The Islamist character of the new regime

Dr. Friedman explains that he does not share the optimism regarding the new regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as al-Julani. He notes that in public discourse in Arabic, al-Sharaa does not mention the word democracy, and his government is composed mainly of his associates and members of his organization, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. According to him, the persecution of minorities, especially the Alawites, continues, driven by a Salafi ideology that aims to turn Syria into a “Sunnistan” cleansed of those not considered Muslims. He mentions that in response, the spiritual leadership of the Druze issued a statement emphasizing that they are Muslims.

The new Syrian army

The new army being established in Syria is, according to Friedman, a vengeful and ideological army. Photos from the ground show bearded soldiers and commanders quoting the Quran, and the fighters are sometimes called “mujahideen” rather than soldiers. Friedman warns that the dismissal of the veteran officer corps, which was mostly Alawite and secular, is a ticking time bomb. He compares this to the situation in Iraq, where dismissed officers from Saddam Hussein’s army later became the foundation of the ISIS organization.

The integration of foreign fighters

Another concern is the integration of foreign fighters, such as Chechens and Uyghurs, into the new Syrian army, instead of expelling them from the country as promised. Friedman emphasizes that these are terrorists with blood on their hands who have no emotional connection to Syria, and therefore they are capable of committing serious crimes. He mentions that al-Julani’s original organization, Jabhat al-Nusra, means “the Support Front,” and these foreigners see themselves as having come to help turn Syria into an Islamic state.

The attitude toward Israel

Friedman argues that while Western media talks about moderation, he finds no evidence for it in Arabic sources. According to him, the talk of a non-belligerence agreement with Israel is a move designed to please the Americans but is meaningless, as a de facto state of non-belligerence has existed since 1973. Regarding the recent rocket fire from Syria, the new regime was quick to deny responsibility and blamed it on a “rogue Palestinian organization.”

The danger of the al-Hol camp

The most alarming development, in Friedman’s view, concerns the al-Hol camp. Over 40,000 people are held in the camp, most of them women and children of ISIS fighters. The Kurds, who guarded the camp with American funding, are transferring responsibility to the new Syrian regime. A spokesman for the new Syrian Interior Ministry stated that there is an intention to open the camp and integrate its residents into Syrian society. Friedman warns that this is a population with an extremist ideology. Reporters who visited the site reported on women and children who hold to ISIS ideology, view anyone not like them as an “infidel,” and educate the younger generation accordingly. Releasing them into society without a re-education process is a tremendous danger.

International pressure and the chance for change

According to Friedman, the key to influencing Syria is economic. He believes the United States should use the sanctions card and not lift them all at once, but rather gradually and in exchange for concrete steps by the regime. He notes the growing influence of Turkey and Qatar, the regime’s main supporters, which is reflected, for example, in the rewriting of textbooks to portray the Ottoman period in a positive light. As for the possibility of Druze autonomy in the south, Friedman is skeptical and notes that the Druze themselves wish to remain part of Syria.

He sees the only hope in a broader regional context. If the war in Gaza ends and regional arrangements are reached, countries like Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, which will participate in Syria’s reconstruction, could pressure the regime to move closer to Israel and away from Iran, their common enemy.

Background to the war: from al-Bashir’s ouster to a succession struggle

According to Dr. Koren, Sudan has never been stable since its independence in 1956. The situation has worsened in recent years, leading to famine, the flight of millions of citizens, the spread of disease, and mass killings. The current crisis is a direct result of the processes that led to the ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019. Al-Bashir, who led the country with a jihadist ideology, was ousted following widespread popular protests against economic collapse and oppression.

His place was taken by his two immediate successors: General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chief of staff of the Sudanese army, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, a later incarnation of the notorious Janjaweed militia. Dr. Koren explains that Hemedti, a tribal leader from the Darfur region, served al-Bashir and committed crimes for him that amounted to genocide in Darfur in 2003-2005. After al-Bashir’s ouster, Burhan and Hemedti ran the country jointly, while thwarting American and European attempts to integrate a civilian element into the government.

Sudan’s turnaround: from a terrorist state to an attempted rapprochement with the West

Dr. Koren reviews Sudan’s past as a terrorist state under the rule of al-Bashir and the ideologue Hassan al-Turabi. Sudan allied with Iran, served as its gateway to Africa, and in the 1990s hosted Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda members. It was involved in the 1995 assassination attempt on President Mubarak and the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These actions led to the imposition of crippling sanctions that brought its economy to the brink of collapse.

To escape the situation, al-Bashir began looking for a way off the list of state sponsors of terrorism. In 2015, he joined the Saudi coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen, and in 2016, he severed relations with Iran. According to Dr. Koren, the Americans then hinted to him that the path to restoring relations with Washington passed through establishing relations with Israel. He adds that 90% of the Sudanese force that fought in Yemen was composed of Hemedti’s militia members. This helped to legitimize the militia, which was accused of genocide, and drew the attention of the United Arab Emirates, which was impressed by Hemedti’s military capabilities and cultivated ties with him.

The outbreak of the civil war and international involvement

The partnership between Burhan, a representative of the old Arab elite from northern Sudan, and Hemedti, a tribesman from Darfur who rose from outside the establishment, fell apart in April 2023. Hemedti, feeling he had amassed enough power with the support of Russia and the United Arab Emirates, launched a rebellion against Burhan. Dr. Koren details the alignment of forces: traditionally, Egypt and Saudi Arabia supported Burhan out of a desire for stability. On the other hand, Hemedti received support from the UAE, which is interested in food security and regional influence, as well as from Russia and the Wagner Group, which used Sudan as a springboard to expand their influence in Africa and received Sudanese gold in return.

When Burhan’s forces suffered defeats, he made a U-turn. On October 8, 2023, immediately after the war in Israel broke out, he renewed relations with Iran and in return received UAVs and drones from it that enabled him to achieve military successes. Following this, Dr. Koren explains, another reversal occurred: Russia, recognizing the shift in the balance of power, switched its support from Hemedti to Burhan.

Sudan’s strategic importance

Dr. Koren emphasizes that despite its image, Sudan is not a marginal country. Its location on the Nile and the Red Sea is of paramount strategic importance. It serves as an export route for South Sudan’s oil destined for China, and powers like Russia and Turkey covet the establishment of a naval base in Port Sudan. The renewed connection between Sudan and Iran creates a dangerous axis with the Houthis and gives Tehran a foothold on the way to Niger, one of the world’s largest uranium producers. As for Israel, he says, both warring parties signed the Abraham Accords and are still interested in ties with it, understanding that the road to Washington passes through Jerusalem.

The world’s most severe humanitarian crisis

The war, combined with climatic phenomena like floods and drought, has created the most severe humanitarian crisis in the world today in Sudan, with millions of displaced people, severe famine, and disease. Dr. Koren argues that the crisis is being ignored internationally, partly because Arab and global media avoid extensive coverage of a conflict where Arabs are slaughtering black Africans, similar to the silence that characterized the coverage of the Darfur genocide in the early 2000s.

Diagnosis before solution

According to Dr. Adi Schwartz, any attempt to offer a solution must be based on an accurate diagnosis of reality, not on wishful thinking. He argues that the correct approach is to gather evidence from the ground and draw conclusions, not to start with the desired outcome and bend the facts to fit it. An approach of self-deception, he explains, is what partly led to the disaster of October 7. According to him, had the Israeli establishment internalized the true intentions of the Palestinians, it would have interpreted the preliminary signs on the night of the attack differently.

No alternative to Hamas

Schwartz argues that the claim that Israel should have built an alternative to Hamas in Gaza is misleading. In his view, no such alternative exists because Hamas is an authentic representative of the Palestinian public in Gaza and the West Bank, as Palestinian polls also indicate. He challenges listeners to find any significant popular or intellectual Palestinian movement that has emerged since October 7 and called for abandoning the hundred-year war on Zionism. According to him, the anger on the Palestinian street is directed at Hamas for its tactical failures and the destruction of the Strip, but not for its ideological goals.

A zero-sum conflict

At its core, Schwartz argues, the conflict is a zero-sum game. The vast majority of Jews in Israel, from the far left to the far right, have one common goal: the existence of a sovereign Jewish state. The Palestinian side, in contrast, opposes the very existence of such a state, not just its borders. Therefore, the conflict can only end in one of two ways: either the Jews give up their aspiration for a state, or the Arabs give up their war on Zionism.

