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This episode’s guest is Dr. Haim Koren, a veteran diplomat from Reichman University who served as Israel’s ambassador to Egypt and South Sudan. The episode discusses the mechanisms for establishing initial ties between hostile states, and how secret contacts mature into diplomatic relations. The discussion follows a report of a secret meeting between the head of the Mossad and the Syrian foreign minister.
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Security diplomacy
According to Dr. Haim Koren, establishing secret contacts between hostile entities is a long-standing diplomatic practice, born out of shared interests, usually security-related. He explains that Israel’s foreign policy was shaped from its inception by David Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine. Ben-Gurion understood that without security, the young state could not survive, and therefore he prioritized security considerations over all others. As a result, the security establishment, led by the Mossad, became a central arm in managing Israel’s foreign relations, especially through secret channels and with actors that are not officially sovereign states.
The periphery doctrine
Dr. Koren explains that Ben-Gurion initiated a strategy known as the “periphery doctrine,” aimed at breaking the political isolation imposed on Israel by the Arab states. The idea was to establish ties with non-Arab states and entities in the second and third circles around Israel. Through a process of elimination, potential partners were identified, such as Iran and Turkey (non-Arab Muslim countries) and Ethiopia (a Christian country). In addition, Israel established ties with minority groups in the region, such as the Maronites in Lebanon and the Christians in South Sudan. According to him, some of these contacts were successful, like with pre-revolutionary Iran, while others were less so, like with the Christians in Lebanon. These ties, even if they did not mature into full relations, created a basis for future cooperation. For example, the ties with Morocco allowed it to host the secret meetings between Moshe Dayan and Sadat’s representatives, which paved the way for the peace agreement with Egypt.
The Mossad as a diplomatic arm: the story of South Sudan
To illustrate these processes, Dr. Koren shares the story of South Sudan. In 1968, after the Six-Day War, the leader of the South Sudanese rebels, Joseph Lago, approached the head of the Mossad station in Kenya. He asked for Israel’s help in their struggle against the Sudanese government, arguing that the Sudanese Arabs wanted to destroy them just as the Arabs wanted to destroy Israel. The head of the Mossad at the time secretly brought Lago to a meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir.
Following the meeting, Israel sent a delegation led by Mossad officer David Ben-Uziel (nicknamed “Tarzan”) to assess the situation on the ground. The delegation recommended assisting the rebels. Israel’s interest was to keep Egypt, which supported the Sudanese regime, busy on another front, thereby diverting its resources from the War of Attrition against Israel. The connection was maintained for decades, and in 2011, when the establishment of the independent state of South Sudan became possible, Israel was one of the first countries to recognize it. According to Dr. Koren, the process took 43 years, and it demonstrates the importance of patience and long-term vision in diplomacy. To this day, South Sudan is one of the few countries that consistently supports Israel in UN votes.
Contacts with Syria and the evolution of Jolani
In the current Syrian context, Dr. Koren argues that the contacts with Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, are not new. He explains that Israel had cooperated with Jolani back when he was the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. As part of this, Israel provided medical aid to his wounded fighters. According to him, Jolani remembers this assistance, and this early acquaintance, based on a shared interest against the Assad regime, is the foundation for the current contacts.
Dr. Koren believes that Jolani is undergoing a process of rebranding, trying to present himself as a Syrian national leader rather than an Islamist terrorist. He is not a puppet of Turkey, but a leader who understands Syrian interests and tries to advance them, even if it involves dialogue with Israel.
From mistress to common-law wife
Dr. Koren describes the development of Israel’s secret relations using the metaphor of a transition from the status of a mistress to that of a common-law wife. In the past, many countries preferred to maintain secret ties with Israel for fear of the Arab world’s reaction. The Abraham Accords, he says, changed the situation, and today countries like the United Arab Emirates and Morocco are not ashamed of their public ties with Israel. Israel’s status has changed, and it is no longer seen as a pariah. Therefore, even countries that previously avoided open ties are now willing to consider them. He emphasizes that the key to the success of such processes is patience, secrecy, and avoiding leaks that could destroy the trust-building process.
The original episode, in Hebrew: מסודאן ועד סוריה: כך רוכשים בעלי ברית בחשאי