A conversation with Mariam Younes: Lebanon after Hezbollah and the Assad regime

The reaction in Lebanon to the war

According to Mariam Younes, the events of October 7 stunned the Lebanese, but an even greater shock came the next day, when Hezbollah decided to join the war against Israel. She emphasizes that this was done in defiance of the Lebanese government, which had asked the organization to refrain from doing so. Younes explains that Hezbollah operates as an entity completely separate from the state, especially given the absence of a president and the partial functioning of the government in recent years.

The Lebanese public, which at the time was dealing with a severe economic, political, and social crisis, did not want to be part of this war and was not prepared to pay its price. Younes argues that October 7 “broke the glass ceiling” of silence. When Israel began to carry out targeted attacks on Hezbollah’s bases, its weapons depots, and its leadership, many Lebanese were happy. They saw this as the beginning of a change and an opportunity to free themselves from the organization’s control over the country.

Voices in Lebanese society

Younes details the different positions among Lebanon’s communities. According to her, the situation in the Shiite community is complex. Hezbollah empowered the community, which was previously at the bottom of the social ladder, and gave it power, status, and money. The organization ran a state within a state for them, so support for it among Shiites is strong and stems from a deep-rooted ideology. However, she notes that even among Shiites, there is a certain percentage that, since October 7, has been arguing that “this is not our war” and demanding true Lebanese sovereignty, separate from the Iranian “axis of evil”.

The Sunnis, in contrast, harbor intense resentment toward Hezbollah, partly because the organization assassinated prominent Sunni leaders, like Rafic Hariri, and trampled on their status. The hatred for Iran, Hezbollah’s patron, has grown much stronger. Younes says that Hezbollah supporters are sometimes called “Iranians” rather than Lebanese, and the discourse against Iranian involvement in Lebanon has become central.

The fall of the Assad regime and the discourse on peace

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was received in Lebanon as a complete surprise. Younes recalls that Syria controlled Lebanon until 2005, and the hatred for the Assad regime is deep. In addition, Lebanon is dealing with the presence of about two million Syrian refugees on its territory. According to her, after the fall of Assad and the elimination of Hezbollah’s leadership, the first signs of change began to appear: the Gulf states are returning to support Lebanon economically, and the public discourse is changing.

A particularly surprising development, according to Younes, is that the media and social networks in Lebanon have begun to speak openly about peace with Israel. She notes that the senior Lebanese diplomat Nawaf Salam has even declared a desire for a peace agreement. Younes estimates that the weaker Iran becomes, the stronger the Lebanese desire for peace will grow.

The fear of civil war and the weakening of Hezbollah

Boris Gorelik notes that the fear of a new civil war previously prevented a confrontation with Hezbollah, but today Lebanese politicians are speaking openly about disarming the organization. Younes agrees and attributes this mainly to the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah. She claims that “Hezbollah was Nasrallah”, and his charisma is what made the organization what it was. After Israel exposed its weakness and eliminated its leader, the fear of the organization has diminished.

However, the trauma of the civil war still exists and deters many from taking drastic steps. Despite this, the Lebanese government is now setting clearer boundaries for Hezbollah. As an example, she says that the government forbade the organization from opening another front during the attacks in Iran, and the organization complied.

Cautious optimism and mistakes Israel should avoid

Younes describes the general atmosphere in Lebanon as very optimistic, albeit cautious. There is hope for a fundamental change in the Middle East after the war. When asked what mistakes Israel might make to sabotage the chance for peace, she replies that the list is long. The biggest mistake, she says, is to treat the Lebanese, Syrians, or Iranians as a single monolithic group and to ignore the subtle cultural and social nuances.

She emphasizes the critical importance of Israeli public diplomacy directed at the Arab world. Younes praises the work of the IDF’s Arabic-language spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, who has become a credible figure in the eyes of many Lebanese because his reports from the ground have proven to be accurate. She argues that a parallel figure is missing in the diplomatic field, one who would explain Israel’s positions and actions and serve as a counterweight to the propaganda of networks like Al Jazeera.