the right of return within Israel, as both together are not possible. He calls for mutual recognition of the historical connection of both peoples to the land, noting that even the Quran tells the stories of the patriarchs in this land. The question is not to whom the land belongs, but how both peoples can belong to it together.

The future of the settlements and reconciliation

Within the framework of a two-state solution, Sinijlawi believes that Jews who wish to should be allowed to continue living in places like Hebron, as Israeli citizens and residents of the state of Palestine. The Palestinian state would be responsible for their security and rights. Above all, he emphasizes the need for a reconciliation process. He says the damage done to hearts is greater than the physical damage, and if Israelis were able to reconcile with Germany, the two peoples can also reconcile. He does not believe the process requires one side to declare defeat, but rather should stem from a shared national interest.

The need for imagination

Sinijlawi concludes with an analogy. Before October 7, there was no lack of information about Hamas’s plans, but a lack of imagination to believe they would be realized. Today, there are many signs that the region wants normalization with Israel, but Israelis lack the imagination to see themselves as part of the Middle East. Both sides, he concludes, need to imagine peace to make it a reality.

Pressure on Al-Qard al-Hasan, Hezbollah’s bank

According to Friedman, the first channel for strangling Hezbollah is targeting the Al-Qard al-Hasan (The Good Loan) bank. The bank was established by Hezbollah in 1982 and received a license from the Lebanese government in 1987. Outwardly, it functions as a charity that provides interest-free loans and grants to the Shiite community, in accordance with Islamic law. In practice, Friedman claims, the bank serves as a conduit for money laundering, terror financing, and paying salaries to the organization’s operatives. Its main sources of funding are aid from Iran and profits from the drug trade.

Recently, significant pressure has been applied to the bank. In addition to Israeli strikes on its branches, the United States has issued an ultimatum to the Lebanese government: within two months, starting from November 11, Hezbollah must disarm and shut down Al-Qard al-Hasan. At the same time, the Americans recently imposed sanctions that disconnect the bank from the Lebanese banking system, which harms its ability to conduct money transfers.

Hezbollah refuses to comply with the demands, which creates immense pressure on the Lebanese government. According to Friedman, three-quarters of the Lebanese public are demanding that the government send the army to the south and disarm Hezbollah. However, the Lebanese army fears a confrontation. Friedman notes that according to a simulation he ran, Hezbollah is stronger than the Lebanese army in terms of equipment, experience, and motivation, so it is unclear why it would give up its power.

The collapse of the drug empire

The second part of the economic strangulation, which has seen significant successes, is the war on Hezbollah’s drug empire. For decades, the organization has made enormous profits from growing hashish and opium, and especially from producing Captagon pills. The smuggling route, Friedman explains, originated in Lebanon, passed through Syria in cooperation with the Assad regime, and from there continued to Jordan, Israel, and the Gulf states. In this way, the drugs primarily harmed countries considered enemies of Iran.

Friedman describes two key developments that caused the empire’s collapse. First, Lebanon’s security forces began raiding the drug-growing areas in the Beqaa Valley. Since Hezbollah officially denies any connection to drugs, it cannot respond militarily to these actions. The highlight of the operation was the assassination of drug lord Ali Zwaiter, the “Escobar of Lebanon,” by a Lebanese army drone.

Second, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria changed the rules of the game. The new ruler, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is keen to prove to the West that he is a legitimate partner, as well as to strike at his bitter enemy, Hezbollah. Therefore, the new Syrian regime has begun to fight the drug trade, destroy shipments, and act against smugglers. Turkey, which supports the new regime, assisted in the effort by arresting Syria’s biggest drug lord, Omar Shadeh, and extraditing him to the Syrians. As a result, Friedman explains, Hezbollah’s second most important source of funding is in real existential danger.

A look to the future

In summing up the discussion, Boris Gorelik raises the concern that Israel has remained relatively passive in the process, and is dependent on the actions of the United States, Turkey, and the new Syrian regime. Friedman agrees but notes that Israel always has the military option, which could harm Hezbollah more quickly and drastically. However, he warns that such an attack could lead to an escalation, and quotes Nasrallah’s deputy, Naim Qassem, who recently said the organization “will no longer be able to remain silent” if it feels its end is near.

