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Boris Gorelik speaks with Samer Sinijlawi, a Palestinian political activist from Jerusalem and a member of Fatah. Sinijlawi argues that peace is a supreme Palestinian interest, and that the path to it involves building trust with the Israeli public, deep reform in the Palestinian leadership, and mutual recognition of the historical rights of both peoples. He presents a vision of a two-state solution based on common interests, reconciliation, and imagination.
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The need for an Israeli majority for peace
According to Sinijlawi, peace is always one Israeli election away. A political solution will only be possible when 51 percent of the Israeli public votes for such an option. Therefore, the Palestinian side must work to rebuild trust with Israelis and persuade them to support the two-state solution. He believes that any other solution means the victory of one side over the other, which he considers impossible. The recent war, which he says has returned the situation to the starting point of October 6, only proves this.
The need for a Palestinian “Ben-Gurion”
Boris remarks that peace is a “tango” that requires change on the Palestinian side as well. Sinijlawi agrees, adding that alongside one election in Israel, the Palestinians need one leader to change the situation. He says the Palestinians lack their own “Ben-Gurion”: a leader with a vision for building state institutions and the internal strength to exert authority even against internal opponents, as Ben-Gurion did in the Altalena affair. He also mentions Menachem Begin, a right-wing figure who evacuated settlements in Sinai in exchange for peace.
Failures in the Palestinian leadership
Sinijlawi argues that the Palestinian leadership throughout history, from Hajj Amin al-Husseini to Mahmoud Abbas, has not understood the conflict from the other side’s perspective. In the 1990s, the Palestinian leadership adopted a strategy of applying pressure and violence, thinking it would achieve gains. Sinijlawi maintains that pressure does not work on Israelis, and the only way to move forward is through persuasion and speaking to their hearts.
Why Abu Mazen rejected Olmert’s offer
The most important missed opportunity, according to Sinijlawi, was Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s peace offer to Mahmoud Abbas in 2008. Sinijlawi explains the rejection for two reasons. The first was political timing: the Americans advised Abbas to wait for Tzipi Livni, who was expected to win the elections and sign a similar agreement. The second, more significant reason lies in Abbas’s personality. He preferred to leave a legacy as a leader who gave up nothing, especially on the right of return, rather than a legacy as a leader who achieved 90 percent of the Palestinian goals.
Abu Mazen’s role in the rise of Hamas
Sinijlawi accuses Abbas of “stealing 20 years” from the lives of the Palestinian people. He claims that Abbas made strategic mistakes that helped Hamas take over Gaza. First, he allowed Ismail Haniyeh to establish an internal security force in the Strip. After the Hamas takeover, he ordered 50,000 Palestinian Authority employees in Gaza to stay home, thereby vacating the institutions of government and handing them to Hamas on a silver platter.
The peace movement and the younger generation
Boris asks about the existence of a Palestinian peace movement, and Sinijlawi explains that he represents a generation that sees Israel as a successful model to emulate, not an enemy. He aspires to establish a Palestinian state with a parliamentary democracy and a free-market economy, similar to Israel. His activism, he emphasizes, stems from a Palestinian national interest. According to him, the younger Palestinian generation is connected to the world through social media, wants to live well, and is less interested in national symbols. He sees this as an opening for a new leadership that will offer hope.
Deradicalization and mutual recognition
Sinijlawi argues that demilitarizing Gaza is not enough. The will to use weapons must be addressed through a process of deradicalization and changing the narrative. Both sides, he says, face a difficult decision. Israelis must choose between annexation and separation. The Palestinians must choose between a two-state solution and exercising the right of return within Israel, as both together are not possible. He calls for mutual recognition of the historical connection of both peoples to the land, noting that even the Quran tells the stories of the patriarchs in this land. The question is not to whom the land belongs, but how both peoples can belong to it together.
The future of the settlements and reconciliation
Within the framework of a two-state solution, Sinijlawi believes that Jews who wish to should be allowed to continue living in places like Hebron, as Israeli citizens and residents of the state of Palestine. The Palestinian state would be responsible for their security and rights. Above all, he emphasizes the need for a reconciliation process. He says the damage done to hearts is greater than the physical damage, and if Israelis were able to reconcile with Germany, the two peoples can also reconcile. He does not believe the process requires one side to declare defeat, but rather should stem from a shared national interest.
The need for imagination
Sinijlawi concludes with an analogy. Before October 7, there was no lack of information about Hamas’s plans, but a lack of imagination to believe they would be realized. Today, there are many signs that the region wants normalization with Israel, but Israelis lack the imagination to see themselves as part of the Middle East. Both sides, he concludes, need to imagine peace to make it a reality.
The original episode, in Hebrew: איפה בן גוריון הפלסטיני?