The goal: making the other side give up

As a Zionist, Schwartz believes the only solution is for the Arab side to end its war on Israel. To achieve this, Israel must redefine the war’s objective: not just a military victory over Hamas, but a change in Palestinian ideology. According to him, an ideology cannot be defeated by military means alone. The military effort is only half the job, and it must be backed by a broad diplomatic, public diplomacy, and cognitive effort.

In response to a question from Boris about whether such an approach is not patronizing, Schwartz replies that the Americans were also patronizing toward Japan and Germany after World War II, and they brought about a profound change in those societies. He argues there is no reason to accept as neutral a murderous ideology that denies the Jewish people’s right to self-determination.

The “day after” in Gaza

Regarding the day after the war in Gaza, Schwartz emphasizes that the important question is not who will rule the Strip, but what the content of that rule will be. Any authority that is established, whether Israeli, international, or Palestinian, must be subject to clear conditions: ending the war on Zionism, renouncing territorial claims on Israel, and giving up refugee status and the “right of return.”

If the Palestinians refuse these conditions, Schwartz argues, the Gaza Strip must not be rebuilt. According to him, rebuilding the Strip without an ideological change means helping the enemy prepare for the next attack. In such a situation, protected humanitarian zones should be established only for those Palestinians who agree to the conditions, and new education and employment systems should be built for them, without the involvement of UNRWA.

The diplomatic and ideological struggle

Schwartz calls on Israel to wage an uncompromising diplomatic and ideological struggle against the Palestinian narrative, and especially against UNRWA’s refugee mechanism, which he says perpetuates the conflict and encourages the Palestinians to continue their war. He notes that the international community sends the opposite message to the Palestinians: no matter what you do, even crimes like those of October 7, the world will rebuild for you. He concludes with a warning that continuing to ignore Palestinian ideology, as expressed in the recent speeches of Abu Mazen, will lead to further disasters.

The idea of return: Physical and mythological

Schwartz explains that the Palestinian idea of return has two meanings. The first is a physical and practical return: the aspiration of Palestinians to one day return to the lands and homes from before 1948. The key symbol and the “March of Return” in Gaza are concrete expressions of this. The second meaning is mythological: a return in time, back to the era before Zionism and the State of Israel, which is perceived in the Palestinian imagination as a kind of lost paradise. The goal is to erase the existence of the State of Israel, which is the “disaster” in this narrative.

Lessons from October 7th

According to Schwartz, one of the main lessons from the attack is that Israelis must stop lying to themselves. For years, Israel developed fantasies that the Palestinians could be appeased with economic benefits or by finding a “governing alternative” to Hamas. He argues that one must listen carefully to what Palestinians say about their deep-seated goals. While they spread disinformation on many topics, they do not hide their aspiration for return and their non-recognition of the State of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. He challenges anyone to find a significant Palestinian public figure who has recognized the Jewish right to self-determination and explicitly renounced the demand for return.

No alternative to Hamas

Schwartz claims that the Israeli search for a “governing alternative” to Hamas in Gaza is an illusion. According to him, there is no fundamental ideological difference between Hamas and the majority of the Palestinian public, including Fatah, regarding the core of the conflict: the attitude toward Zionism and the Jewish state. Hamas grew out of Gazan society and reflects its positions. Recent public opinion polls show overwhelming support among Gazans for the continuation of Hamas’s armed struggle. Schwartz emphasizes that in protests in Gaza, criticism of Hamas is heard regarding daily hardships, but there are no calls to stop the war against the Jews.

Sources of Palestinian resilience

Schwartz asks how the Palestinian side, which is militarily and economically weak, has managed to sustain the struggle for a hundred years. The answer, he claims, is not in their own strength but in external support. In the past, this was mainly support from the Arab and Muslim world, but in recent decades, crucial support from the West has been added. Governments, international organizations, and public opinion in the West provide the Palestinians with political, economic, and ideological oxygen that allows them to continue their struggle without compromise. UNRWA, which is funded almost entirely by the West, is a key example of a body that perpetuates the Palestinian narrative instead of solving the refugee problem.

The solution: A multi-front Israeli struggle

The solution, according to Schwartz, is not purely military. Israel must wage a comprehensive struggle on all fronts: military, diplomatic, ideological, and legal. It must initiate a deep, strategic public diplomacy campaign to change the global narrative. The central message should be that the conflict does not stem from the absence of a Palestinian state, but from the refusal of the Arab and Palestinian world to accept the existence of a Jewish state. He criticizes Israeli diplomacy, which he says fails to present this position and continues to react to specific incidents instead of waging a broad ideological campaign.

Optimism and pessimism

Schwartz presents a complex view of the future. On the one hand, he is optimistic from a broad historical perspective. The State of Israel is stronger than ever, and the Sunni Arab world is weaker and more hesitant than in the past. The fact that no Arab country joined the war against Israel is evidence of this. On the other hand, he is pessimistic about the Israeli consciousness. Unlike the 1948 generation, which understood the nature of the existential struggle, many Israelis today tend to believe in “stories” and magic solutions like a “regional alliance” or the “reconstruction of Gaza,” without understanding that the struggle for Israel’s very existence is still ongoing.

Asymmetric warfare

At the beginning of the conversation, Dr. Sobelman clarifies that most conflicts in the world are asymmetric, meaning they are conducted between parties with distinctly different levels of power, like Israel versus Hamas or Saudi Arabia versus the Houthis. According to him, the concepts of symmetric and asymmetric are a mental model that simplifies reality for the purpose of analysis. He adds that other distinctions, such as between a “state” and a “terrorist organization”, can also be misleading. Sometimes, it is more effective to refer to all entities in the arena simply as “actors”.

Dr. Sobelman argues that the concept of “proxy actors” is also problematic. Hamas, for example, is sometimes seen as a proxy of Iran, but in the October 7th attack, it trapped its patrons, Iran and Hezbollah, in a situation they did not want and had not coordinated with it. This phenomenon, where a weak actor in an alliance drags its stronger partner into a dangerous adventure, is known from history, as in the case of the network of alliances in Europe before the First World War.

The Axis of Resistance as a strategic community

The central thesis of Dr. Sobelman’s book is that in recent years, a regional strategic community has formed that calls itself the “Axis of Resistance” (Mihwar al-Muqawama). According to him, this is not a hierarchical network of a patron and clients, but a system in which all actors learn from and teach one another.

He explains that he noticed the phenomenon when he identified that Hezbollah’s strategic language and concepts, which he had been studying since the 1990s, had spread among other actors in the axis. Terms like “rules of the game” (and later “rules of engagement”) and “deterrence equations”, coined by Hezbollah, were adopted by Hamas, the Houthis, and even the Iranians themselves.

Hezbollah as a laboratory and Nasrallah as the “axis of the axis”

According to Dr. Sobelman, Hezbollah is the central “laboratory” of the Axis of Resistance, and Hassan Nasrallah is the “axis of the axis”, the master planner to whom everyone looks up. Even the Iranians, who are considered the patrons, see him as a source of inspiration. As an example, he brings up the days following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020. According to him, the Iranians first turned to Nasrallah to consult on how to respond, and the Iranian response bore Hezbollah’s conceptual “fingerprints”, for example, in its emphasis on a proportional response and in relation to the American action.

Rules of the game and deterrence equations

Dr. Sobelman elaborates on the key concept of “rules of the game”. This refers to an unwritten language and patterns of behavior that develop between adversaries, even if they do not recognize each other and there is a huge power gap between them. These rules create mutual expectations about what is “allowed” and what is “forbidden”. For example, an attack in broad daylight is considered more severe than an attack at night. Over time, both sides, and even the civilian population, learn the rules and know how to anticipate the adversary’s moves.

He explains that even the weaker actor has the ability to create leverage. Just as security prisoners obtain better conditions by threatening to set the area ablaze, organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah use their ability to inflict pain on Israel to impose red lines and “rules of the game” that serve them.

Victory through survival

Dr. Sobelman quotes Henry Kissinger, who said in the context of the Vietnam War that in an asymmetric war, the strong side loses if it does not win, and the weak side wins if it does not lose. This principle, he says, explains the rise of Hezbollah’s prestige. The organization was perceived as the victor in 2000, when Israel withdrew from Lebanon, and again in 2006, when it survived an all-out war against the IDF.

At the beginning of the current war, Hamas leaders explicitly used the analogy of the Vietnam War. They claimed that the heavy losses in Gaza are a necessary “tax” (dariba) on the path to victory, just as the Vietnamese lost millions but were perceived as victors against the United States.