Friedman rejects the claim that Israel can cooperate with the new Syrian regime against Hezbollah. According to him, al-Sharaa is fighting Hezbollah out of self-interest, and replacing Iranian patronage in Syria with Turkish patronage simply substitutes a new enemy for the old one. Despite this, he ends on an optimistic note, emphasizing that the economic strangulation of Hezbollah is real, and the distress within the organization is keenly felt.

The root of the conflict is religious

According to Yinon Dan Kehati, the root of the conflict is religious. Islam, which for 1,400 years was accustomed to ruling over Jews as protected subjects, never had to theologically confront a situation of Jewish sovereignty over Muslims. The establishment of the State of Israel, especially on waqf land, is perceived as a humiliation and a “religious accident” that Islam seeks to erase from history.

Kehati explains that he does not dismiss the Quran or the faith of Muslims, but rather offers a different interpretation of it. This interpretation reconciles with the return to Zion as the fulfillment of the prophecies of the prophets of Israel, who are also prophets in Islam. According to this approach, opposition to Jewish sovereignty is in fact opposition to the prophets of Islam itself. Kehati believes that the future peace discourse should be led by the national-religious public, meaning the settlers, and not by the secular public, whose approach has failed.

Using Islamic sources

Kehati describes his method as a kind of spiritual jiu-jitsu: using Islamic sources and the religious energy of the other side to advance the Zionist argument. He does not rely on the Torah, because Muslims would immediately claim it has been corrupted (tahrif), but on the Quran itself.

As an example, he points to the concept of “wa’d Allah” (the promise of God), which is considered eternal and inviolable in the Quran. Since the Quran mentions God’s covenant with the Children of Israel, and it is never written that the covenant was annulled, a Muslim who acts against this covenant is in fact acting against Allah.

Regarding the claim that the Torah was corrupted, Kehati replies that the Quran itself came to “confirm” the Torah, and notes that only “some” of the Jews corrupted it. He also cites a hadith (Sunan Abu Dawood 4449) according to which the Prophet Muhammad judged Jews according to their own Torah. Kehati asks how it is possible for a true prophet to judge based on a source he himself considers forged.

From exile to sovereignty

Kehati argues that Israeli society still suffers from an “exile mentality,” and especially from a discomfort with using force. According to him, using force is not just about deploying the army, but also about taking responsibility for all the inhabitants of the land, including generosity toward those who accept our rule and punishment for those who oppose it. He criticizes the statement “I don’t want to worry about Gaza’s sewage,” arguing that when Israel does not take responsibility, the “sewage,” whether it is literal wastewater or incitement in the education system, flows back to it.

Boris raises the hypothesis that the disengagement from Gaza and the lack of contact with Jews contributed to the dehumanization that enabled the cruelty of October 7, and that the settlements, by creating friction and contact, might actually be an opportunity for peace. Kehati agrees and quotes Major General (res.) Gershon Hacohen, who said that the friction between settlers and Palestinians in Gush Etzion creates a new reality and allows them to see that there are human beings on the other side.

A phased political plan

Boris asks about the political solution and the demographic threat. Kehati clarifies that he is not aiming for a halachic state, but for a spiritual leadership that will unite all parts of the nation and adapt the principles of the Kingdom of Israel to our times, for example in a federal structure based on tribal lands.

He proposes a phased process of “restoring sovereignty,” not “annexation,” because you cannot annex what is already yours. The process would begin with a few villages as a pilot, whose residents would receive residency status, followed by pathways to citizenship subject to conditions. The conditions are based on the three options that Joshua bin Nun offered to the Canaanites: those who wish to flee may flee, those who wish to fight will fight, and those who wish to make peace may make peace. According to Kehati, the State of Israel has never properly defined the option of peace from within the Jewish tradition, and has always clung to the paradigm of separation and two states.

Names, types, and styles

According to Dr. Yaron Friedman, the keffiyeh has different names in different regions. The literary term is keffiyeh, from the city of Kufa in Iraq. In the region of Israel, Lebanon, and Palestinian society, it is called a hatta. In Iraq and Jordan, it is known as a shmagh, a name that may originate from Akkadian, and in the Persian Gulf states, it is called a ghutra.

There are three main types of keffiyehs. The first type is a completely white keffiyeh, common among fellahin and Bedouins. The second type is a red-and-white keffiyeh, which is today primarily identified with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The third type is the black-and-white keffiyeh, which has become a symbol of the Palestinian people.

