Secularism is winning in Iran

The cancellation of the new hijab law

Eilam Gindin opens with a current example of secularism’s victory in Iran: the cancellation of a new, draconian hijab law that was supposed to take effect in December. Since the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protest, many women have stopped wearing the hijab, and the regime has struggled to re-enforce the law. The new law included severe punishments, ranging from fines and a ban on leaving the country to 15 years in prison and even the death penalty.

According to her, Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, opposed the law, arguing it was unenforceable and would cause public unrest. Despite this, the regime intended to advance it. What changed the picture was the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, which led to the collapse of a large part of Iran’s proxy network. Eilam Gindin explains that the proxy network provided Iran not only with a geographical foothold and reputation, but also with manpower to suppress demonstrations, as there are not enough Iranians willing to do it. Following this weakening, the Supreme National Security Council ordered the Majles (the parliament) not to enact the law, for fear of public reaction.

Surveys on religion and secularism

Boris notes that Eilam Gindin previously mentioned a survey according to which about 50% of Iranians define themselves as non-religious. Eilam Gindin clarifies that there were two surveys. One was unreliable, conducted among followers of a Telegram channel for regime opponents. The other was an extensive telephone survey conducted by a European research institute among thousands of Iranians, most of them inside the country. According to her, the results of the reliable survey are similar, and she argues that they represent a “lower bound.” The reason is that citizens inside Iran, if they were to lie in such a survey, would do so to appear more religious, not less, out of fear for their safety.

The pendulum of identities in Iran

Eilam Gindin describes what she calls the “pendulum of identities” in Iran, which swings between the ancient, pre-Islamic Iranian identity and the Muslim identity. On the one hand, Iranians have immense national pride in their ancient heritage, which predates Islam by thousands of years. On the other hand, Iran has been a Muslim country since the seventh century.

To illustrate this, she recounts the myth of the Arab king Zahhak, who made a pact with the devil, causing two snakes to grow from his shoulders. To soothe his pain, he had to feed them the brains of young men. The Iranians, who hated their king, called on Zahhak to rule over them. Eilam Gindin sees this story as an allegory for the Iranians’ acceptance of Islam, and later, for the acceptance of Khomeini’s rule in 1979. Today, the image of Zahhak is used in caricatures against Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is depicted with snakes on his shoulders. Persian mythology, she says, is alive and breathing in the culture and serves as a tool for criticism against the regime.

The Shah’s secular coercion and the Republic’s religious coercion

According to Eilam Gindin, the current secularization process is a backlash against the regime’s religious coercion. She explains that this is a historical pendulum swing. In the 1930s, the last Shah’s father, Reza Shah, imposed full secularism, including a ban on wearing the hijab. This move caused fierce opposition and an Islamic revival, which culminated in the 1979 revolution. The last Shah tried to emphasize the ancient Iranian identity at the expense of the Muslim identity, which alienated him from the people. Ironically, Eilam Gindin argues, it was the Islamic Republic, with its religious coercion, that succeeded in realizing the Shah’s vision and making the Iranian people largely secular.

Iran-Israel relations on the day after

Boris asks if, after the fall of the regime, Iran will normalize its relations with Israel. Eilam Gindin replies that it is hard to know, but points to a large gap between the regime’s position and the people’s position. After October 7, the pro-Hamas demonstrations organized by the regime were empty of people. In contrast, in soccer stadiums, the crowd booed during moments of silence for the “martyrs of Gaza” and shouted insults at those waving Palestinian flags. At a non-political event, the funeral of an actor, the head of the cinema association was booed by the crowd when she began to speak against “the Zionists in Israel.”

The opposition and the future

Eilam Gindin briefly reviews the opposition figures, including the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, which is hated by most Iranians, and the crown prince, Reza Pahlavi. She criticizes Pahlavi’s visit to Israel, arguing that he presented himself as a puppet ruler of foreign powers, thereby repeating his father’s mistake.

In conclusion, she expresses cautious optimism. The collapse of the proxy network has significantly weakened the regime. The next time a nationwide protest breaks out, it will be much harder for the regime to suppress it without external help. Therefore, the regime is now acting more cautiously toward the people, as the cancellation of the hijab law has shown.