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Dr. Harel Chorev, a senior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center, is a guest on the podcast to discuss the emergence of Yasser Abu Shabab, a local figure in the Gaza Strip who is cooperating with Israel, and to examine the broader strategy of relying on local clans for the day after Hamas.
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Who is Yasser Abu Shabab?
According to Dr. Chorev, Yasser Abu Shabab is a relatively unknown young man from a small clan belonging to the large Tarabin tribal confederation. This confederation has an extensive network of connections in Sinai, the Negev, Judea and Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Abu Shabab himself is involved in crime and smuggling, but Chorev emphasizes that in the survivalist reality of Gaza, it is hard to find saints.
Abu Shabab’s motive is opportunistic: he aims to seize a position of power in the post-war administration. He is not an ideologue or a religious figure, but a member of a Bedouin family whose interests are local and focused on the eastern Rafah area. According to Chorev, this fact is good news, as it refutes the claim that he is an ISIS member.
Abu Shabab is close to Fatah and is being directed by figures in Ramallah, including Abu Mazen’s advisor, Mahmoud al-Habbash, and other security personnel who have a personal score to settle with Hamas.
Local legitimacy and a vision for the day after
Dr. Chorev explains that Abu Shabab’s status as a Gazan gives him local legitimacy (shar’iyya), unlike external actors who would be parachuted into the Strip. He is in direct conflict with Hamas and has even received help from the IDF to repel the organization’s attacks.
The very fact that he is standing up to Hamas offers an alternative horizon for the residents. He has established a protected zone to which several hundred families have moved, and they receive security and aid. According to Chorev, this is the first bud of an alternative government.
Abu Shabab has a vision that goes beyond managing a militia. He presents himself as a linchpin for a future government and has already begun recruiting professionals, such as judges, engineers, and doctors, with the aim of establishing a functioning civil administration.
Lessons from past attempts
Boris Gorelik draws a comparison to Israel’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which became Hamas. Dr. Chorev rejects the comparison, arguing that it is a myth. According to him, Israel supported the Muslim Brotherhood as a non-militant social organization that served as a counterweight to Fatah. The support ceased in 1987, when Yassin turned the movement into Hamas and gave it a militant ideology.
Chorev reviews Israel’s attempts to cultivate local forces and notes that the results are mixed. The “Southern Village Guard” in Lebanon in 1982 failed quickly, but the South Lebanon Army (SLA) operated successfully for more than 20 years. The conclusion, he says, is that local forces can be effective at the local and municipal level, but they will always lose in a struggle against a broad national movement. Therefore, the correct solution is to integrate them into a national framework, such as the Palestinian Authority.
The clan model: Prospects and risks
Dr. Chorev opposes Dr. Mordechai Kedar’s “Palestinian Emirates” plan, which proposes dismantling the Authority and relying on clans. He argues that this is a regressive move that ignores the existence of a Palestinian national identity and the international legitimacy of the PLO.
However, in a situation of a power vacuum in Gaza, he suggests using clans as temporary, local “linchpins” on which “bubbles of control” can be built in different areas. He warns against making Abu Shabab the ruler of the entire Strip, a step that would lead to the collapse of the entire structure if something were to happen to him.
Chorev argues that arming the militias with light weapons is a necessity. Without them, they will not be able to fight Hamas and do the “dirty work” instead of IDF soldiers. He recalls that one of the reasons for the defeat of the PA’s security forces by Hamas in 2007 was Israel’s restriction on their armament.
The connection to a hostage deal and the look ahead
According to Dr. Chorev, this model is particularly relevant in the context of a possible hostage deal, which might require the IDF to evacuate areas. He asks what is preferable: a vacuum that Hamas will enter, or a local force that will hold the territory.
If such a force, operating with legitimacy from the Palestinian Authority, is attacked by Hamas, it would allow Israel to respond militarily with international backing. Chorev notes that the rhetoric of senior PA officials towards Hamas is sharpening, and Abu Mazen himself has made it clear that he will not accept an armed Hamas in the Strip.
The emergence of Abu Shabab’s militia is part of a broader process of breaking the barrier of fear of Hamas and the erosion of its rule. Chorev concludes that despite the risks, this is an opportunity that Israel should examine with caution and creativity, while learning from past experience and avoiding excessive expectations.
The original episode, in Hebrew: פרוייקט אבו שבאב