The current war and the day after

Dr. Sobelman believes that the current war has dealt a severe blow to the Axis of Resistance’s operational model. The belief that it is impossible to inflict a devastating preemptive strike on them, because they are decentralized and operate underground, has been shaken. He compares this to the collapse of the idea of Pan-Arabism after the Six-Day War.

Finally, he argues that the biggest mistake Israel can make now is not to leverage its extraordinary military achievements. According to him, military achievements, however impressive, are temporary if they are not anchored in long-term political and diplomatic arrangements. Without a strategic vision to translate military power into a political settlement, the other side will eventually recover, and the opportunity will slip away.

The Palestinian Authority: Abu Mazen’s successor

According to Yaron Friedman, a change of leadership is expected in the Palestinian Authority, and the apparent successor to Abu Mazen is Hussein al-Sheikh. Al-Sheikh comes from the internal Fatah, unlike the leadership that came from Tunis, and was formerly a member of the Tanzim. He is considered the main rival of the imprisoned Marwan Barghouti. Friedman explains that al-Sheikh and Israel have common enemies, chief among them Hamas. Another common enemy is Barghouti, whom Hamas might try to free in order to undermine the Authority’s rule.

Al-Sheikh is responsible for coordination with Israel, speaks Hebrew, and has gained legitimacy in the United States. However, he is not popular among Palestinians and is considered a rich and corrupt figure. Friedman argues that in the Middle East, public legitimacy is not a necessary condition for rule, citing Egyptian President el-Sisi, the Assad family in Syria, and others as examples. He adds that Hamas may have also lost its legitimacy in the eyes of Gaza’s residents.

Egypt and Jordan

Friedman describes the situation in Egypt and Jordan as relatively static. The main threat to the regime in Egypt is economic, and it has been exacerbated by the Houthi attacks on shipping in the Suez Canal. Egypt is refraining from military action against the Houthis, aligning with the current Saudi policy of non-intervention in Yemen.

In Jordan, in addition to economic problems and water shortages, there is internal instability following the war in Gaza, which is manifested in numerous demonstrations. The regime is using the situation to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Meanwhile, smuggling of the Captagon drug from Syria continues, despite the Syrian rebel leader al-Julani’s declarations that he has destroyed the production infrastructure.

Chaotic Syria

The situation in Syria, according to Friedman, remains chaotic. The control of Ahmed al-Sharaa, known as al-Julani, over his men is questionable, as evidenced by massacres of minorities, first the Alawites and now the Druze. His organization’s ideology is radical Salafist and does not allow for the existence of minorities.

Friedman explains that the Druze in Lebanon, led by Walid Jumblatt, are now trying to broker an agreement between the Druze in Syria and al-Julani’s forces. Their goal is to prevent Israeli intervention, which Friedman believes would be a mistake. He does not foresee Syria breaking up into states along ethnic lines, because no side would give up strategic areas like the coast, the oil fields in the north, or the agricultural areas in the south.

Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq

In Lebanon, Friedman explains, there is a transitional situation, and the country may be freeing itself from Hezbollah’s grip, but the picture is not clear. Hezbollah is not disarming, but Israel is now attacking targets in Lebanon without regard for the organization.

In the second circle, Turkey is indeed threatening Israel, but tensions between them have been de-escalated through the mediation of a third country, likely Azerbaijan. In Iraq, the Shiite militias, which were active in Syria, have returned home and are now seeking to integrate into the Iraqi army and cease their independent operations. According to Friedman, this is a blow to Iran and good news for Israel.

Iran, the Gulf states, and North Africa

Friedman expresses deep concern about any nuclear agreement with Iran. He claims the Iranian regime is in a difficult economic and political situation, and Qasem Soleimani’s “export of the revolution” project has failed. An agreement that would pour billions into the regime would be a lifeline, allowing it to rehabilitate itself and its militias.

Regarding the Gulf states, Friedman sees no chance of normalization with Saudi Arabia as long as the situation in Gaza continues. He commends the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, which have managed to preserve the Abraham Accords despite the war.

In North Africa, the civil war in Sudan continues, although it seems the army is beginning to overcome Hemetti’s militia. In Libya, the country is still divided between two rival governments. In Tunisia, President Kais Saied has become a dictator, and in Algeria, tensions with Morocco have intensified following the Abraham Accords.

A blood libel and a coordinated attack

According to Khalifa Khalifa, the chain of events began following a visit by a Druze delegation from Syria to Israel for the Nabi Shu’ayb holiday on April 25. The visit, which was a great display of brotherhood and strengthened the alliance between the communities, was perceived as a grave insult by the Islamist side in Syria. As a pretext for the attack, he explains, a blood libel was spread: an audio clip of a young Druze man allegedly cursing the Prophet Muhammad was presented along with a picture of an elderly sheikh, to create the false impression that a religious leader was behind the insult.

The libel led to a declaration of jihad against the Druze in mosques throughout Syria, on the grounds that they were both traitors collaborating with Israel and insulters of the Prophet. Calls to slaughter the Druze were heard at demonstrations, and the situation quickly escalated into a large-scale military attack on Druze neighborhoods, chief among them the Jaramana neighborhood in Damascus. According to Khalifa, the local residents in Jaramana fought for 48 hours until they ran out of ammunition.

Siege on Suwayda

The attacking forces, according to the guests, are ISIS-like jihadists, some of them foreigners (Chechens, Uzbeks, and Afghans), operating under the umbrella of the new Jolani regime and posing as official security forces. Sheikh Wazir Amoun describes a pattern of action in which “moderate” forces first enter to calm the area, and immediately afterward, the jihadists arrive to carry out the massacre.

After the attack in Jaramana, the focus shifted to the Suwayda province, the heart of the Druze concentration in Syria. Khalifa recounts that when Druze reinforcement forces tried to leave Suwayda to assist the residents of Damascus, they were ambushed by Bedouin tribes from the Daraa region, with whom they had previously had good neighborly relations. As a result, the city of Suwayda itself came under siege. Sheikh Wazir Amoun adds and tells of another planned ambush, in which Jolani’s security forces led a delegation of Druze dignitaries into a deadly trap on the Damascus-Suwayda road. In this ambush alone, 38 people were killed.

Israel’s betrayal

Khalifa Khalifa expresses a deep sense of betrayal and disappointment with Israel. He recalls past promises by Israeli prime ministers and defense ministers to protect the Druze in Syria, and argues that there is no way Israeli intelligence did not know in advance about the massive buildup of forces for the attack. According to him, Israel’s silence makes it appear weak and dishonorable, and puts the alliance between the peoples to the test. He compares his feelings to the sense of betrayal felt by the residents of the Gaza envelope on October 7.

He rejects the claim that Israel is afraid of getting bogged down in the Syrian quagmire as happened in Lebanon, arguing that policy is not conducted out of fear. According to him, Israel must either keep its word or openly admit that it does not intend to intervene, instead of playing “cheap politics” at the expense of those being slaughtered. Sheikh Wazir Amoun adds that the attackers mocked the Druze captives, telling them: “Bring Israel to protect you.”

Internal politics and the attitude toward Islam

Sheikh Wazir Amoun explains that the Druze community in Syria is not monolithic, but the spiritual leadership, headed by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, advocates a moderate line calling for a united Syria not under radical Islamic rule. He emphasizes that none of the Druze asked to annex villages to Israel.

He dismisses the religious pretext for the attack, noting that there are many Shiite television channels that broadcast content against the Prophet Muhammad without provoking such a violent reaction. The real reason, he claims, is the anger over the successful visit to Israel and the desire to harm the developing bond between the Druze and Israel. He clarifies that the Druze respect the Prophet Muhammad and key figures in Islam, but hold their own theological interpretation of the Quran, and all they want is to be left to live their religious lives in private and their civil lives in normality.

The move to advocacy

According to Mansour Ashkar, until October 7 he worked as a security officer on cruise ships. When the attack occurred, he was in Texas, and the shock of the sights made him want to return to Israel and enlist in the reserves. After being told to wait, he decided he had to act. He foresaw a wave of antisemitism and denial in the Arab world, and knew he had to stand with his country. He began creating videos in English for an international audience, to refute the lies being spread about Israel. He also tried to create content in Arabic, but stopped due to the hateful responses and threats he received.