Friedman adds that over the keffiyeh, it is customary to wear an iqal, a black cord made of goat wool. The name of the iqal is related to the Arabic word “aql” (intellect), and it was also used in the past to tie camels’ legs. Today, its main function is to hold the keffiyeh on the head. There are different styles of wearing the keffiyeh and the iqal, which vary from country to country and from tribe to tribe. For example, Saudis tend to let the edges of the keffiyeh hang loose on their shoulders, while Qataris prefer to lift them upwards.

The symbols on the fabric

Dr. Friedman explains that several fixed symbols appear on the keffiyeh. The two prominent stripes on the sides of the keffiyeh are usually interpreted as the two great rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris. Among Palestinians, however, the stripes symbolize the sea and the river. Other interpretations see them as a symbol of trade routes or Bedouin migration paths.

Another example is the fishnet pattern, which symbolizes the source of livelihood in various regions. Another pattern, of triangles, is often interpreted as ears of wheat or barley, a symbol of agriculture and the fellahin. Palestinians, according to Friedman, interpret this pattern as olive leaves, a distinct Palestinian symbol.

From class history to a national symbol

The keffiyeh was not always a national symbol. During the Ottoman period, Friedman explains, it was a class symbol. The common people, the fellahin and the Bedouins, wore a keffiyeh, while the urban elites close to the government wore a Turkish tarboosh.

During the Great Arab Revolt (1936-1939), which was led mainly by fellahin, the keffiyeh became a symbol of the struggle against the British Mandate. After 1967, when the Israeli government banned the flying of the Palestinian flag in the territories, the black-and-white keffiyeh, identified with Yasser Arafat, became a substitute for the flag and a prominent symbol of Palestinian identity. Left-wing Palestinian factions, such as the Popular Front and the Democratic Front, adopted the red-and-white keffiyeh, not because of its Jordanian context, but because the color red symbolizes communism.

Friedman notes that Jews also wore keffiyehs. Members of the First and Second Aliyah, members of the “Hashomer” organization, and even David Ben-Gurion, wore keffiyehs as a symbol of returning to the land, integrating into the region, and blending in against the enemy. The custom ceased in the 1960s, when the keffiyeh became a distinct Palestinian symbol.

Economics, politics, and the keffiyeh today

According to Friedman, the Palestinian keffiyeh industry was nearly wiped out due to the market being flooded with cheap goods from China. One factory in Hebron, owned by the Hirbawi family, is the last one that continues to produce original Palestinian keffiyehs. Following the “Swords of Iron” war, the factory has experienced a revival. Global demand for keffiyehs has soared, and they have become an international symbol of support for Palestinians and protest against Israel among left-wing activists around the world.

To conclude, Friedman talks about the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. After Argentina’s victory, captain Lionel Messi was dressed in a bisht, a prestigious robe of honor worn by Gulf emirs. According to Friedman, this was the Qataris’ way of bestowing “Arab honor” on Messi for his victory in the first Arab World Cup. The act drew criticism because the bisht concealed the Argentinian team’s emblem.

Why a border is needed at sea

According to Dr. Spanier, demarcating borders at sea is a much more complex task than marking borders on land. Historically, the need for a maritime border hardly existed, but towards the 17th century, states began to understand the economic importance of their adjacent maritime space, mainly for fishing purposes. The first principle that developed was the “cannon shot rule,” which granted a state sovereignty over a sea strip about three miles wide from the coast.

The real revolution occurred in the mid-20th century, with the discovery of oil and natural gas reserves at sea. States realized that there were enormous resources on the seabed, and this created an urgent need to establish clear borders to regulate exploration and production rights. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which Israel has not signed but accepts its principles, stipulates that every state has an exclusive economic zone of up to 200 miles from its coast, and that overlapping areas should be divided “fairly and equitably.”

The background of the dispute between Israel and Lebanon

Dr. Spanier explains that until the 1990s, Israel’s maritime border was not a significant issue. After the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Israel unilaterally drew a maritime border line based on the principle of equal distance from the coasts. This line, marked with buoys for the first five kilometers, became the routine security line.

The complication began with a series of regional agreements. In 2003, Egypt and Cyprus signed a maritime border agreement. In 2007, Lebanon and Cyprus signed a similar agreement, but Lebanon canceled it. In 2010, Israel signed a maritime border agreement with Cyprus. According to Spanier, the problem arose because Israel, in its agreement with Cyprus, started its line from a point further north than the one it set in 2000. It relied on the point established in the canceled agreement between Lebanon and Cyprus. This move created a “disputed triangle” of about 860 square kilometers between Israel and Lebanon.

