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In this episode, Boris Gorelik explains how to approach and interpret polls, focusing on polls concerning Palestinian public opinion. According to him, to understand a poll, one must examine four aspects: when multiple sources are actually a single source, what people are willing to tell a stranger pollster, the poll’s methodology, and the recognition that there are always things we do not know.
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The consensus trap
Boris begins by explaining the “consensus trap.” He argues that contrary to popular belief, broad agreement among different sources is not necessarily a guarantee of accuracy, and sometimes it is the opposite. He relies on the idea of the “wisdom of the crowd,” which posits that the average of many people’s estimates is more accurate, but he emphasizes that a condition for this is that the opinions must be independent. When there is dependence between sources, accuracy decreases. He gives the example of a 1965 statistical study which showed that ten experts with high correlation among them are effectively equivalent to fewer than two independent experts.
As a real-world example, he mentions the American intelligence assessments before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Three different intelligence agencies claimed that Saddam Hussein had mobile biological weapons labs, but a post-mortem investigation revealed that they all relied on the same single, unreliable source. Similarly, he explains, many organizations publish polls on Palestinian society, but in practice, the fieldwork in the West Bank and Gaza is conducted by only two main bodies: the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) of Khalil Shikaki, and the Israeli company Statnet, managed by Yosef Maklada. Therefore, when different research institutes hire the services of Statnet, they are in fact relying on the same methodology and the same databases, and their results are not independent.
Boris adds other examples, like the story of King Ahab’s 400 prophets, and a rule from Jewish law stating that if all the judges of the Sanhedrin unanimously find a defendant guilty, he is immediately acquitted, out of fear of a systemic failure. The conclusion, he says, is that disagreement between different polls is not necessarily a bad thing, and may in fact indicate independent and serious work.
The price of a word
The second topic Boris discusses is “the price of a word,” meaning, the gap between what people think and what they are willing to say. In an environment of pressure or fear, people tend to say what is safe to say rather than their true opinion. This is especially true for polls conducted in non-democratic societies or under authoritarian rule. When a pollster approaches a person, whether by phone or face-to-face, the respondent does not know who they are dealing with: is it an innocent pollster, a representative of the security forces (of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, or Israel), or some other actor.
As a result, the answers received in such polls are of questionable reliability. Boris gives as an example a recording of a 1980 cabinet meeting of Saddam Hussein, in which all the advisors enthusiastically supported going to war against Iran, for fear of opposing the dictator. He argues that a particularly high percentage of support in a poll, for example 90%, does not necessarily indicate broad agreement, but may reflect the high price of disagreement.
What we do know about Palestinian public opinion
Despite all the difficulties, Boris presents what can be learned from the polls about Palestinian society, mainly by looking at trends over time. He notes that contrary to expectations, after October 7, support for Hamas in polls was higher in the West Bank (over 80%) than in Gaza (around 50%). He explains this by the fact that West Bank residents did not pay the same price for the war as Gaza residents did.
However, the trend since then has been a consistent decline in support for Hamas in both areas. Boris emphasizes that it is important to pay attention to the precise wording of the question and to the methodology. He gives an example of two polls from the same month that showed completely different data on support for Hamas (6.7% versus 24%), and the difference stemmed from different phrasing of the question and the answer options provided. The polling method (telephone, face-to-face) also affects the results.
Boris summarizes the main findings from the latest polls:
- The “rally ‘round the flag” effect that occurred after October 7 has faded, and support for Hamas is on a downward trend.
- The decline in support for Hamas is not translating into an increase in support for Fatah. Instead, a political vacuum has been created, with almost half of West Bank residents not identifying with any faction.
- In all polls, Marwan Barghouti, who is imprisoned in Israel, is the leading candidate for president.
- There are significant gaps between Gaza and the West Bank: in Gaza, 65% believe the armed struggle has failed and 60% support the two-state solution. In the West Bank, only 35% think the armed struggle has failed and 40% support the two-state solution.
Boris concludes with a personal gut feeling that despite the decline in support for Hamas in the polls, if free elections were held, the most extreme force would win.
The original episode, in Hebrew: איך אפשר להאמין לסקרים?