The ideology of radical Islam

Ashkar explains that Islam sees itself as the final and perfect religion. According to this view, Jews and Christians can live under Muslim rule as dhimmis, in a humiliated status and while paying heavy taxes. The return of the Jews to Israel and the establishment of an independent state constitute a theological problem and a deep insult to the Muslim world, since a small group of Jews has managed to defeat them repeatedly. According to him, radical Islam interprets Israeli success as a punishment for Muslims having strayed from the path of Islam’s “Golden Age.” They believe that once they succeed in wiping out the Jewish state, it will be proof of their return to the right path, and from there they can proceed to conquer the world.

Antisemitism in Europe and the liberal dilemma

Ashkar, who lives in Germany, sees that country as Europe’s last hope against Islamism. He argues that liberals in Europe, who fight against any sign of Nazism, are blind to a similar ideology growing under their noses. Boris Gorelik notes the liberal dilemma: the fear of restricting freedom of religion reminds them of the 1930s and 1940s. Ashkar replies that Europe is afraid to “call it by its name” and confront Islam. He recounts a trip in Jordan with a young German woman, where they encountered humiliating treatment of women from a Bedouin host. His travel companion had difficulty condemning the treatment, whereas if German men had behaved that way, they would have been arrested immediately. He claims that Europe gives “discounts” to Muslims and allows them to call for the destruction of Jews and demand Sharia law, instead of demanding that they meet European standards.

The rise of the right and the future of the continent

Ashkar believes that hatred of Jews in Europe is gradually being replaced by hatred of Arabs, due to the rise in crime and terrorism by immigrants. He describes how countries like France and the Netherlands are “lost” and will become European caliphates. According to him, he predicted 17 years ago that the liberal “open door” policy would lead to the rise of the far right. Ordinary German citizens, fed up with crime, are turning to parties like “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) out of a feeling that only these parties protect their values. Ironically, these voters tend to be more pro-Israel than the left. However, Ashkar is more concerned about the younger generation in Germany, the TikTok generation, which is tired of Holocaust studies and is becoming vulnerable to Islamist and communist propaganda that blames the Jews. He tells how he infiltrated pro-Palestinian demonstrations and heard calls in Arabic for the destruction of the Jewish people, alongside baseless conspiracy theories about Israeli plans to conquer the Middle East.

The way forward

According to Ashkar, the West is in a chess tournament while Islam is in a fencing tournament. He believes the Muslim empire never gave up on the idea of conquering the world, and Islamist activists openly say that within a few decades they will be the majority in Europe and will establish Sharia law there. The solution, in his opinion, is for the West to set clear standards for Muslims and enforce them without compromise. He positively notes countries like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which are trying to promote a more modern version of Islam. As for Israel, its role is to continue to preserve its democracy, to shine a spotlight on the dangers of radical Islam to warn the West, and above all, to continue to be strong.

A new government, old faces

According to Yaron Friedman, on the surface, the new government presented by al-Sharaa looks promising. The number of ministers was reduced from 28 to 23, and most of them are educated professionals with advanced degrees in their fields. However, Friedman points to several fundamental problems. First, the government was not elected but appointed by al-Sharaa, who seized power by force. Second, female and minority representation in the government is minimal. There is only one female minister, a Christian, and two ministers from minority groups in relatively marginal roles: a Druze minister of agriculture and an Alawite minister of transportation. This is a dramatic decrease in the representation of Alawites, who made up about ten percent of the population and held an average of three to four portfolios in Assad’s governments.

The real power, Friedman argues, is concentrated in the hands of ministers who are former senior members of the terrorist organization Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant), al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. For example, the new interior minister was formerly responsible for assassinations in the organization, and the defense minister was an engineer who provided technical support to its operatives. The foreign minister, Asaad Hassan al-Shaybani, is one of the organization’s founders, but he is considered a scholar with connections in Europe, and al-Sharaa is pinning his hopes on him to lift international sanctions.

Unlike Assad’s government, where most ministers were under personal sanctions, only one minister in the new government is under sanctions. As a conciliatory step, the Kurds received two portfolios, including the education portfolio, after years of zero representation. Friedman explains that this is an attempt by al-Sharaa to reach an agreement with the Kurdish autonomy, but the Kurds themselves are not quick to buy the gesture. Friedman’s conclusion is that this is not a government of all Syrians, but a “Sunnistan”: a state controlled by Sunni Arabs from al-Sharaa’s political base.

A temporary constitution and a new mufti

In parallel with forming the government, al-Sharaa appointed a new mufti for Syria, Sheikh Osama al-Rifai. According to Friedman, al-Rifai is an 80-year-old cleric with broad legitimacy among Sunnis, but he also has a Muslim Brotherhood agenda. He fled Syria twice, once to Saudi Arabia and once to Turkey, where he received patronage from Erdogan. Friedman notes that al-Rifai is a staunch opponent of Iran, which aligns with al-Sharaa’s current line, who claims that by fighting the Iranian presence, he is removing any threat to Israel.

The transitional constitution that was published grants al-Sharaa almost absolute power. It establishes a presidential system with no prime minister, in which the president appoints all ministers, senior judges, and also a third of the parliament members. The basis for legislation is Sharia, and the president must be a Muslim (a clause that also existed in the previous constitution). The only positive point, according to Friedman, is the establishment of a state monopoly on military force and the prohibition of militias. However, he estimates that senior members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham will simply become the commanders of the new army.

Why are no elections being held?

Al-Sharaa avoids using the word “democracy” and has only hinted that elections might be held in about four years. Friedman believes this is a mistake. According to him, if al-Sharaa were to hold elections now, he would win a landslide victory. The Sunni majority is grateful to him for overthrowing the Assad regime, and the minorities (about 30% of the population) do not pose an electoral threat. An election victory would grant him international legitimacy and help in lifting sanctions. Waiting four years, on the other hand, exposes him to mistakes that will erode his popularity, which is already declining due to the difficult economic situation. Friedman speculates that al-Sharaa may not intend to hold elections at all, or that he hopes to imitate Erdogan’s model: first achieve economic growth and only then go to elections on a wave of popularity.

The economic situation and dependence on the Kurds

The economic situation in Syria is difficult and continues to deteriorate. Promises of aid from the Gulf states have not yet materialized, and al-Sharaa cannot fulfill his promise to double the salaries of state employees. Syria’s most significant economic asset is oil, but most of the reserves are in the area controlled by the Kurds. Therefore, an agreement with them is critical for al-Sharaa to get oil flowing to the refineries and jump-start the economy. This puts him on a collision course with Turkey, which opposes the Kurds. Meanwhile, al-Sharaa’s fight against Hezbollah on the Lebanese border continues, which prevents him from accessing the cheap Iranian fuel that flowed into the country during the Assad era. Friedman concludes that the near future will reveal whether al-Sharaa will try to build a state for all its citizens or continue on his ideological path and establish a Sunni dictatorship.

Research method: Open-source intelligence

According to Neri, the research began following reports and photos that reached the “Sharks in Israel” association from the fishing port in Gaza. To collect data systematically, he adopted open-source intelligence (OSINT) methods. He located and followed the Facebook and TikTok pages of fish shops, merchants, and influential fishermen in the Strip. To do this, he learned Arabic and the local names of the various fish species.

The reason this method is particularly effective in Gaza, Neri explains, is the lack of electricity and refrigeration. Fish merchants must sell their fresh goods as quickly as possible. Therefore, they post videos and photos of the daily catch on social media as soon as it reaches the market, sometimes with a note showing the date to prove its freshness. This creates an almost complete daily record of what is caught and sold. The study collected data from the beginning of 2020 until January 2023, and the monitoring continued after the war broke out.

Sharks and batoids in the Gazan market

In Israel, all cartilaginous fish, including sharks, batoids (like stingrays and mantas), and guitarfish, have been protected species since 2005. In contrast, in Gaza, as in most countries in the region, similar fishing bans are not enforced.

The research shows that the entire catch of cartilaginous fish in Gaza is intended for local consumption. Unlike in the Asian market, where shark fins are a luxury item, in Gaza the fins are discarded or used as bait. Neri says that local beliefs have developed around eating shark meat, for example, that it strengthens men or that eating a male shark embryo ensures that the baby born will be a boy.

Overfishing and destructive methods

Fishing in Gaza, according to Neri, is unmanaged and unregulated. Fishermen use destructive and non-selective fishing methods, such as trawl nets that are dragged along the seabed, sweeping up everything in their path. As a result, about fifty percent of the catch is bycatch, meaning other fish and animals with no commercial value. But unlike in other places, in Gaza, even the bycatch reaches the market and is sold as food.

