Why the Iranians are not rebelling, and what it means for Syria

Why is the Iranian regime stable?

Boris Gorelik opens by asking why the Iranian people, who seemingly hate the ayatollahs’ regime, do not rebel against it despite the severe blows the regime has suffered. According to Alex Grinberg, the answer lies in the inability of many Israelis to understand the nuances and subtleties of Iranian society. He explains that the fact that the people do not support the regime is what has enabled Israel’s intelligence operations inside Iran, as it is relatively easy to recruit collaborators. However, hatred for the regime does not necessarily translate into a willingness to rebel.

Grinberg argues that the Israeli expectation of a popular uprising stems from an Israel-centric perception that does not match reality. He compares the situation to Russia, where citizens do not rebel against Putin, not out of love for him, but out of fear that the alternatives are worse. According to him, the idea of a “people” rising up is a myth. Revolutions are led by a small, self-sacrificing core, not by the masses.

He quotes an anonymous Iranian blogger who explains that the urban, liberal youth in Tehran, although they oppose the regime, are unable or unwilling to initiate a violent rebellion. These people have a reasonable standard of living and are not willing to risk their lives and property, especially when there is no clear governing alternative. A rebellion will only break out when there is a crack in the elites, or when the public has nothing to lose, and that is not the current situation in Iran.

The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria

The conversation moves to Syria as a test case, where a regime fell after an armed uprising. Grinberg clarifies, arguing that Assad did not massacre “his own people.” According to him, his people are the Alawites, and he was fighting Islamists who threatened to destroy all minorities. Therefore, the Sunni elites in Damascus supported him, not out of love, but from an understanding that he was the lesser of two evils compared to the jihadists.

The collapse of the Assad regime, Grinberg explains, was made possible for several reasons. First, Hezbollah, which was the main fighting force supporting Assad, was weakened by the blows it took from Israel and could not send reinforcements to Syria. Second, Russia was busy with the war in Ukraine and could not provide significant assistance. The decisive factor, he says, was the composition of the Syrian army. Most of the rank-and-file soldiers are Sunnis, and without Hezbollah’s support, they had no motivation to fight against their Sunni brothers. They simply abandoned their weapons and fled.

Al-Jolani and the post-Syrian chaos

Today, Grinberg argues, there is no Syrian state. In its place, there is chaos. At the center of the chaos is Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the leader of the rebels, who was formerly a senior commander in an al-Qaeda branch. Even if his current intentions are good and he is trying to establish a unified Syrian army, he cannot shake off his jihadist past. Moreover, if he gets too close to the West, he will risk his life and be considered a traitor and an agent of the Jews.

The immediate danger is the situation in the Druze Mountain region (Suwayda). According to Grinberg, jihadist forces, which now include units of al-Jolani equipped with tanks, are trying to invade the area. Whether Jolani is ordering this or has no control over his forces, the result is dangerous. This proves that even if Jolani declares moderation, the reality on the ground is violent and dangerous, especially for minorities.

The need for an Israeli strategy: ‘Pax Israeliana’

Boris asks why Israeli action in Syria is necessary. Grinberg replies in the spirit of Machiavelli: Israel cannot remain neutral when surrounded by violent forces. He recounts a conversation with a diplomat from a friendly Muslim country, who argued that the region expects Israel to present a clear geopolitical vision. The Israeli approach of “just leave us alone” is perceived as childish and not serious in a region where empires like Iran and Turkey operate with a long-term vision.

The Israeli vision, in Grinberg’s view, should be a “Pax Israeliana” (Israeli peace), similar to the “Pax Romana.” This does not mean conquest, but rather ensuring regional order and security. Israel must make it clear that anyone who threatens it or its allies will suffer a severe blow. This is what the local populations, including the Druze and the Sunnis, want: stability and security.

Specifically, if jihadists threaten the Druze in Suwayda, Israel must respond forcefully, for example by bombing targets like the city of Daraa, to create deterrence. If Syria becomes a “no man’s land,” Iran could penetrate it, and Israel would have no way to stop it. Therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate strength now to prevent greater violence in the future.

The limits of power and the alliance with the Druze

Grinberg emphasizes that morality in foreign policy is about credibility and loyalty. Israel must protect its allies, like the Druze, but it must also clearly define the limits of its power. Israel can protect Suwayda, but it cannot protect Druze in Damascus or Aleppo. It must not make promises it cannot keep.

At the same time, Israel must not repeat past mistakes, as in the First Lebanon War, and rely exclusively on the information its allies provide. Israel must develop its own independent and deep understanding of what is happening in the region. Loyalty to the Druze does not mean that Israel should do whatever they want. Their interests are important, but Israel also has its own interests. Ultimately, he concludes, in the Middle East there is no clear distinction between peace and war, and power dictates the rules of the game.