The Iranian strategy: Espionage, cyber, and influence

The Iranian strategy: Combat without contact

According to Finko, there is a fundamental gap between Iranian strategic thinking, which plans for generations, and the Israeli and Western tendency to focus on the “here and now.” The Iranians advocate a concept of combat without contact, meaning they prefer to send others to die for them, such as members of Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Houthis in Yemen.

But their strategy is broader and includes extensive use of what he calls soft power: the ability to achieve goals without firing a single shot. This power is wielded in various ways, from investing money in anti-Israeli organizations in the West to influence and cyber operations.

Influence and cyber operations

Finko notes that reports from the Shin Bet, Google, and Microsoft have pointed to Iranian involvement in fueling the social protests in Israel before October 7. According to him, bots and fictitious personas on social media worked to increase division and polarization in Israeli society. He compares this to the methods of Russian military intelligence (GRU), which creates local crime in European countries to undermine the sense of security and stability.

Another layer is cyberattacks, whose goal is not only to disrupt national infrastructure, like the attempted attack on Israel’s water facilities a few years ago, but also to create panic and psychological harm to the public. Ultimately, the goal of all these actions is to undermine governmental stability and social resilience in Israel.

Human espionage: The psychology of recruitment

Boris asks about the gap between the strategic sophistication and Iran’s apparent failures in human espionage, which sometimes seem amateurish. Finko replies that the public is only exposed to the cases the Shin Bet chooses to publicize, and that catching agents is an inseparable part of the world of espionage.

He distinguishes between a “spy” (like Eli Cohen), who undergoes training and is sent to a target country, and an “agent,” who is a citizen of the target country recruited by a foreign entity. The process of recruiting an agent begins with identifying a target with access to information, building a psychological profile to understand their weaknesses and motivations, and then gradually establishing contact.

Finko emphasizes that contrary to popular belief, money is not the main motivator. It is used as a tool to bind the agent and make them understand they are crossing lines, but the real motivations are psychological: ego, loneliness, a sense of lack, or a desire for revenge. As an example, he brings up a case where an Iranian agent posed as a Jew living in Iran, contacted divorced Israeli women on Facebook, and exploited their loneliness to get them to perform tasks for him.

Cooperation with Russia and China

Finko explains that Iran does not act alone. It has close cooperation with Russia and China in the fields of intelligence and cyber. According to him, there are joint intelligence collection centers, and the three conduct joint exercises and attack operations. However, he clarifies that each country also has its own interests, and there is not always full coordination. He separates Qatar from this axis, noting that it operates in parallel and in competition with Iran.

Precautionary rules

Following a personal story from Boris about a suspicious approach he received on LinkedIn, Finko offers some precautionary rules for citizens:

• Reduce publishing personal and family details on social media as much as possible.
• Be suspicious of approaches and offers that seem too good to be true.
• Verify the identity of the person making contact: search Google for information about the proposed company or conference, and examine their social media profile (a new profile with few friends is a suspicious sign).
• Request a video call. According to him, many agent handlers will disappear at this stage.

Why are Russian-speaking Israelis more vulnerable?

At the end of the conversation, Boris raises the point that almost all the Jewish Israelis arrested in recent years on charges of spying for Iran are Russian speakers. Finko explains this by saying that they are often second-generation immigrants from former Soviet Union countries who have experienced difficulties acclimating and economic and social frustration in Israel. The Iranian approach, which offers them money, warmth, and attention (even if fake), falls on fertile ground of a sense of deprivation and lack of appreciation. He speculates that it might be Russian intelligence that points out these potential recruitment targets from within the community to the Iranians.