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This episode’s guest is Lt. Col. (res.) Avi Shalev, author of the book “Yoman al-Qasmi” and a researcher of Arab culture. Shalev analyzes the October 7 events through the prism of a Palestinian television series titled “Qabdat al-Ahrar,” which aired about a year and a half before the attack. According to him, the series not only offered a chilling prediction of the attack’s details, but also exposes the depth of the Israeli intelligence failure, which stemmed from a profound cultural misunderstanding of Palestinian society and Hamas.
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The series “Qabdat al-Ahrar”
Avi Shalev begins by describing the series “Qabdat al-Ahrar” (“The Grip of the Free”), a Ramadan series produced by Hamas that aired in the spring of 2022. The 30-episode series deals with Hamas’s preparations for war with Israel. The final episode depicts a surprise attack on the communities of the western Negev, strikingly similar to the October 7 attack. It shows, among other things, Nukhba terrorists in IDF uniforms, ambushes on roads, the use of pickup trucks, the kidnapping of soldiers, and the capture of the Gaza Division headquarters. The series ends with the Israeli flag being taken down from the base and the Palestinian flag being raised.
Shalev notes that about six months after the series aired, Yahya Sinwar awarded it a prize at a festive ceremony in Gaza. In his speech, Sinwar said that everything seen in the series was the military wing’s plan, and that he intended to make it a reality. In response to a question from Boris, Shalev confirms that Fatah officials criticized the series in real time, claiming it was far-fetched and imaginary.
The failure of intentions intelligence
According to Shalev, the series is a key example of the Israeli intelligence failure, which focused on “capabilities intelligence” (locating targets, identifying the enemy) and neglected “intentions intelligence” (understanding the mentality, culture, and perceptions of the other side). The Israeli security establishment clung to the conception that Hamas was deterred and primarily interested in economic welfare and improving the lives of Gaza’s residents. Shalev mentions the former head of Military Intelligence, Aharon Haliva, who said after the attack that even if he had received concrete information about an impending war, he would not have believed it because it contradicted the prevailing view.
Boris remarks that it is easy to analyze things in hindsight, and that the intelligence community is flooded with information and cannot change its worldview based on every single piece of data. Shalev agrees that the matter is complex, but argues that the main problem is in the way Israel analyzes information.
The gap between open-source and secret intelligence
Shalev explains that the Israeli intelligence community, reflecting a Western culture, gives supreme importance to secret information obtained through technological means (cyber, wiretaps) and dismisses open-source intelligence (OSINT). The perception is that the truth is spoken behind closed doors, while public statements are merely “Arab waffling,” exaggerations, and lies.
In contrast, traditional Arab culture is a “shame culture” with an “external locus of control.” In such a culture, what is said and done in the public sphere carries decisive weight, sometimes more than the factual truth. The Israeli conception was based on one-on-one talks between COGAT officers and Gazan figures, while public statements by senior Hamas officials, sermons in mosques, and productions like the series “Qabdat al-Ahrar” were ignored.
Deception and internal messaging
According to Shalev, the series was not only meant to threaten Israel, but served mainly as an internal messaging tool for Hamas towards its supporters. It was intended to explain the contradiction between the organization’s jihadist ideology and the reality of security calm and coordination with Israel. The series’s message to the Gazan audience was that all the quiet and economic easements were part of a sophisticated deception plan, which would end in a surprise attack.
Shalev provides examples from the series: the villain is a Gazan merchant who collaborates with the Shin Bet, drinks alcohol, and abuses his sister. He represents the corruption of economic ties with Israel, and Hamas sends a message that it will settle the score with him. Another character is a senior Hamas cyber operative, whose wife and mother-in-law suspect he is working late because he has married a second wife. He explains to them that there is a secret plan he cannot reveal. The message is: trust us, we have a big plan.
Cultural gaps and their consequences
Shalev argues that the cultural gap is the heart of the problem. He points to the dismantling of Unit “Hatsav” (8200’s open-source collection unit) as an example of the disdain for open-source intelligence. He explains that in Israeli culture, information “leaked” from a private conversation is perceived as more credible than an official statement. In contrast, in Arab culture, a public statement has a binding effect. The classic example is Yasser Arafat, who used to say different things in English and Arabic, because only his words in Arabic had real meaning for his audience.
In conclusion, Shalev claims that the disregard for Hamas’s public messages, such as those that appeared in the series, stemmed from a deep misunderstanding of Arab culture. Instead of seeing them as a plan of action and a declaration of intent, Israel dismissed them as insignificant background noise.
The original episode, in Hebrew: הסרט שניבא את הטבח