One year since the fall of the Assad regime: The Druze in Syria are in existential danger

Syria after Assad

According to Khalifa Khalifa, Syria has ceased to exist as a functioning state and has become a collection of geographic areas controlled by tribes, terrorist organizations, and gangs. The civil war, which lasted almost 15 years, created an entire generation that grew up in a reality of all-out war and extreme demographic changes. Within this chaos, the Druze in the Bashan mountains tried to maintain relative isolation and not take part in the war, but they paid a heavy price for it. According to him, all the fighting organizations, including Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Syrian regime itself, turned the Druze into a target and a source of income through kidnappings for ransom.

Jolani’s rule, “Gaza on steroids”

Khalifa Khalifa argues that although the new leader, al-Jolani, has legitimacy from large parts of the population and is trying to present a moderate facade to the West, the ideological backbone of his rule remains radically Islamist. His base, he says, still adheres to the logic of “either you convert to Islam or we will kill you” and aspires to establish a caliphate. He describes the new state that is forming as “Gaza on steroids”: a vast territory of 185,000 sq km (compared to 365 sq km in the Gaza Strip), with access to the sea, access to Saudi and Qatari money, and Turkish intelligence backing.

The massacre of the Druze and the existential danger

Khalifa mentions the 2018 massacre of the Druze carried out by ISIS and their allied Bedouin tribes. He reports that there were nearly 4,000 victims in the massacre, including more than 500 men who were executed and over 120 women who were abducted as sex slaves. He emphasizes that relative to the Druze population in Syria, which numbers less than a million people, this is a tremendous blow, more severe than the October 7th attack relative to Israel’s population. According to him, parallel to the massacre, Turkish archaeology teams entered the area to loot antiquities and erase the local history, especially the historical connection between Jews and Druze. Today, 32 Druze villages are still occupied and there are more than 200,000 displaced people in Suwayda, with no economy, education, or future. Their only lifeline, he claims, is Israel, whose intervention prevented an even larger massacre.

Can Jolani moderate?

Boris Gorelik asks if there is a chance that Jolani will choose a more moderate model, like Erdogan’s Turkey, and allow the existence of minorities. Khalifa Khalifa expresses deep skepticism. He argues that the dynamics of political Islam always drag the leader to more extreme positions, because there will always be someone more extreme who will claim he is “not Muslim enough.” He gives the example of Hamas, which came to power in democratic elections and led Gaza into constant decline. According to him, slogans heard in recent military parades in Syria, such as “Khaybar, Khaybar, O Jews,” prove that the direction remains extremist and dangerous for Israel.

A vision for the Bashan region: A Druze buffer state

Khalifa proposes a possible solution to the situation, which includes population exchanges. According to his vision, the Sunni tribes from the Daraa and Bashan area, who participated in the massacre, would receive compensation and move to the Damascus area. In their place, the Druze living in Damascus, who live as a scattered and threatened minority, would move to the Bashan region. Such a move would create a homogeneous Druze territorial continuity. He believes this can be financed with the help of Saudi Arabia, as part of a comprehensive deal that would include normalization and giving the Saudis access to Israeli technology. The fertile Bashan region, with the help of knowledge and technology from Israel, could become the “breadbasket of the Middle East” and create a stable and prosperous buffer zone between Israel and Syria.

The Jewish-Druze alliance

Khalifa emphasizes the importance of the alliance between Jews and Druze. He notes that the spiritual leader of the Druze in Syria, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, conditioned their partnership in a future Syria on it being a secular, liberal, and democratic state, a revolutionary position in the Arab world. He adds that during the massacre, Israel’s intervention came after a call from the spiritual leader of the Druze in Israel, Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif. According to him, this fact shows that the voice of the Druze leadership in Israel was stronger than the directives of the American administration, which had been charmed by Jolani. Khalifa calls on Israel to abandon its “diaspora mentality,” recognize its power as a regional power, and formulate a long-term strategic vision in which the Druze can be key partners.