The dispute over the area intensified when it became clear that a gas field, dubbed “Qana” by the Lebanese, was likely located within this triangle. While Israel has large gas reserves, Lebanon, which is in a deep economic crisis, has not found gas in its territory, and the Qana field became its great economic hope. However, no energy company was willing to invest in exploration in a disputed area.

The 2022 agreement

Against the backdrop of the stalemate and the difficult economic situation in Lebanon, a US mediation process began, led by Amos Hochstein. According to Dr. Spanier, the Israeli government gave the mediators three guidelines: to reach an agreed-upon international border line, to create strategic stability, and to enable the secure development of gas fields.

Ultimately, the agreement reached in October 2022 stipulated that Israel would return to the original border line it drew in 2000. In doing so, Israel relinquished its claim to the triangle area it created in 2010. The agreement is not a direct one between Israel and Lebanon. Each country signed a separate document with the United States, and the agreement was deposited with the UN.

The current situation and open issues

Dr. Spanier argues that the agreement is valid under international law, even without ratification by the Knesset. He rejects the claim that Israel “gave up territory,” explaining that it was territory Israel had unilaterally claimed in a move that was legally questionable from the start. He notes that since the current war began, the maritime arena has remained quiet and Hezbollah has refrained from firing at the gas rigs, which in his view indicates that the agreement has created a stable balance of deterrence.

However, two issues remain open. The first is the five-kilometer-wide sea strip adjacent to the coast. This area was defined as “status quo” because the starting point of the land border, in the Rosh HaNikra area, is still disputed. A final solution will only be possible after the 13 disputed points on the land border are settled.

The second issue is the Qana gas field. Exploratory drilling conducted at the site after the agreement revealed that the field likely does not contain a commercial quantity of gas. According to Dr. Spanier, this is an unfortunate situation, as it is in Israel’s interest for Lebanon to be an economically stable country. He hopes that future exploration north of the border line will yield positive results for the Lebanese.

The role of a population officer

According to Ronen Abramov, the role of the population officer was born from the understanding that the front had moved to the home front. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the enemy has understood that Israel’s soft underbelly is its civilian population. The Home Front Command was established to deal with this challenge, with the main goal being to maintain functional continuity. Unlike in the past, when civilians stayed in shelters for many weeks, today the goal is to allow the population to continue a certain routine even under fire.

Abramov explains that his role is to understand the population’s needs and mediate them to the military command. The needs change over time, and he gives an example of an incident where the main demand of civilians in shelters was an internet connection. He talks about his service during the Corona period, when the Home Front Command distributed food in Bnei Brak. The mission revealed the complexity of the population: every Hasidic sect has different rules, different kashrut requirements, and different sensitivities. The population officer must know these nuances to function effectively.

Battalion 419 on October 7

On the morning of October 7, Battalion 419 was called up to the south. Abramov says that the first mission was to secure the main roads to allow forces to reach strategic targets. After the area was cleared of terrorists, the battalion’s main mission began: searching the communities in the Gaza envelope for missing people and bodies.

He describes entering the communities, where the first thing the soldiers encountered was the smell of death. According to the battalion commander’s directive, every house that was searched and cleared was marked with spray paint with the number 419, which became a symbol of the battalion’s work. During the searches, the soldiers also collected ammunition and sensitive information from the homes of security personnel.

Abramov details the procedure for handling bodies. After a body was located, engineering forces were called in to rule out the possibility of booby traps. Afterward, personnel from the Military Rabbinate handled the body. The bodies were evacuated in two separate trucks: one to the Shura base, for Israeli citizens and foreign workers, and the other to the Sde Teiman base, for the bodies of terrorists. He notes that the condition of the bodies was very poor and made identification difficult.

Psychological coping and work in the disaster zones

Boris asks about the psychological coping with the atrocities. Abramov replies that the soldiers worked on “autopilot” and focused on the mission. However, he describes a process of becoming somewhat accustomed to the horror, such as the ability to distinguish between the smell of a human corpse and the smell of an animal carcass or spoiled meat.

Later, the missions expanded to searching the open areas, the Nova festival site, and the agricultural fields. At a certain point, personnel from the Israel Antiquities Authority also joined the efforts, using their archaeological sifting techniques to find human remains in houses that had been completely burned. He tells of the moment when the remains of Ruth Peretz were found inside a burned ambulance, and how he only understood the magnitude of the event the next day, when he saw her picture in the news.

