Politics in Arab society in Israel: A historical overview and current trends

Historical overview: Three stages

According to Dr. Khizran, the history of Arab politics in Israel can be divided into three main stages.

The first stage lasted from the establishment of the state until the abolition of the military government in the mid-1960s. This period was characterized by a struggle between two currents: the Israeli Communist Party, which worked to emphasize national identity and fought against the military government, and opposite it, the traditional leadership (leaders of clans and villages) which organized into “satellite lists” linked to Mapai, the ruling party. Dr. Khizran notes that the Communist Party, which accepted activists from the National Liberation League into its ranks, accepted the partition plan under the influence of the Soviet Union. He adds that in the 1950s, the state considered conscripting all its Arab citizens into the army, but backed down for fear of creating an “army within an army” after about 26,000 Muslim volunteers registered. Instead, the state chose to conscript small minorities like the Druze and to establish local authorities to strengthen clan-based fragmentation.

The second stage began with the end of the military government and lasted until the Arab Spring. The abolition of the military government, alongside processes of modernization and the rise of an educated generation, weakened the status of the traditional leadership. At the same time, a trend of Palestinization and political radicalization grew stronger. This trend found institutional expression in the 1970s with the rise of Hadash in Nazareth and the establishment of public institutions that emphasized Palestinian identity. According to Khizran, this process reached its peak after the Oslo Accords, with the establishment of the Balad party by Azmi Bishara. Balad introduced a new discourse that called for abolishing Israel’s Jewish identity and turning it into a “state of all its citizens.”

The third stage began with the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011. Since then, Dr. Khizran explains, we have witnessed the rise of a new school of thought, which he calls “the local civic political discourse.” This school, led by Ra’am, changes the order of priorities: it decouples the relationship of Arabs with the state from dependence on a solution to the Palestinian problem, and it focuses on the demand to maximize the rights derived from Israeli citizenship.

Integration without identification

Dr. Khizran argues that the new approach, represented by Ra’am, is not Israelization or Zionization, but instrumentalization. He calls this “integration without identification.” According to this approach, integration into the Israeli public sphere is a tool for achieving goals and budgets for the benefit of Arab society, and it has no element of emotional or ideological identification with the state, its symbols, or the Zionist ethos. He says this can be described by the phrase “the heart is with Gaza and the pocket is with Israel.”

He notes that this trend is supported by the Arab public, as shown in public opinion polls that consistently indicate a majority of the public wants to see its representatives in the coalition to obtain budgets and jobs. The state, too, especially since 2011, has recognized the desire for economic integration and has invested large sums through government five-year plans, understanding that the integration of Arab society will contribute to the Israeli economy. The conduct of the Arab public after the events of October 7, which was characterized by political realism, also reinforces this analysis.

Two schools of thought in Arab politics

Today, politics in Arab society is divided between two main schools of thought. The first school is the “mobilizing national discourse,” represented by the Joint List (Hadash, Balad, and Ta’al). It continues to emphasize Palestinian national identity and commitment as a central component. Opposite it stands the school of “local civic discourse,” represented by Ra’am, which emphasizes civic interests and is willing to join a coalition without conditions related to the Palestinian issue. Dr. Khizran emphasizes that Ra’am’s approach is pragmatism, not ideological moderation.

Boris Gorelik asks what options are available to an Arab citizen with right-wing economic views. Dr. Khizran replies that apart from Hadash, which is a communist party, the other parties are mainly nationalist and not economically defined. He believes that citizens and parties have learned to create a balance between emphasizing Palestinian identity and the political realism required to manage daily life.

Ahead of the elections

Despite the ideological disputes, Dr. Khizran explains that the two lists, the Joint List and Ra’am, meet on one point ahead of the upcoming elections: the desire to replace the government and prevent Benjamin Netanyahu from rising to power. He confidently assesses that both lists will recommend a candidate other than Netanyahu, without receiving anything in return, in order to prevent him from forming a government. The campaign of both blocs presents the elections as fateful, arguing that the current government is responsible for most of the problems in Arab society, such as crime and a lack of governance.

The future: Israelization or pragmatism?

Boris Gorelik asks if a scenario of deeper Israelization in Arab society is possible in the future, similar to the Druze model or the one represented by Yoseph Haddad. Dr. Khizran expresses skepticism. In his opinion, Haddad’s model is perceived in the Arab public as a negation of the self and the Palestinian national narrative, and it does not have broad support. He believes that as long as the Palestinian problem is not resolved, deep identification with the state will not occur. The prevailing trend will remain “integration without identification,” meaning, an instrumental integration aimed at benefiting Arab society while preserving its separate national identity.