Paradoxically, the restrictions the IDF imposes on fishing zones create a kind of temporary marine reserve. In areas where fishermen are forbidden to enter, fish populations can recover, which probably prevents a total collapse of the ecosystem.

The impact of wars and the blockade on fishing

The study shows a direct link between the security situation and the extent of fishing and species diversity. After Operation Guardian of the Walls, when the permitted fishing zone was expanded to 15 nautical miles, fishermen reached deeper waters. As a result, they caught species they had not seen before and documented them on social media, asking what the fish was.

During the current war, the Gaza port and a large part of the fishing fleet were destroyed. Fishing has been reduced to small boats (hasakeh) near the coast. The catch now consists mainly of small, young fish, which indicates fishing for nutritional survival. Prices in the market have soared. For example, the price of a kilogram of guitarfish, a critically endangered species, jumped from 20 shekels before the war to 100 shekels. Neri notes that all the documented transactions were in shekels.

Pollution and poisonous fish

Neri warns that the waters off the coast of Gaza are highly polluted, partly due to the collapse of sewage treatment systems. Heavy metal pollution accumulates in the bodies of apex predators like sharks, and this process, known as bioaccumulation, makes their meat dangerous to eat.

In addition, the poisonous pufferfish is common in the Mediterranean and also reaches Gaza’s markets. The fishermen are aware of the danger and post warnings about it. Neri says that through such posts, he found the Facebook page of the Hamas naval police, whose duties include enforcing the ban on selling poisonous fish.

The fate of the fishermen

Neri says that about a third of the social media pages he followed ceased activity after October 7. Many of the fishermen, young residents of refugee camps, were killed in the war. During the ceasefire, he recognized many of them in photos of the dead posted online by residents who returned to their destroyed homes. Despite this, some fish shops have reopened and resumed advertising their goods using the exact same method.

The Palestinian Authority has lost its relevance

Sinijlawi begins by referring to a simulation of the Riyadh Summit held at Tel Aviv University, where he represented the Palestinian Authority. According to him, although he opposes the PA’s strategy over the last decade and sees it as a failure, he tried to represent its positions faithfully. He argues that the current Palestinian leadership is completely disconnected from the Palestinian street, and this disconnect has made it irrelevant. As an example, he notes that while the participants were gathering at the university, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman convened a summit of Arab leaders in Riyadh and did not invite Mahmoud Abbas.

The psychological barrier between Israelis and Palestinians

Boris notes polls showing that even after October 7, a majority of the Palestinian public still supports a two-state solution. Sinijlawi agrees that the mainstream of the Palestinian people wants to achieve a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel, but argues that a deep psychological barrier prevents progress. According to him, both peoples feel that the other side wants to destroy them. Palestinians see Israelis as a military occupier denying them freedom and dignity, while Israelis see Palestinians as a security threat and a source of terror.

He adds that the media on both sides fuels mistrust and fear. The Israeli media, he claims, presents only negative stories about Palestinians and refrained from showing the human suffering in Gaza during the war. Meanwhile, the Palestinian media presents only Palestinian pain and ignores the price the war is exacting from the Israeli side.

Palestinian responsibility for change

Sinijlawi argues that the responsibility to initiate change lies more heavily with the Palestinian side. The reason for this, he says, is the asymmetry in the situations of the two peoples. Israel has a strong state, a robust economy, and a powerful military, and it can continue to manage the conflict for decades. The Palestinians, in contrast, do not have this ability.

A genuine Palestinian change, in his view, would be demonstrated by the Palestinian leadership beginning to show understanding for Israel’s security concerns, not as a favor to Israel but out of Palestinian national interest. Such a change would also include a shift in media discourse, and even the creation of warm personal ties between Palestinian and Israeli leaders, such as mutual family visits. Such a dynamic, he believes, could create the trust that would allow for progress.

The Palestinian leadership on the day after Abbas

According to Sinijlawi, the Palestinian people are fed up with both the corruption of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the destruction Hamas has brought upon Gaza, and they are looking for a third way and a leadership that will provide hope. He believes that such a leadership will emerge after Abbas leaves the political stage. He describes Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu as partners who in fact serve each other’s interests: Abbas wants to remain president for life, and Netanyahu wants to avoid negotiations.

Sinijlawi claims that there is a whole generation of leaders in Fatah waiting for an opportunity, and he lists names like Mohammed Dahlan, Nasser al-Qudwa, Tawfiq Tirawi, and Jibril Rajoub. However, he emphasizes that as long as Abbas is in power, such a change is not possible. According to him, it is not possible to organize a popular protest against the government in the West Bank because of the checkpoints and restrictions, and also because of the suppression of the opposition by the Palestinian security services, as political dissident Nizar Banat learned firsthand when he was killed after being arrested by the Palestinian police.

The two-state solution: one state and minorities

In response to a question from Boris, Sinijlawi rejects the idea of two separate Palestinian entities in Gaza and the West Bank. He emphasizes that the Palestinian people are one people, and that within the framework of a two-state solution, territorial contiguity could be created through a corridor connecting Gaza and the West Bank, as part of land swaps.

Additionally, he addresses the issue of the settlers. According to him, the two-state solution must allow for the existence of a Jewish and democratic state of Israel. He adds that the Palestinian narrative must recognize the Jewish people’s historical right to the land. Accordingly, Jews who wish to live in the Palestinian state could do so, as Israeli citizens and residents of Palestine, and would be subject to Palestinian law. He emphasizes that they would be accepted as individuals, similar to the status of Arab citizens of Israel, and not as a collective with national rights or separate security arrangements.

Tom Wegner’s centers and books

At the beginning of the conversation, Wegner presents his work. “The Center for the Middle East” is a platform that hosts speakers from the Muslim world every week and runs WhatsApp groups for direct dialogue between Israelis and various groups in the Middle East, such as Kurds, Iranians, and Lebanese. The “Center for Normalization in the Middle East” is a new association whose goal is to expand this activity and create direct, unmediated contact between Israeli society and friendly elements in the region.

His book, “The Abrahamic Revolution,” presents a new concept of peace born from conversations with intellectuals from the region after the events of October 7th. His second book, “Union of the Believers,” was co-authored with the Palestinian writer Elias Nasri Baboun and outlines an unconventional peace concept based on an original interpretation of the Abrahamic religions. According to Wegner, the conflict is not only territorial but also cultural and religious, so a solution is needed that also addresses these dimensions.

The potential of interfaith dialogue

Wegner argues that dialogue between Jewish and Muslim religious figures has great potential. He tells of fruitful meetings he holds, both secretly and publicly, between rabbis and imams. According to him, contrary to the prevailing view, there are many points of convergence between Judaism and Islam, not just similarities. For example, he mentions a meeting he arranged between Rabbi Yaakov Nagen from Hasidic Judaism and Sheikh Ghassan Manasra from Sufi Islam, which demonstrated the closeness between the two streams.

He claims that when one reads the original texts of the Tanakh and the Quran, without the later interpretations, one discovers that they get along well with each other. He explains that the Quran itself calls for debating with the “People of the Book,” Jews and Christians, in a pleasant manner and emphasizes God’s attributes of mercy. The clash, in his opinion, is not between the religions themselves but between religion and tribal, violent cultures.

The Temple Mount as a test case

Boris raises the issue of the Temple Mount as an example of the difficulty, noting that the Chief Rabbinate forbids Jews from ascending the Mount and the Muslim muftis are not expected to invite them to pray. Wegner replies that the position of the Mufti of Jerusalem, who prevents Jewish prayer, contradicts the principles of the Quran, according to which a mosque is a house of prayer for all peoples, and especially for the “People of the Book.” He quotes a Syrian Sunni imam who said that preventing any person from praying is considered a grave sin in Islam, bordering on heresy. According to Wegner, Islam’s original peace plan is to invite others to the mosque to persuade them gently, not to kill them.

Wegner’s role in the simulation: Abrahamic religious leader

In the Riyadh conference simulation, Wegner played a unique role created especially for him: “Abrahamic religious leader.” He did not represent a specific religion but spoke on behalf of a collective of all monotheistic religions, an idea originating in his book “Union of the Believers.” As part of the role, he “burst into” the conference to call on politicians to make peace in the name of God.

The concept he promoted is that the differences between the Abrahamic religions in their original versions are marginal and do not justify war. He notes that the most significant theological difference between Judaism and Islam is the question of who was bound for sacrifice, Isaac or Ishmael. According to him, Hamas has distorted the religious narrative, and now major figures in the Muslim world, such as the World Council of Imams and muftis in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are speaking out against it and distinguishing between extremist Islam and original Islam.