Maintaining morale and the transition to routine

When the acute phase of the searches ended, the missions became a routine of security, patrols, and escorting civilian entities. Abramov explains that to maintain sanity and morale, it was important to create certainty through a fixed schedule. Another significant factor was performances by artists who came to the area. He talks about a performance by Eviatar Banai that provided the soldiers with a moment of catharsis and detachment.

Alongside this, there were talks with professionals about resilience and processing experiences. Abramov, in his role as a population officer, initiated “discussion circles” himself for event closure. He admits that the burnout was immense, and his personal breaking point came when the pressure from home increased. He notes the heavy price that reserve duty exacted from many soldiers: divorces, collapsed businesses, and “invisible” psychological wounds.

Social cohesion and drawing lessons

Today, in his role as a social cohesion officer, Abramov works to strengthen the bonds between soldiers. According to him, the army understands that today’s commander needs to be an embracing and inclusive figure, not one who operates solely by the power of authority. He argues that when a strong and cohesive community is created at the company level, the soldiers’ commitment to each other increases. He notes positively the fact that politics remained outside the army during the war.

In conclusion, he calls for unity among the people and to avoid returning to the internal conflicts that preceded October 7. He hopes that Israeli society will once again become as cohesive as the Jewish communities in the diaspora, and will know how to conduct arguments for the sake of heaven and not for the sake of quarreling.

What is mental resilience?

According to Prof. Gadron, the American Psychological Association defines resilience as the process of adapting well in the face of a threat, trauma, or stress. The term includes both the process and the outcome, meaning the ability to recover and return to functioning. He notes that there are questionnaires to measure personal resilience, such as the CD-RISC questionnaire, which assesses, among other things, the ability to adapt to change and recover quickly from setbacks. In addition to personal resilience, there is also community resilience, which includes physical infrastructure (like water, electricity, and hospitals) alongside strong social networks and welfare services. Prof. Gadron distinguishes resilience from related concepts. One concept is “Sense of Coherence,” which describes the ability to understand difficult situations, manage them, and find meaning in them. Another concept is “Coping,” which refers to the set of thoughts and behaviors a person employs to solve a problem or adapt to it. He rejects the cliché that any way of coping is good, explaining that the coping strategy must be adapted to the situation. For example, in an uncontrollable situation like an air raid siren, effective coping would actually involve denial, humor, or relaxation, not an attempt to solve the problem.

Israeli resilience

Boris Gorelik asks why Israeli society has not collapsed despite the ongoing war. Prof. Gadron explains that Israeli society is well prepared for emergencies. From a young age, citizens practice going to shelters, and most of the population completes military service, which provides coping tools. According to him, many other countries do not have such preparation. He cites a study by Avi Bleich from the period of the terror wave of the 2000s, which found a unique combination in Israel: very high levels of distress alongside a strong belief in the ability to cope. This combination, of acknowledging distress together with a high sense of capability, is a key component of Israeli resilience.

The biological measure of resilience: The vagus nerve

Prof. Gadron specializes in the vagus nerve, also known as the “wandering nerve.” This is a nerve that descends from the neck to the internal organs and transmits information about the body’s state to the brain. Its activity can be measured using a metric called “heart rate variability” (HRV). Contrary to popular belief, a completely stable pulse is not a good sign. Rather, small and constant changes in the intervals between heartbeats indicate flexibility and adaptability. According to him, high heart rate variability is associated with a reduced risk for a wide range of mental health problems, including anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as physical illnesses like diabetes, stroke, heart attacks, and cancer. A study he conducted among pre-military academy students showed a direct link between high heart rate variability and higher levels of resilience and fewer physical and post-traumatic symptoms. People with high vagal activity (activity of the vagus nerve) respond to stress more moderately and recover from it more quickly.

How to increase resilience?

Prof. Gadron suggests several simple ways to increase vagal activity and thus resilience:

1. Mediterranean diet: Consumption of olive oil, fish, fruits, and vegetables.
2. Moderate physical activity: The activity itself lowers heart rate variability, but in the long run, it contributes to an increase in this metric at rest.
3. Slow, rhythmic breathing: Lowering the breathing rate to about five or six breaths per minute. The technique is simple: inhale through the nose (“smell a flower”), pause for a moment, and exhale slowly through the mouth (“blow out a candle”). Practicing for a few minutes, several times a day, can raise heart rate variability almost immediately. One can use biofeedback apps that show the change in real time.

