The Swords of Iron War and regional upheaval

The Palestinian arena: Gaza and the West Bank

According to Yaron, 2024 was characterized by the IDF’s entry into the Gaza Strip, taking control of its territory, and dismantling Hamas battalions. However, he notes that the remnants of Hamas’s forces show no signs of surrender, a phenomenon he attributes to high motivation and many years of indoctrination. He describes Hamas’s education system since 2007 as a mechanism that spread antisemitic and extreme religious incitement, which dehumanized Jews and prepared the ground for the October 7th attack.

The Israeli response was strong and largely restored deterrence. Yaron mentions the figures from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, which speak of tens of thousands killed, but emphasizes that the data do not distinguish between terrorists and civilians. He sharply criticizes the Al Jazeera network for its propaganda against Israel. The main question that remains open, he says, is who will rule the Strip the day after the war. In the absence of Israeli agreement on an alternative like the Palestinian Authority, the remaining option is Israeli military rule, a difficult scenario with serious consequences.

Meanwhile, significant fighting also took place in Judea and Samaria, with hundreds of arrests, many Palestinian fatalities, and attacks against Israelis.

Lebanon: A blow to Hezbollah

The war in Gaza created a domino effect that led to the war in the north. Yaron explains that Nasrallah tied Lebanon’s fate to Gaza’s fate, and his insistence that the residents of the north would not return to their homes left Israel no choice but to launch a broad offensive and eliminate Hezbollah’s leadership. According to him, Nasrallah is a hothead who brought disaster upon his organization.

There is now a temporary ceasefire, during which the Lebanese army is supposed to deploy in the south, but it is doing so very slowly. Yaron describes the Lebanese army as weak, fragmented, and unmotivated. Meanwhile, the Lebanese population is beginning to grasp the extent of the blow Hezbollah has suffered, and internal criticism against it is growing. The question is whether this will translate into political change, or if Hezbollah will try to renew the fighting to prove its strength.

Syria: The fall of the Assad regime

The blow to Hezbollah in Lebanon led to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Yaron describes how the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from Syria, alongside Israeli strikes, created an opportunity for the Sunni opposition organizations in Idlib. These organizations, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Jolani), launched a lightning offensive and conquered Damascus within days. Assad’s army, which was hollow, corrupt, and hungry, simply disintegrated.

Now, Syria has transformed from an Iranian protectorate to a Turkish protectorate. The new regime in Damascus is composed of Salafi-jihadist organizations, which were previously identified with al-Qaeda. Despite al-Jolani’s attempts to present a moderate facade, Yaron expresses deep concern about the changes in the education system and the harm to minorities, especially the Alawites. The Druze, seeing what is happening to the Alawites, are refusing to surrender their weapons. The future of the Kurds in the country’s northeast, who control the oil fields, is also shrouded in uncertainty.

Jordan and Egypt: Stability under pressure

Jordan and Egypt maintained stability in 2024, but both are facing severe economic crises and growing public pressure following the war in Gaza. In Jordan, King Abdullah allowed the Muslim Brotherhood movement to return to parliament to release pressure, but was surprised by their strength in the elections, where they won a fifth of the seats. According to Yaron, this situation constitutes a time bomb.

In Egypt, the economy suffered a severe blow due to the Houthis’ blockade of shipping lanes in the Red Sea, which is harming revenues from the Suez Canal. Egypt cannot act militarily against the Houthis at the request of Saudi Arabia, which wants to maintain its ceasefire with the organization in Yemen. However, the peace treaty with Israel stood the test, and Egypt refrained from military intervention or accepting Palestinian refugees.

Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf states

In Iraq, the pro-Iranian militias refrained from intervening in the war in Syria, despite an explicit demand from Iran. Yaron explains this is due to their fear of a domino effect reaching them as well, and due to American and governmental pressure. The trend in Iraq is a rapprochement with the moderate Sunni axis of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

Iran, for its part, feels that billions invested in proxy militias have gone down the drain. It faces internal criticism, and all that remains for it now is the nuclear card, in the hope of reaching an agreement with the new American administration. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, desires quiet and stability to advance its economic vision, and therefore maintains normal relations with Iran to restrain the Houthis.

In conclusion, Yaron believes that 2025 holds both dangers and opportunities. The fate of Gaza’s reconstruction, and the question of whether the money will come from moderate countries like Saudi Arabia and the Emirates or from actors like Qatar and Turkey, will be critical. He ends on a cautiously optimistic note, hoping that a new American administration will want to expand the Abraham Accords and bring greater stability to the region.