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This episode’s guest is Alex Grinberg, an Iran scholar at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS). The conversation deals with the recent protests in Iran, examining the stability of the Islamic regime, the chances of its collapse, and the factors influencing this, including the economic situation, national identity and ethnic minorities, and external pressures.
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The current state of the protests
According to Alex Grinberg, the protest in Iran is indeed expanding and the regime is struggling to contain it, but it has not yet reached the intensity of the protests that erupted after the murder of Mahsa Amini. However, the situation today is different. The Iranian regime, which is a smart regime, is using a method of targeted repression: it does not shoot everyone, but rather locates the protest leaders and neutralizes them, partly by monitoring social media. On the other hand, it seems that many Iranians have reached a point where they have nothing to lose. The protest is not about a specific issue, but stems from an impossible economic situation, with extreme inflation.
The conditions for a revolution
Boris Gorelik mentions the classic conditions for a revolution, and Grinberg adds two crucial factors: the regime’s willingness to use force to suppress, and the people’s willingness to fight. According to him, if people indeed have nothing to lose, they become more determined. However, he quotes an anonymous Iranian writer who claims that Iranians are not like Arabs, and that Iranian youth, who see themselves as European, will not take up arms and fight the government. Grinberg emphasizes that in 20th-century history, no regime has fallen solely due to popular protest. He gives the example of the suppression of the demonstration in Novocherkassk in the Soviet Union in 1962. Iran is not North Korea, and protesting is permitted there under limitations, but the situation is complex.
National identity and minorities
In response to Boris Gorelik’s question about ethnic minorities, who make up about half the population, Grinberg states unequivocally that a strong Iranian identity exists. He explains that the use of the term “minorities” is misleading. The Azeris, for example, are a very large group, but they are Shiites and are integrated into the government. They have no separatist aspirations, and their main demand is for cultural recognition, such as the right to teach their language in schools. He emphasizes that during the protests, all ethnic groups feel Iranian and share in the general suffering.
The regime’s fears and weaknesses
According to Grinberg, the regime fears internal collapse more than mass demonstrations. Unlike in Syria, there is no deep sectarian divide in Iran between the government and the people. The regime’s main fear is a proliferation of small protest hotspots in the periphery, which are difficult to control all at once. In addition, the regime is operating from a position of military weakness, and it fears an American or Israeli strike that it would be unable to prevent.
The Chinese reform scenario
Boris Gorelik raises the possibility of a China-like scenario, in which a new leader would carry out deep economic reforms while preserving the framework of the Islamic Republic. Grinberg believes such a scenario is unlikely. According to him, the Iranian regime is too ideological and cannot afford to carry out such a reform, as it would be interpreted as succumbing to pressure and would expose its failure. Such a move would seem cynical and would damage the legitimacy of the government, which cannot afford a visible gap between its stated ideology and reality.
The Israeli interest and external intervention
Grinberg rejects the claim that Israel has an interest in the Iranian regime’s survival in order to unite the Gulf states against it. He explains that Israel’s clear interest is for the regime, which poses an existential threat, to disappear. However, he distinguishes between overthrowing the regime, which he believes is not possible through external intervention, and “neutralizing” it. The goal should be to exact an unbearable price from the regime for its aggression. He warns against the narrative that the Iranians are spreading in the West, according to which the fall of the regime would lead to greater chaos than in Iraq or Syria. He claims this is a propaganda tool, and that Iran, as a nation-state, is not similar to those countries.
On the term “opposition”
Finally, Grinberg clarifies that in Iran there is no “opposition” in the conventional sense of democratic countries, meaning a body that can legally replace the government. What exists are dissidents, mainly abroad, who are not organized as a political force that could serve as a governing alternative.
The original episode, in Hebrew: מתי יהיה הסוף של הרפובליקה האיסלאמית של איראן?