Psychoneuroimmunology: The link between stress and illness

Prof. Gadron’s field of research, psychoneuroimmunology, examines the mechanisms that link psychological stress to physical illnesses. He explains that stress causes changes in the immune system. In stressful situations, parts of it are suppressed, but other parts become overactive, creating a chronic inflammatory response. This inflammation is a major risk factor for many chronic diseases. The vagus nerve acts as a regulator or “thermostat” for the inflammatory response. When it functions well, it helps calm the inflammation after the threat has passed.

Short-term trauma treatments

Prof. Gadron argues that it is time for mental health treatment in Israel to be based more on scientific evidence and less on dogmatism. He presents two short and effective methods for treating trauma. One is the Memory Structuring Intervention (MSI), which he developed. In the treatment, which lasts one or two sessions, the therapist helps the patient, after practicing calming breathing exercises, to organize the traumatic memory chronologically and to name the sensations and emotions. The goal is to shift the memory processing from emotional and primitive areas of the brain to more frontal and rational areas, thereby restoring the patient’s sense of control. Another method is Dr. Moshe Farchi’s SIX C’s model, designed to help people return to functioning immediately after a traumatic event. A study conducted by Gadron and Farchi showed that the method can also “inoculate” adolescents against the effects of future events.

Social resilience

Finally, Boris Gorelik asks if there is a social equivalent to the vagus nerve, meaning a mechanism that calms the community. Prof. Gadron speculates, while stressing that this is not a scientific assertion, that focusing on a common goal and on what unites people can build social resilience. He calls for remembering what the different groups in society have in common and acting together, based on the understanding that there is more that unites than divides.

Two types of heroism

According to Yagil Henkin, a distinction can be made between a Western and a non-Western concept of warfare. While in many tribal societies combat was personal and designed to display individual courage, the Western concept, from the Roman legion to the present day, emphasizes mass, coordinated combat in which each soldier is required to fulfill their duty as part of a system.

However, even within this organized framework, there is room for personal heroism, which has two main types. The first type is heroism within the scope of an order, where a soldier is required to perform an especially dangerous mission, far beyond what is expected of a regular soldier. An example of this is the first soldier to breach a wall in a Roman siege, or Eitan Naveh at Ammunition Hill, who provided cover for his comrades while completely exposed to enemy fire. The second type of heroism occurs when the plan goes wrong and the system collapses. In such a situation, the hero is the one who understands the new circumstances, takes initiative, and performs a dangerous action to save the day, without a direct order.

“The younger generation is getting weaker”?

Boris asks if it is harder to expect acts of heroism in the modern, individualistic era. Henkin explains that the saying “the younger generation is getting weaker” is a recurring phenomenon throughout Israel’s history. He mentions the “espresso generation” of the 1960s, who were considered spoiled and hedonistic but fought heroically in the Six-Day War. According to him, even before the current war, some criticized the fighting spirit of the younger generation, but reality proved otherwise.

Henkin argues that in Israel, despite individualism, there is a strong sense of belonging to the collective, to one’s comrades in arms, and to the state. This feeling is what motivates many people to run into the battlefield rather than away from it. He notes that although the immediate motivation on the battlefield is fighting for the comrades to your right and left, what brings the soldiers to the battlefield in the first place is a deeper sense of belonging.

Heroism and moral context

Henkin addresses the tendency to confuse courage with moral righteousness. He mentions Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who used to point out that there were brave people on the Nazi side as well. According to Henkin, courage is a quality that does not indicate the righteousness of the cause. He argues that even among Hamas terrorists there are acts of courage, for example, when a terrorist single-handedly charges a tank. Acknowledging the enemy’s courage does not mean justifying their actions, but rather understanding reality.

He distinguishes between courage and heroism. Courage is the ability to overcome fear and act under fire. Heroism, in our perception, is an exceptional act of courage performed for a positive cause. Therefore, a Hamas fighter who charges in to murder a family might be considered a hero by his comrades, but in our eyes, he will remain a villain. The heroism we value combines two components: exceptional courage and a contribution to a worthy cause.

