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Three months after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, commentator Yaron returns to the podcast to summarize the beginning of the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known by his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Julani. The episode deals with the question of the new leader’s identity, the economic and social situation in Syria, and the challenges facing the new regime.
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Doctor Sharaa and Mister Julani
Yaron begins with a biographical overview of Ahmed al-Sharaa, in an attempt to understand the man who now rules Syria. Al-Sharaa was born in 1982 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a family originating from the Golan Heights, hence his moniker “al-Julani.” He grew up in Damascus, where he received a Salafi Islamic education from a preacher in Aleppo, in stark contrast to his father, who was a Nasserist, secular, and pan-Arab academic. According to Yaron, the Second Intifada in 2000 deeply influenced him.
In 2003, al-Sharaa traveled to Iraq to fight the American occupation, where he joined al-Qaeda and was close to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS. He was captured by the Americans in 2006 and spent five years in prison, where he taught other inmates literary Arabic. After his release in 2011, he was sent by Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the leader of al-Qaeda, to establish a branch of the organization in Syria.
In Syria, Julani founded the Jabhat al-Nusra organization, which was based mainly on Syrian recruits, unlike ISIS which was composed of foreigners. This created a bloody rivalry with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In 2016, Julani officially severed his ties with al-Qaeda and changed his organization’s name to “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.” Yaron notes Julani’s strategic abilities, which were demonstrated in the formation of the “Jaysh al-Fath” coalition in 2015, which almost brought about Assad’s downfall were it not for the Russian intervention. According to Yaron, this intervention delayed the regime’s fall by a decade.
A moderate Salafi regime?
Yaron expresses great skepticism about al-Sharaa’s “moderation.” He emphasizes that the new leader does not speak of democracy, but of “liberation.” He appointed his Salafi government from Idlib to run the country from Damascus, and the newly established army uses Islamic slogans. Furthermore, the curriculum in the education system is becoming increasingly religious, and statements by a senior official in the government on the status of women have sparked outrage among many Syrian women.
An economy in severe crisis
The economic situation in Syria, which was already dire before the fall of Assad, has worsened even more. International sanctions have not been lifted, the electricity supply is almost nonexistent, and Iranian aid, which included subsidized fuel, has ceased. In addition, the Kurdish autonomy in the country’s northeast, which controls the oil fields, has stopped supplies to the new regime in response to attacks against it. The state coffers are empty, and al-Sharaa is turning to Saudi Arabia and Qatar for aid. Yaron estimates that any such aid will come with a heavy political price, and the supporting countries will take control of Syria just as Iran did before.
The plight of minorities
One of the most worrying issues is the situation of minorities. The Alawite community, which was dominant under the Assad regime, has surrendered its weapons and is now vulnerable to attacks. Yaron describes acts amounting to pogroms, with members of the new regime entering the homes of Alawites on the pretext of searching for Assad loyalists.
The Druze and the Kurds, seeing the fate of the Alawites, are refusing to disarm. The Druze in the south feel relatively protected due to their proximity to the border with Israel and Jordan. The Kurds in the north fear an American withdrawal that would abandon them to Turkey and al-Sharaa’s forces. Yaron explains that according to Salafi-jihadist jurisprudence, both Alawites and Druze are considered apostates whose punishment is death.
International recognition and tension on the Lebanese border
Despite its problematic nature, al-Sharaa’s regime has received recognition from many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. Yaron notes that the main supporters are Turkey and Qatar, which in his opinion does not bode well. In the West, only France has recognized the new regime.
Meanwhile, a real war is being waged on the Syria-Lebanon border. Al-Sharaa’s forces are attacking Shiite villages in Syria and also firing toward the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon, claiming they are fighting drug smugglers. Hezbollah and the Shiites in Lebanon see this as a pretext for a sectarian attack. Yaron concludes that the future looks bleak, and that the chance for peace between Israel and Syria, or even for normalization, has become very remote.
The original episode, in Hebrew: סוריה החדשה - סיכום ביניים