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The episode features Noa Shusterman Dvir, head of the Palestinians and the Region Program at MIND Israel, a center for policy, national security, and strategy consulting. Shusterman Dvir analyzes the reasons Hamas still controls Gaza even after the release of the hostages, the dynamics that led to the cessation of fighting, and the challenges facing the reconstruction of the Strip and the day after the war. She discusses the humanitarian situation, the negotiations on the demilitarization of the Strip, and the involvement of international and regional actors, including Egypt and Turkey.
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The hostages: from asset to liability
According to Noa Shusterman Dvir, the abduction of the captives on October 7 was originally intended to secure the release of prisoners, but during the war they became a bargaining chip for Hamas’s self-preservation and an attempt to moderate the Israeli response. The dynamic changed when Hamas realized that holding the hostages was becoming a liability for its image and made it difficult to rally the international community to its side. Once it received sufficient guarantees that Israel would not return to intense fighting, the organization preferred to “get rid of” the hostages, return them to Israel, and receive the prisoners in return, as was its original goal.
The negotiations and guarantees for the cessation of fighting
Shusterman Dvir explains that after the first ceasefire, from which Israel returned to fighting, Hamas understood that the hostages were not a sufficient guarantee. Therefore, in all subsequent rounds of negotiations, it insisted on receiving international guarantees, mainly from the United States, that Israel would not resume fighting. The current framework, known as “President Trump’s 20-point plan,” is very similar to a previous framework from the Biden administration that Israel rejected. According to her, Netanyahu agreed to the current framework only after heavy American pressure. The agreement includes an Israeli commitment to the mediators, Egypt and Turkey, not to return to intense fighting, and this is why Hamas felt secure enough to release the hostages.
Why is Hamas still in power?
The main reason Hamas is still on its feet, Shusterman Dvir argues, is the lack of an alternative. In a place where the average wage is very low, whoever holds the power, resources, and weapons sets the agenda. Currently, there is no actor, military or administrative, capable of challenging Hamas in the Gaza Strip. She adds that another IDF ground incursion into the areas remaining under Hamas control is a difficult and dangerous mission, especially when the organization mainly holds light weapons and there is a significant buffer zone separating the Gazan population from Israel.
Hamas’s willingness to give up civilian control
From her conversations with Palestinian officials, Shusterman Dvir understands that Hamas has already given its consent in principle to transfer the administrative reins of the Strip. The organization understands that it is incapable of managing the reconstruction of the Strip, the cost of which is estimated at over 50 billion dollars. As a designated terrorist organization, Hamas will not receive the necessary funds from the international community, including from countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, it is willing to give up civilian administration, but the question is on what terms and what assets, mainly weapons, it wants to retain. Talks on the demilitarization of the Strip are taking place in Cairo, but Hamas refuses to discuss the mechanisms before Israel fulfills all its obligations under the “20-point plan.”
Humanitarian aid and the economy in the Strip
Hamas claims that Israel is not meeting its obligations under the agreement. For example, it is not allowing the entry of 600 aid trucks per day and is not permitting free movement at the Rafah crossing as it committed to do. The Strip’s economy today is almost entirely dependent on international humanitarian aid. International organizations purchase goods, sometimes in Israel, and bring them into the Strip. In the past, Israel tried to “dry up” the Strip of cash, which led to the development of a barter economy based on goods like cigarettes. Regarding weapons smuggling, Shusterman Dvir claims, based on conversations with security officials, that contrary to popular belief, most of the tunnels between Egypt and Gaza were already sealed in 2016.
An international stabilization force and Egypt’s role
As part of the “20-point plan,” discussions are being held about an international stabilization force. Turkey, which is involved in the mediation, will not be part of such a force, at Israel’s demand. The countries whose names have been raised as candidates to send troops are Morocco, Albania, Kosovo, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia. However, Indonesia, which was supposed to be the main contributor, has frozen its contacts, and there is a large gap between the number of soldiers required and the existing commitments. Shusterman Dvir emphasizes the importance of Egypt, which refuses to accept refugees for fear of importing terrorism into its territory and harming the peace agreement with Israel. She notes a worrying phenomenon of the formation of a new “Sunni quartet,” which includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. This axis, which is not a formal alliance, is intended to challenge Israel’s policy, and Israel needs to take it seriously to prevent a crisis in relations.
The original episode, in Hebrew: למה חמאס עדיין בשלטון?