Commemorating heroism

In the past, for example after World War I, the commemoration of war was mainly collective, as evidenced by monuments like the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. However, in recent years, partly due to the influence of television and cinema, there is a growing tendency to focus on personal stories. Henkin gives the example of the immense popularity of Easy Company from World War II following the series “Band of Brothers,” which turned the battle sites where they fought into pilgrimage destinations.

Another trend is the focus on stories of heroism involving saving lives, like the story of the medic Desmond Doss in the film “Hacksaw Ridge,” over stories of heroism of fighters who killed enemies. According to Henkin, modern society is sometimes more comfortable identifying with heroism that does not involve killing.

Decorations for heroism in Israel and the world

Boris notes that Israel is considered “stingy” in awarding decorations compared to other armies like the U.S. military. Henkin explains that this stems from a more socialist and egalitarian tradition, and from the absence of “campaign medals” given for the mere participation in a war. It took the IDF years to formalize its system of decorations and citations.

Henkin points to a change in the nature of the decorations. In the Second Lebanon War, for example, the vast majority of decorations were given for rescue and saving lives in situations that went wrong, not for the outstanding execution of a successful mission. He argues that there is a tendency to overlook “gray” heroism, the perfect execution of a mission, because it is perceived as self-evident.

Regarding the current war, Henkin speculates that the reason for the delay in awarding citations stems from several factors: the desire to thoroughly investigate all events, the fear of controversies surrounding the distribution, and the fact that there are so many acts of heroism that a concern exists that mass distribution would devalue the decoration.

Creating the exhibit

According to Yuval Leikin, who served in the training division of the Intelligence Directorate, about two weeks after October 7 he received the mission to create an “atrocities exhibit.” In his view, the very use of this term shows how the event was perceived by the high command: an event whose essence is the atrocity, not necessarily the operational aspects.

The mission was vague and raised many questions, such as who the target audience was, which atrocities to display, and what the legal and moral limitations were, for example regarding the privacy of the murdered and the dignity of the individual.

Sources of the documentation

Leikin explains that when he began his work, the internet was already flooded with atrocity materials. He identifies three main sources for these materials.

The first source was the Hamas terrorists themselves. He claims that filming the acts of murder and disseminating them were part of the mission assigned to them, with the goal of creating chaos, psychological warfare, and exciting their supporters.

The second source was journalists and private individuals, both Israeli and foreign, who moved around the area and collected materials, sometimes for self-promotion.

The third source was Israeli bodies, both institutional and semi-institutional, that operated channels of influence, sometimes anonymously, and distributed materials to shock and provoke criticism in international public opinion.

According to him, in the first few weeks, there was chaos in the management of the materials, but most Israeli actors refrained from distributing images of children or of explicit acts of rape.

Beyond the atrocity: The full story

During their work, Leikin and his team realized that the story was deeper than the atrocity itself. They began to investigate the entire “value chain” that led to the murder: the preparations, the religious and ideological basis, and the social environment in Gaza that he says encourages a culture of death. The story expanded from the individual terrorist to the entire society.

Israel’s “day of lineage”

Leikin calls October 7 Israel’s “day of lineage.” In his view, it is an event that illustrates what could have happened on all of the country’s borders, and serves as a reminder that Israel must “forever live by the sword.” He believes a similar event could happen again, including from Gaza, because the hatred, the education, and the means still exist there. According to him, for the exhibit intended for international audiences, they considered calling it “Amalek.”

How to display atrocities

Leikin describes the dilemma of how to present the atrocities. In the exhibit, they chose not to create a logical order, but to present “walls of photos” that simulate the chaos and randomness of the massacre.

One of the key insights from the work was that it is much harder for people to hear the stories than to see the pictures. The imagination, he says, fills in the details in a more difficult way. He illustrates this with the story of the Kapsheter family, who were murdered in their car, and with the description of the bodies’ positions, which indicated resistance at the moment of death.

In addition to the victims, the exhibit also shows the murderers: their faces, their laughter, and their religious fervor, to emphasize the gap between their inhumanity and the helplessness of the murdered.

The murderers’ motives

Leikin analyzes the motives of the murderers, who were mostly young men who grew up in Gaza. He points to three main factors. The first is human bestiality and the need to release aggression. The second is the feeling of absolute control they had in the area. And the third is a deep-seated, antisemitic, and anti-human hatred, built by Hamas’s system of education and incitement.

He expresses pessimism about the future and believes the war has only deepened the hatred among the younger generation in Gaza.

