Israel at a demographic turning point

Israel: a demographic anomaly?

Prof. Sasson begins by explaining that Israel is often seen as a demographic anomaly, mainly because it is usually compared to European countries. Israel’s fertility rate, close to three children per woman, is unprecedented in developed countries, especially given its high income level. According to him, the central debate in demography is whether the factor influencing fertility is economic or cultural. While economically Israel is indeed an outlier, Prof. Sasson argues that if it is compared to Middle Eastern countries, it is much less of an anomaly and its demographic trends fit into the regional context.

A demographic turning point

Boris Gorelik notes that in the last year, for the first time, the base of Israel’s age pyramid has narrowed slightly, meaning there are fewer infants than children in the age group above them. Prof. Sasson agrees that this is a significant qualitative change, but the question is whether it is a momentary fluctuation or the beginning of a turning point. According to him, Israel is now at a “demographic turning point” or a “perfect storm” because in recent years, since 2018 or 2019, there has been a trend reversal in all three fundamental demographic processes: fertility, mortality, and migration. Fertility has begun to decline across all population groups, mortality has been affected by COVID-19, the war, and crime in Arab society, and migration has changed direction.

Negative migration balance

In the last three years, Prof. Sasson explains, Israel has gone from being a country that absorbs immigrants to a country with a net negative migration balance. He refers to a study by Prof. Itai Ater, which shows that even after subtracting the new immigrants from Russia and Ukraine who left, the balance remains negative. This involves veteran Israelis, many of them native-born, who are leaving. Prof. Sasson sees this as a loss of human capital and a worrying cultural shift, where emigration becomes a legitimate option for young people. He warns against the institutionalization of emigration processes, where Israeli communities formed abroad, for example in Cyprus, attract more emigrants.

Transitions between sectors

In response to a listener’s question, Prof. Sasson discusses the transitions between sectors in Jewish society: Haredi, religious, traditional, and secular. He explains that it is very difficult to measure this phenomenon accurately in the absence of longitudinal data on individuals. However, a study he conducted found that in the last twenty years, the Haredi community has grown in line with its fertility rate. In contrast, the proportion of religious people in the population has barely changed, despite their high fertility, which suggests that members of the group are leaving it. The proportion of traditional people in the population has decreased, while the proportion of secular people has grown slightly. According to him, the difficulty in measurement also stems from fluid definitions and the fact that people move along a spectrum of religiosity.

Aliyah potential versus antisemitism

Boris Gorelik asks about the chance of large waves of aliyah (immigration to Israel) from Western countries following the wave of antisemitism. Prof. Sasson answers cautiously. He acknowledges that antisemitism is a significant “push factor,” but for mass aliyah to occur, a strong “pull factor” from Israel is also required. Currently, the data do not show a significant increase in the number of immigrants from Western countries. He mentions that migration is the most difficult demographic process to predict, and historical processes like the aliyah from the Soviet Union show that dramatic changes can happen quickly.

Haredi society and Arab society

The discussion moves to two key population groups. Regarding Haredi society, Prof. Sasson notes that it constitutes about 12% of the population, but its share is growing. The challenge, he says, is less demographic and more political and social. The problem is not the existence of a “society of learners” itself, but rather the state policy that may incentivize a lifestyle that is not economically sustainable in the long run. He mentions that the employment rate for Haredi women is high, but for men it remains low, around 50%.

Regarding Arab society, Prof. Sasson explains that it is very heterogeneous and less secular than Jewish society. However, in what seems paradoxical, its demographic behavior conforms to classic theories: with the rise in living standards and modernization, fertility has consistently declined, from almost ten children per woman in the 1960s to fewer than three today. It is actually Jewish society, where fertility rose for two decades until 2018, that breaks the conventional demographic models.

Culture versus economics

In conclusion, Prof. Sasson returns to the argument that the main factor influencing fertility in Israel is not economic but cultural, and specifically the level of religiosity. He gives the example of Sweden, where generous economic incentives do not succeed in significantly raising fertility. In Israel, by contrast, the cultural and collectivist value attributed to family and children, even among secular people, is what explains the unusually high birth rates for a developed country.