During the simulation, Wegner worked behind the scenes. He agreed with the Qatari delegation on a delegation of imams to visit al-Aqsa, and a reciprocal delegation of rabbis to visit Qatar. In a conversation with the Palestinian representative, Samir Sinjilawi, he suggested that the Palestinians invite Jews to pray inside the al-Aqsa Mosque to neutralize the tension. Sinjilawi was surprised and responded with a question about the more urgent need for a Palestinian state, and also cited the Chief Rabbinate’s ban on Jews ascending the Mount. Wegner noted the irony that he was speaking for Islam and the Palestinian was speaking for the rabbis.

A vision for regional union and the importance of direct contact

Wegner admits that for now, his ideas do not have a foothold among senior political leaders, but he identifies a positive trend of developing regional politics. He notes the direct engagement of Israeli politicians with the region’s countries, and vice versa. His long-term political vision is the creation of a structure like the European Union in the Middle East, with a regional parliament that would allow conflicts to be managed with political rather than military tools. He mentions that Dr. Mordechai Kedar, who played the head of the Israeli delegation in the simulation, also expressed a similar aspiration for Israel to be accepted as an equal member in a regional league.

In conclusion, Wegner emphasizes the critical importance of direct contact between Israelis and Arabs. According to him, there is greater demand for dialogue on the Arab side than on the Israeli side, and this disconnect leads to ignorance and distorted perceptions. He calls on Israelis to leave the “aquarium” of internal discourse, learn to speak with the other side, and use technological tools to overcome the language barrier.

Riyadh Summit 2025: The idea and the goal

According to Dr. Levin Schnur, the simulation depicted an event supposedly taking place in May 2025. According to the backstory, U.S. President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman invite representatives from various countries and other leaders to discuss ways to realize their shared vision: regional stability and prosperity. Levin Schnur emphasizes that the organizers deliberately avoided the term “peace conference,” choosing instead to focus on the common interests of all parties.

She explains that a simulation is an academic tool designed to generate insights and prepare for future scenarios under conditions of uncertainty. The main goal was to “shake up the paradigm” and encourage “political imagination” by creating a playful environment that allows participants to think outside the box.

The participants and their interests

Boris raised doubts about the likelihood that countries like Lebanon or Turkey, or a Palestinian delegation, would agree to sit at the same table with Israel. Levin Schnur replies that the key is interests. Every country, she argues, has a broad set of interests that goes beyond the conflict with Israel. Lebanon, for example, is a weak state trying to recover, and it might find a regional transportation network more interesting than focusing on the conflict. According to her, the experts who played the roles of the representatives believed that such a meeting has potential.

Regarding the Palestinians, she notes that the invitation was sent to a “Palestinian leadership” and not explicitly to the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian representative in the simulation, Samer Sinijlawi, stressed that he does not represent Hamas or Fatah.

The Palestinian representation and the Israeli interest

Boris notes that the actual Palestinian leadership is Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and wondered about the chances that a moderate voice like Sinijlawi’s would be elected. Levin Schnur replies that the Palestinian Authority is corrupt and collapsing, and that recent polls show very low support for both Hamas (less than 6% in Gaza) and the PA. In contrast, there is broad support for the two-state solution.

The main insight from the simulation, she says, is that stability on the Palestinian front is an interest of all regional players, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United States. Palestinian governmental weakness is a vulnerability through which radical forces could penetrate and undermine the stability of the entire region. Therefore, this is not about doing a favor for the Palestinians, but about a shared interest.

Behind the scenes: The challenges and unique aspects

The simulation included representatives playing the roles of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The Turkish representative and the Saudi representative participated via Zoom, partly due to difficulties the Turkish representative had in obtaining a visa. Levin Schnur says that the simulation was based on detailed “content files” prepared by experts, which included consultations with officials from the relevant countries.

She points out two unique aspects of this simulation. First, it was public and intended to make the insights accessible to the general public. Second, it did not try to promote a specific future scenario, but only to examine what a plausible future might look like. Levin Schnur talks about a previous simulation she conducted on the constitutional crisis in Israel, which she says predicted developments with surprising accuracy.

Language, culture, and self-interest

Boris asks why the simulation was conducted in English, even though the Israeli and Palestinian representatives began their conversation in Arabic. Levin Schnur replies that the use of English reflects American presence and influence. According to her, this points to a broader problem: Israel must remember that it has to look after its own interests. The United States, even under a friendly administration, primarily promotes its own interests.

She argues that Israel’s current leadership is not sufficiently engaged in formulating long-term plans. She compares this to another study of hers, in which she found a hundred-year history of proposals for an Israeli constitution, evidence of political imagination and long-term planning. Finally, she emphasizes that a goal was also to create a model for collaboration within Israel, which is why the initiative included bodies from various political backgrounds, such as the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

Preacher and fighter in Syria

According to Yaron Friedman, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam was born in 1882 in the town of Jableh on the Syrian coast, to a family of clerics. In his youth, he was sent to study for about ten years at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, where he specialized in Islamic law and the Arabic language. When he returned to Syria, he became a well-known preacher. He did not only deal with religious matters, but also called for jihad against European colonialism, for example against the Italians who invaded Libya. Friedman explains that his motivation was a combination of pan-Islamism and Arab nationalism. During World War I, he enlisted in the Ottoman army and gained military experience. After the war, with the establishment of the French Mandate in Syria, he rebelled against the French, organized gangs, and carried out attacks against them. The French issued a death sentence against him, and around 1920 he fled his country.

The move to Haifa

Al-Qassam fled to Palestine and settled in Haifa. According to Friedman, he was appointed imam of the Al-Istiqlal Mosque, which was then being built in the lower city. The Supreme Muslim Council, headed by Hajj Amin al-Husseini, supported his appointment, possibly to keep a potential religious rival away from Jerusalem. In Haifa, al-Qassam continued to preach against Western imperialism, now in the form of the British Mandate, and added a new enemy, the Zionist movement. In parallel with his work as an imam, he worked as a teacher and was appointed registrar of marriages and divorces for the Waqf. This role, Friedman explains, allowed him to visit villages and neighborhoods, build personal connections, and recruit young men for his cause.

Forming terror cells

Friedman describes how in the late 1920s, al-Qassam began to form clandestine cells in the Haifa area. He mainly recruited poor laborers, unemployed men, and peasants who had lost their lands after they were sold by landowners to the Zionist movement. He gave them a religious education while inciting them to violent struggle. His cells, known as “al-Kaff al-Aswad” (the Black Hand), carried out murders and attacks against Jews and damaged infrastructure in areas like Yagur, Nahalal, and Atlit. However, Friedman emphasizes that his activities were not very successful, and he only managed to recruit a few dozen fighters.

The move to Samaria and his death

Al-Qassam aspired to organize a nationwide revolt, but failed to gain support from the Palestinian leadership. Hajj Amin al-Husseini, who saw him as a rival, feared a harsh British response and avoided cooperation. Consequently, al-Qassam moved his activities to the Samaria region, mainly to Jenin. In 1935, after one of his men murdered a Jewish policeman in the British police service, the British launched a large-scale manhunt. They located him and his men in the village of Ya’bad, west of Jenin. In the ensuing battle, al-Qassam and several of his men were killed. He was buried in a Muslim cemetery in Nesher, near Haifa.

Why did Hamas choose al-Qassam?

Friedman explains that al-Qassam’s death turned him into a martyr and a symbol. David Ben-Gurion even compared him to the Palestinians’ Trumpeldor. However, his memory was almost forgotten until Hamas revived it with the organization’s founding in 1987. Why did Hamas choose him and not a more central figure like Hajj Amin al-Husseini? According to Friedman, al-Husseini’s image was tainted by his collaboration with Nazi Germany. Al-Qassam, in contrast, provided a “purer” model: a cleric who took up arms, combined religious faith with armed struggle, and died as a hero in battle against the British and the Zionists. His figure was a perfect fit for the ideology of Hamas, which combines nationalism and jihad.

Doctor Sharaa and Mister Julani

Yaron begins with a biographical overview of Ahmed al-Sharaa, in an attempt to understand the man who now rules Syria. Al-Sharaa was born in 1982 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a family originating from the Golan Heights, hence his moniker “al-Julani.” He grew up in Damascus, where he received a Salafi Islamic education from a preacher in Aleppo, in stark contrast to his father, who was a Nasserist, secular, and pan-Arab academic. According to Yaron, the Second Intifada in 2000 deeply influenced him.