The future of the exhibit and of memory

The exhibit is located at the Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (I.H.C.) in Glilot, but for now it is not open to the general public. It is used mainly for diplomats, journalists, and IDF cadets. Leikin expresses hope that the responsible authorities will decide to open it to the public.

According to him, this situation is an expression of the fact that two years after the event, the state has still not formalized the mechanisms for documenting, commemorating, and researching October 7. However, he ends on a cautiously optimistic note. October 7 was a sobering event that reminded Israelis that they live in a jungle where strength is the only way to survive.

Early beginnings

According to Dr. Admoni, the first contacts between Americans and Qataris began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the activity of American missionaries in the Gulf region. At that time, Qatar was a remote and undeveloped area, and the missionaries operated there with relative freedom, in direct contact with the local ruler. Until World War I, the territory was subject to a struggle for control between the Ottoman Empire and Britain. After the war, in 1916, a protectorate treaty was signed that placed Qatar under British influence, which lasted until its independence in 1971.

From oil to independence

With the discovery of oil, a competition began between British and American oil companies for the Qatari ruler’s favor. According to Dr. Admoni, the ruler exploited this competition to secure better economic terms, explaining to the British representative that the Americans were simply offering more money. After the British withdrawal in 1971, the United States began to strengthen its diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar. Initially, the Qataris were hesitant, but as exports to the United States grew, the relationship warmed. As early as 1983, initial military cooperation began between Doha and the U.S. Central Command.

The American base moves to Qatar

The turning point in the relationship came after the first Gulf War. The American presence at the Dhahran base in Saudi Arabia sparked fierce opposition from the public and the kingdom’s conservative religious establishment. Meanwhile, a new leader came to power in Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, who deposed his father in 1995. Hamad, who was educated in Britain, began to work vigorously to build Qatar’s international standing. He identified the opportunity, and when the Saudis pressured the Americans to leave, he offered to host the base on Qatari territory and even to fund its construction and maintenance. Al-Udeid Air Base became the center of American activity in the region, and its importance grew even more after the September 11 attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Who works for whom

Qatar funds the maintenance of the American base to the tune of about 300 million dollars a year. According to Dr. Admoni, this funding gives it enormous leverage over Washington. Qatar has skillfully made itself an essential asset for the United States, regardless of the ruling party. It invests not only in ties with the administration, but also in American civil society. It donates vast sums to universities, funds training for school principals, and even supports foundations linked to politicians on both sides of the aisle, such as the “Barbara Bush Foundation for Education.” At the same time, it gives interviews to right-wing media outlets like Breitbart, thereby cultivating ties with all ends of the political spectrum.

Mediation with terrorist organizations

The other unique asset that Qatar offers the Americans, Dr. Admoni explains, is its extensive ties with terrorist organizations and Islamist actors like Hamas and the Taliban. Qatar presents itself as being able to get its hands dirty for the United States and serve as a vital mediator. This role makes it a central hub in the regional diplomatic network and gives it power and influence far exceeding its size. The United States has become dependent on Qatari mediation, whether in negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan or in talks with Hamas for the release of hostages.

Washington’s red line

In response to a listener’s question, Dr. Admoni estimates that there is almost no red line Qatar could cross in the eyes of the Americans. He mentions an anecdote according to which President George W. Bush joked about the need to bomb the Al Jazeera offices, because the network’s cameras were always present alongside terrorists. In other words, American awareness of the problematic nature of Qatar exists, but Washington sees it as the price of doing business. Qatar helps the United States maintain appearances, for example, by transferring humanitarian aid to Afghanistan without officially recognizing the Taliban regime.

The presidential order and internal stability

Donald Trump recently issued a presidential order granting Qatar a security guarantee. Dr. Admoni notes that the order is not binding on future presidents, but emphasizes that support for Qatar is bipartisan. He speculates that the order was published as a counter-reaction to an Israeli strike in Doha, which in his opinion was intended to convince Trump to take a tougher line but achieved the opposite result. Regarding internal stability, Dr. Admoni believes that the assassination of a key figure would not change Qatar’s policy, but he notes that the regime is paranoid. The Ministry of Interior recently ordered citizens to return unlicensed weapons, and the Independence Day parade was canceled, possibly out of fear of a coup. The ruling Al Thani family is tightening its grip and appointing close associates to key positions, including a new defense minister who is a known Hamas supporter.