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This episode features Dr. Yaron Friedman to discuss the developments in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. The conversation focuses on the new government formed by Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Jolani), the transitional constitution he published, and the question of whether Syria is heading toward democracy or a new Islamic dictatorship.
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A new government, old faces
According to Yaron Friedman, on the surface, the new government presented by al-Sharaa looks promising. The number of ministers was reduced from 28 to 23, and most of them are educated professionals with advanced degrees in their fields. However, Friedman points to several fundamental problems. First, the government was not elected but appointed by al-Sharaa, who seized power by force. Second, female and minority representation in the government is minimal. There is only one female minister, a Christian, and two ministers from minority groups in relatively marginal roles: a Druze minister of agriculture and an Alawite minister of transportation. This is a dramatic decrease in the representation of Alawites, who made up about ten percent of the population and held an average of three to four portfolios in Assad’s governments.
The real power, Friedman argues, is concentrated in the hands of ministers who are former senior members of the terrorist organization Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant), al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. For example, the new interior minister was formerly responsible for assassinations in the organization, and the defense minister was an engineer who provided technical support to its operatives. The foreign minister, Asaad Hassan al-Shaybani, is one of the organization’s founders, but he is considered a scholar with connections in Europe, and al-Sharaa is pinning his hopes on him to lift international sanctions.
Unlike Assad’s government, where most ministers were under personal sanctions, only one minister in the new government is under sanctions. As a conciliatory step, the Kurds received two portfolios, including the education portfolio, after years of zero representation. Friedman explains that this is an attempt by al-Sharaa to reach an agreement with the Kurdish autonomy, but the Kurds themselves are not quick to buy the gesture. Friedman’s conclusion is that this is not a government of all Syrians, but a “Sunnistan”: a state controlled by Sunni Arabs from al-Sharaa’s political base.
A temporary constitution and a new mufti
In parallel with forming the government, al-Sharaa appointed a new mufti for Syria, Sheikh Osama al-Rifai. According to Friedman, al-Rifai is an 80-year-old cleric with broad legitimacy among Sunnis, but he also has a Muslim Brotherhood agenda. He fled Syria twice, once to Saudi Arabia and once to Turkey, where he received patronage from Erdogan. Friedman notes that al-Rifai is a staunch opponent of Iran, which aligns with al-Sharaa’s current line, who claims that by fighting the Iranian presence, he is removing any threat to Israel.
The transitional constitution that was published grants al-Sharaa almost absolute power. It establishes a presidential system with no prime minister, in which the president appoints all ministers, senior judges, and also a third of the parliament members. The basis for legislation is Sharia, and the president must be a Muslim (a clause that also existed in the previous constitution). The only positive point, according to Friedman, is the establishment of a state monopoly on military force and the prohibition of militias. However, he estimates that senior members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham will simply become the commanders of the new army.
Why are no elections being held?
Al-Sharaa avoids using the word “democracy” and has only hinted that elections might be held in about four years. Friedman believes this is a mistake. According to him, if al-Sharaa were to hold elections now, he would win a landslide victory. The Sunni majority is grateful to him for overthrowing the Assad regime, and the minorities (about 30% of the population) do not pose an electoral threat. An election victory would grant him international legitimacy and help in lifting sanctions. Waiting four years, on the other hand, exposes him to mistakes that will erode his popularity, which is already declining due to the difficult economic situation. Friedman speculates that al-Sharaa may not intend to hold elections at all, or that he hopes to imitate Erdogan’s model: first achieve economic growth and only then go to elections on a wave of popularity.
The economic situation and dependence on the Kurds
The economic situation in Syria is difficult and continues to deteriorate. Promises of aid from the Gulf states have not yet materialized, and al-Sharaa cannot fulfill his promise to double the salaries of state employees. Syria’s most significant economic asset is oil, but most of the reserves are in the area controlled by the Kurds. Therefore, an agreement with them is critical for al-Sharaa to get oil flowing to the refineries and jump-start the economy. This puts him on a collision course with Turkey, which opposes the Kurds. Meanwhile, al-Sharaa’s fight against Hezbollah on the Lebanese border continues, which prevents him from accessing the cheap Iranian fuel that flowed into the country during the Assad era. Friedman concludes that the near future will reveal whether al-Sharaa will try to build a state for all its citizens or continue on his ideological path and establish a Sunni dictatorship.
The original episode, in Hebrew: תקווה חדשה לסוריה?