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This episode’s guest is Mor Shapira, a lecturer in the Department of Arabic at Bar-Ilan University and a researcher at the MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute). The conversation deals with how the agreement between the United States and Iran is covered and received in the Arab world, and with the new strategies the region’s countries are adopting in its wake.
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A temporary and non-final agreement
According to Mor Shapira, there are almost no significant voices in the Arab media who see the agreement as an American achievement. Most countries in the Arab world are not at peace with the agreement, and the only thing that slightly reassures them is the fact that it is a temporary agreement for a period of sixty days, which is not finally signed. The perception is that many things can still change during this period.
The Gulf states’ bear hug
Shapira explains that the Gulf states, led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, are experiencing deep disappointment with the United States, which they perceive as a “paper tiger.” They felt that the Americans did not adequately protect them from Iranian attacks, which hit not only American bases but also civilian infrastructure like hotels and airports.
As a result, these countries are recalculating their course. They cannot afford to give up American patronage, but they also understand that they cannot fight Iran directly. Their new strategy is what Shapira calls a “bear hug”: creating mutual economic dependence with Iran to deter it from future attacks.
Economic peace as a tool of deterrence
The Gulf perception, as Shapira describes it, is that if Iran’s economy, which is on the verge of collapse, becomes dependent on the funds, ports, and investments of the Gulf states, Tehran will have a lot to lose in the event of a conflict. Therefore, countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have rushed to offer Iran trade, investment, and tourism agreements. The goal is to make an attack against them unprofitable for Iran itself.
Qatar’s role as a mediator
Qatar, according to Shapira, is an excellent example of a country that has successfully implemented this strategy. It has fortified its position as an economic and political bridge between Iran and the Arab world, and as a result, has suffered the least damage. Qatar operates extensively behind the scenes, but also knows how to take center stage when necessary, as demonstrated by the prominent presence of its prime minister at the agreement’s signing ceremony, while the American vice president was pushed aside.
Coverage on Al Jazeera and in the Saudi media
Boris Gorelik asks about the coverage on the Qatari network Al Jazeera. Shapira replies that the coverage has become more complex than in the past. The network still gives an extensive platform to Iranian figures, but today its reporters also challenge them with tough questions about the harm to Arab countries.
In the Saudi media, by contrast, the general line is more cautious. There are voices criticizing the decision not to attack Iran, but they are not in the mainstream. The strong economic interest and the understanding that Iran is militarily stronger lead Saudi Arabia to adopt a line of relative silence and not to criticize the agreement publicly.
The Lebanese issue
The conversation turns to Iran’s linking of the Lebanese issue to the agreement. Shapira notes that contrary to the perception that Iran shows loyalty to its allies, there are Shiites in Lebanon who feel exploited. They claim that Iran is primarily concerned with its proxy, Hezbollah, and not with the broader Lebanese interest. They see the move as “too little, too late.”
The idea of sending Syria into Lebanon
Shapira analyzes the idea raised by Trump, that Syria should be allowed to “deal with” Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to her, this idea demonstrates a profound lack of understanding of the Middle East. She explains that such a move would ignore the Lebanese trauma from the Syrian occupation and could ignite a civil war that would actually serve Hezbollah, which would present itself as the protector of the Shiites against the “Sunni invaders.” In addition, she argues that the new Syrian regime does not have the military capability to confront an organization like Hezbollah.
The crisis of confidence in the United States
Boris Gorelik points to a series of American moves in recent decades that were perceived as a betrayal of allies. Shapira confirms that this is a widespread perception in the Arab world. The United States is seen as a fickle partner, motivated by short-term political considerations like gas prices and elections in the United States, rather than by long-term security in the region. President Trump, in particular, is perceived as a non-serious figure, and in the Arab media, he is even called “a dog that barks but doesn’t bite.”
“The poisoned chalice”: Survival as an Iranian victory
From an Iranian perspective, the agreement is compared to Khomeini’s famous “poisoned chalice,” when he was forced to agree to a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War to ensure the regime’s survival. Shapira explains that for the Iranians, survival itself is the victory. They call this “heroic flexibility.” The word for “surrender” (istislam) does not exist in their lexicon, and the guiding principle is that the regime’s survival comes before all else, even at the cost of painful compromises. Therefore, even if it appears outwardly that they have surrendered, from their perspective, they have won because the regime survived.
The original episode, in Hebrew: העולם הערבי - ארה״ב: יחסנו לאן?