In 2003, al-Sharaa traveled to Iraq to fight the American occupation, where he joined al-Qaeda and was close to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS. He was captured by the Americans in 2006 and spent five years in prison, where he taught other inmates literary Arabic. After his release in 2011, he was sent by Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the leader of al-Qaeda, to establish a branch of the organization in Syria.

In Syria, Julani founded the Jabhat al-Nusra organization, which was based mainly on Syrian recruits, unlike ISIS which was composed of foreigners. This created a bloody rivalry with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In 2016, Julani officially severed his ties with al-Qaeda and changed his organization’s name to “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.” Yaron notes Julani’s strategic abilities, which were demonstrated in the formation of the “Jaysh al-Fath” coalition in 2015, which almost brought about Assad’s downfall were it not for the Russian intervention. According to Yaron, this intervention delayed the regime’s fall by a decade.

A moderate Salafi regime?

Yaron expresses great skepticism about al-Sharaa’s “moderation.” He emphasizes that the new leader does not speak of democracy, but of “liberation.” He appointed his Salafi government from Idlib to run the country from Damascus, and the newly established army uses Islamic slogans. Furthermore, the curriculum in the education system is becoming increasingly religious, and statements by a senior official in the government on the status of women have sparked outrage among many Syrian women.

An economy in severe crisis

The economic situation in Syria, which was already dire before the fall of Assad, has worsened even more. International sanctions have not been lifted, the electricity supply is almost nonexistent, and Iranian aid, which included subsidized fuel, has ceased. In addition, the Kurdish autonomy in the country’s northeast, which controls the oil fields, has stopped supplies to the new regime in response to attacks against it. The state coffers are empty, and al-Sharaa is turning to Saudi Arabia and Qatar for aid. Yaron estimates that any such aid will come with a heavy political price, and the supporting countries will take control of Syria just as Iran did before.

The plight of minorities

One of the most worrying issues is the situation of minorities. The Alawite community, which was dominant under the Assad regime, has surrendered its weapons and is now vulnerable to attacks. Yaron describes acts amounting to pogroms, with members of the new regime entering the homes of Alawites on the pretext of searching for Assad loyalists.

The Druze and the Kurds, seeing the fate of the Alawites, are refusing to disarm. The Druze in the south feel relatively protected due to their proximity to the border with Israel and Jordan. The Kurds in the north fear an American withdrawal that would abandon them to Turkey and al-Sharaa’s forces. Yaron explains that according to Salafi-jihadist jurisprudence, both Alawites and Druze are considered apostates whose punishment is death.

International recognition and tension on the Lebanese border

Despite its problematic nature, al-Sharaa’s regime has received recognition from many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. Yaron notes that the main supporters are Turkey and Qatar, which in his opinion does not bode well. In the West, only France has recognized the new regime.

Meanwhile, a real war is being waged on the Syria-Lebanon border. Al-Sharaa’s forces are attacking Shiite villages in Syria and also firing toward the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon, claiming they are fighting drug smugglers. Hezbollah and the Shiites in Lebanon see this as a pretext for a sectarian attack. Yaron concludes that the future looks bleak, and that the chance for peace between Israel and Syria, or even for normalization, has become very remote.

“Trans-Trump”: A Zionist plot

Mor calls the idea “Trans-Trump,” a portmanteau of the words transfer and Trump. According to her, the Arab media describes the plan with two terms: “mughamara,” meaning a reckless adventure, and “mu’amara,” meaning a plot. The prevailing perception, she explains, is that this is a Zionist plot planted in Trump’s mind by the Zionist lobby in the United States.

An Orientalist perspective

According to Mor, Trump, like the West in general, looks at the issue through Orientalist eyes. He sees it as a “deal” with material logic and completely ignores ideological, cultural, and historical factors. This approach, she says, ignores the deep connection of the Palestinians to their land. She notes as an example the fact that residents returned to the ruins of their homes in the northern Strip the moment they were able to, because it is their home.

Criticism of Trump and Arab leaders

Mor quotes the journalist Abdel Bari Atwan, the editor of “Raialyoum,” who speaks out against Trump’s hypocrisy. Atwan attacks Trump for promoting the expulsion of immigrants from his own country while simultaneously promoting the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland. Atwan also calls on the leaders of the Arab world to learn from the president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, who stood by the immigrants from his country. He sharply criticizes the leaders of the Gulf states for not using their immense wealth, symbolized by the “golden toilets” on their private jets, to help their Palestinian brothers.

Hamas’s response

According to Mor, senior Hamas officials like Mousa Abu Marzouk are very wary of Trump. They see him as a pragmatic person but are very afraid of his plan. The main fear is that the evacuation of the Gazan population will lead to the elimination of Hamas rule, since a king cannot rule without subjects. They reject the idea of a “temporary” evacuation, believing that the temporary will become permanent and that there is no good intention behind the initiative.

The Palestinians as a weapon in the struggle

Boris asks why Arab countries do not open their gates to save the Palestinians from their suffering, as other countries have done for refugees throughout history. Mor explains that in the Palestinian narrative, which is also held in the Arab world, any Arab country that cooperates with such a move would be considered a traitor. Absorbing the Palestinians, even with humanitarian intent, would be interpreted as cooperation with a “Zionist plot” to empty Palestine of its inhabitants and to undermine the right of return. The Palestinians themselves, she emphasizes, prefer to remain on their land, even at the cost of severe suffering, rather than give up their historical connection to the place.

An alternative Palestinian proposal

To Boris’s question whether a non-Western, “Middle Eastern” solution model exists, Mor answers in the affirmative. She mentions a proposal raised by Mahmoud al-Habbash, an advisor to Abu Mazen, according to which Gazans could be temporarily housed in areas in the Negev. Such a solution, she says, keeps them within the borders of what they perceive as “Palestine,” but is of course not feasible from Israel’s perspective.

The religious dimension of the conflict

The conversation touches on the religious component of the conflict. Mor explains how agreements with Israel are perceived in the Muslim world not as “peace” (salam) in the Western sense, but as a temporary truce (hudna), similar to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah from Islamic history. She notes that the Arabic root s-l-m is also related to submission (istislam). She argues that as long as religion dictates the agenda of movements like Hamas, a solution cannot be reached. For Hamas, the struggle against Israel is a stage on the way to its complete elimination, and it stems from a religious commandment that cannot be bought off with economic incentives. Therefore, the concept of “money for quiet” has collapsed.

The Iranian strategy: Combat without contact

According to Finko, there is a fundamental gap between Iranian strategic thinking, which plans for generations, and the Israeli and Western tendency to focus on the “here and now.” The Iranians advocate a concept of combat without contact, meaning they prefer to send others to die for them, such as members of Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Houthis in Yemen.

But their strategy is broader and includes extensive use of what he calls soft power: the ability to achieve goals without firing a single shot. This power is wielded in various ways, from investing money in anti-Israeli organizations in the West to influence and cyber operations.

Influence and cyber operations

Finko notes that reports from the Shin Bet, Google, and Microsoft have pointed to Iranian involvement in fueling the social protests in Israel before October 7. According to him, bots and fictitious personas on social media worked to increase division and polarization in Israeli society. He compares this to the methods of Russian military intelligence (GRU), which creates local crime in European countries to undermine the sense of security and stability.

Another layer is cyberattacks, whose goal is not only to disrupt national infrastructure, like the attempted attack on Israel’s water facilities a few years ago, but also to create panic and psychological harm to the public. Ultimately, the goal of all these actions is to undermine governmental stability and social resilience in Israel.

Human espionage: The psychology of recruitment

Boris asks about the gap between the strategic sophistication and Iran’s apparent failures in human espionage, which sometimes seem amateurish. Finko replies that the public is only exposed to the cases the Shin Bet chooses to publicize, and that catching agents is an inseparable part of the world of espionage.

He distinguishes between a “spy” (like Eli Cohen), who undergoes training and is sent to a target country, and an “agent,” who is a citizen of the target country recruited by a foreign entity. The process of recruiting an agent begins with identifying a target with access to information, building a psychological profile to understand their weaknesses and motivations, and then gradually establishing contact.

Finko emphasizes that contrary to popular belief, money is not the main motivator. It is used as a tool to bind the agent and make them understand they are crossing lines, but the real motivations are psychological: ego, loneliness, a sense of lack, or a desire for revenge. As an example, he brings up a case where an Iranian agent posed as a Jew living in Iran, contacted divorced Israeli women on Facebook, and exploited their loneliness to get them to perform tasks for him.

