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The episode features Alex Grinberg, an expert on Iran. The conversation begins with an incident in which an Azeri passenger plane was hit over Chechnya, and from there develops into a discussion about Russia’s conduct, Azerbaijan’s diplomacy, and the possible implications of Turkey’s growing strength in Syria for Israel’s northern border.
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The downing of the Azeri plane in Chechnya
According to Grinberg, the incident illustrates the revulsion the Russian regime inspires. He explains that it was likely the private anti-aircraft systems of Chechnya’s ruler, Ramzan Kadyrov, that fired at the Azeri plane. At the time, there was a Ukrainian drone attack, and the Chechen force fired with criminal negligence at everything flying in the airspace. Grinberg notes that contrary to procedure, the force did not declare a “carpet situation,” which means closing the airspace to civilian aviation before opening fire.
The plane was hit by shrapnel, not a direct missile, which is why it survived. Additionally, electronic warfare measures were used against it, disabling its navigation systems. The Russians’ goal, according to Grinberg, was to hide the malfunction and cause the plane to crash into the Caspian Sea so the black box would not be found.
Azerbaijan’s conduct toward Russia
Grinberg describes how the Russians began to lie, claiming the plane was hit by birds. Azerbaijan, for its part, managed the crisis wisely. It first demanded a clarification, and when the Russians delayed, the Azeri Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted its Russian counterpart. Finally, Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, gave a speech in Russian in which he demanded an investigation and compensation. Only then did an apology come from Putin.
According to Grinberg, the plane’s black box was found and sent to Brazil, the aircraft’s manufacturer, so the Russians cannot hide the truth. He emphasizes that this conduct proves that Azerbaijan is not a Russian client state, but knows how to stand its ground wisely and decisively, contrary to the image it sometimes has in the Western media.
Turkey replacing Russia in Syria
The discussion moves to the implications for Israel, particularly the possibility of Turkey taking Russia’s place in Syria. Grinberg argues that most of Israel’s security establishment does not understand Turkey. He criticizes the “Nagel Report,” which labeled Turkey as an enemy, and argues that a distinction must be made between a hostile state and an enemy state. According to him, Israel has no ability to influence Turkey’s entry into Syria, and Turkey’s goals are economic and imperial, not to launch a jihad against Israel.
He explains that the Turkish model is different from the Iranian one: while Iran uses proxies to destabilize failing states, Turkey works to stabilize areas to enable economic activity for Turkish companies. Although the militias Turkey supports are jihadist, Grinberg believes they should be judged by their actions. He assesses that the Turkish presence does not pose a direct military threat to Israel, but stresses that Israel must not give up territory in the Golan Heights in exchange for any promises.
Lack of expertise on Turkey in Israel
Boris notes that there are very few experts on Turkey in Israel. Grinberg agrees and links this to a broader problem. He claims that a basic condition for expertise on a country is knowledge of its language, but Israel’s higher education system does not encourage non-technical humanities studies. He adds that Israeli intelligence, both civilian and military, focuses mainly on operational aspects and lacks expertise in information warfare, manipulation, and narrative planting, areas in which intelligence agencies like those of Russia and Iran excel.
Information warfare and agents of influence
In this context, Grinberg elaborates on the nature of intelligence work. He argues that its main component is not information gathering, but information warfare, manipulation, and the dissemination of narratives. He distinguishes between a regular “agent,” who is recruited and paid, and an “agent of influence.” An agent of influence, he says, does not have to be formally recruited, but can promote a foreign country’s narrative out of ideological belief. As an example, he cites Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, who passed nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union convinced they were acting for a good cause. He claims that many pro-Iranian agents of influence operate in the West, spreading narratives that serve Tehran, and Israel barely deals with this phenomenon.
The original episode, in Hebrew: חכם, לא רק צודק