Cooperation with Russia and China

Finko explains that Iran does not act alone. It has close cooperation with Russia and China in the fields of intelligence and cyber. According to him, there are joint intelligence collection centers, and the three conduct joint exercises and attack operations. However, he clarifies that each country also has its own interests, and there is not always full coordination. He separates Qatar from this axis, noting that it operates in parallel and in competition with Iran.

Precautionary rules

Following a personal story from Boris about a suspicious approach he received on LinkedIn, Finko offers some precautionary rules for citizens:

• Reduce publishing personal and family details on social media as much as possible.
• Be suspicious of approaches and offers that seem too good to be true.
• Verify the identity of the person making contact: search Google for information about the proposed company or conference, and examine their social media profile (a new profile with few friends is a suspicious sign).
• Request a video call. According to him, many agent handlers will disappear at this stage.

Why are Russian-speaking Israelis more vulnerable?

At the end of the conversation, Boris raises the point that almost all the Jewish Israelis arrested in recent years on charges of spying for Iran are Russian speakers. Finko explains this by saying that they are often second-generation immigrants from former Soviet Union countries who have experienced difficulties acclimating and economic and social frustration in Israel. The Iranian approach, which offers them money, warmth, and attention (even if fake), falls on fertile ground of a sense of deprivation and lack of appreciation. He speculates that it might be Russian intelligence that points out these potential recruitment targets from within the community to the Iranians.

The cancellation of the new hijab law

Eilam Gindin opens with a current example of secularism’s victory in Iran: the cancellation of a new, draconian hijab law that was supposed to take effect in December. Since the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protest, many women have stopped wearing the hijab, and the regime has struggled to re-enforce the law. The new law included severe punishments, ranging from fines and a ban on leaving the country to 15 years in prison and even the death penalty.

According to her, Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, opposed the law, arguing it was unenforceable and would cause public unrest. Despite this, the regime intended to advance it. What changed the picture was the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, which led to the collapse of a large part of Iran’s proxy network. Eilam Gindin explains that the proxy network provided Iran not only with a geographical foothold and reputation, but also with manpower to suppress demonstrations, as there are not enough Iranians willing to do it. Following this weakening, the Supreme National Security Council ordered the Majles (the parliament) not to enact the law, for fear of public reaction.

Surveys on religion and secularism

Boris notes that Eilam Gindin previously mentioned a survey according to which about 50% of Iranians define themselves as non-religious. Eilam Gindin clarifies that there were two surveys. One was unreliable, conducted among followers of a Telegram channel for regime opponents. The other was an extensive telephone survey conducted by a European research institute among thousands of Iranians, most of them inside the country. According to her, the results of the reliable survey are similar, and she argues that they represent a “lower bound.” The reason is that citizens inside Iran, if they were to lie in such a survey, would do so to appear more religious, not less, out of fear for their safety.

The pendulum of identities in Iran

Eilam Gindin describes what she calls the “pendulum of identities” in Iran, which swings between the ancient, pre-Islamic Iranian identity and the Muslim identity. On the one hand, Iranians have immense national pride in their ancient heritage, which predates Islam by thousands of years. On the other hand, Iran has been a Muslim country since the seventh century.

To illustrate this, she recounts the myth of the Arab king Zahhak, who made a pact with the devil, causing two snakes to grow from his shoulders. To soothe his pain, he had to feed them the brains of young men. The Iranians, who hated their king, called on Zahhak to rule over them. Eilam Gindin sees this story as an allegory for the Iranians’ acceptance of Islam, and later, for the acceptance of Khomeini’s rule in 1979. Today, the image of Zahhak is used in caricatures against Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is depicted with snakes on his shoulders. Persian mythology, she says, is alive and breathing in the culture and serves as a tool for criticism against the regime.

The Shah’s secular coercion and the Republic’s religious coercion

According to Eilam Gindin, the current secularization process is a backlash against the regime’s religious coercion. She explains that this is a historical pendulum swing. In the 1930s, the last Shah’s father, Reza Shah, imposed full secularism, including a ban on wearing the hijab. This move caused fierce opposition and an Islamic revival, which culminated in the 1979 revolution. The last Shah tried to emphasize the ancient Iranian identity at the expense of the Muslim identity, which alienated him from the people. Ironically, Eilam Gindin argues, it was the Islamic Republic, with its religious coercion, that succeeded in realizing the Shah’s vision and making the Iranian people largely secular.

Iran-Israel relations on the day after

Boris asks if, after the fall of the regime, Iran will normalize its relations with Israel. Eilam Gindin replies that it is hard to know, but points to a large gap between the regime’s position and the people’s position. After October 7, the pro-Hamas demonstrations organized by the regime were empty of people. In contrast, in soccer stadiums, the crowd booed during moments of silence for the “martyrs of Gaza” and shouted insults at those waving Palestinian flags. At a non-political event, the funeral of an actor, the head of the cinema association was booed by the crowd when she began to speak against “the Zionists in Israel.”

The opposition and the future

Eilam Gindin briefly reviews the opposition figures, including the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, which is hated by most Iranians, and the crown prince, Reza Pahlavi. She criticizes Pahlavi’s visit to Israel, arguing that he presented himself as a puppet ruler of foreign powers, thereby repeating his father’s mistake.

In conclusion, she expresses cautious optimism. The collapse of the proxy network has significantly weakened the regime. The next time a nationwide protest breaks out, it will be much harder for the regime to suppress it without external help. Therefore, the regime is now acting more cautiously toward the people, as the cancellation of the hijab law has shown.

The downing of the Azeri plane in Chechnya

According to Grinberg, the incident illustrates the revulsion the Russian regime inspires. He explains that it was likely the private anti-aircraft systems of Chechnya’s ruler, Ramzan Kadyrov, that fired at the Azeri plane. At the time, there was a Ukrainian drone attack, and the Chechen force fired with criminal negligence at everything flying in the airspace. Grinberg notes that contrary to procedure, the force did not declare a “carpet situation,” which means closing the airspace to civilian aviation before opening fire.

The plane was hit by shrapnel, not a direct missile, which is why it survived. Additionally, electronic warfare measures were used against it, disabling its navigation systems. The Russians’ goal, according to Grinberg, was to hide the malfunction and cause the plane to crash into the Caspian Sea so the black box would not be found.

Azerbaijan’s conduct toward Russia

Grinberg describes how the Russians began to lie, claiming the plane was hit by birds. Azerbaijan, for its part, managed the crisis wisely. It first demanded a clarification, and when the Russians delayed, the Azeri Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted its Russian counterpart. Finally, Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, gave a speech in Russian in which he demanded an investigation and compensation. Only then did an apology come from Putin.

According to Grinberg, the plane’s black box was found and sent to Brazil, the aircraft’s manufacturer, so the Russians cannot hide the truth. He emphasizes that this conduct proves that Azerbaijan is not a Russian client state, but knows how to stand its ground wisely and decisively, contrary to the image it sometimes has in the Western media.

Turkey replacing Russia in Syria

The discussion moves to the implications for Israel, particularly the possibility of Turkey taking Russia’s place in Syria. Grinberg argues that most of Israel’s security establishment does not understand Turkey. He criticizes the “Nagel Report,” which labeled Turkey as an enemy, and argues that a distinction must be made between a hostile state and an enemy state. According to him, Israel has no ability to influence Turkey’s entry into Syria, and Turkey’s goals are economic and imperial, not to launch a jihad against Israel.

He explains that the Turkish model is different from the Iranian one: while Iran uses proxies to destabilize failing states, Turkey works to stabilize areas to enable economic activity for Turkish companies. Although the militias Turkey supports are jihadist, Grinberg believes they should be judged by their actions. He assesses that the Turkish presence does not pose a direct military threat to Israel, but stresses that Israel must not give up territory in the Golan Heights in exchange for any promises.

Lack of expertise on Turkey in Israel

Boris notes that there are very few experts on Turkey in Israel. Grinberg agrees and links this to a broader problem. He claims that a basic condition for expertise on a country is knowledge of its language, but Israel’s higher education system does not encourage non-technical humanities studies. He adds that Israeli intelligence, both civilian and military, focuses mainly on operational aspects and lacks expertise in information warfare, manipulation, and narrative planting, areas in which intelligence agencies like those of Russia and Iran excel.

Information warfare and agents of influence

In this context, Grinberg elaborates on the nature of intelligence work. He argues that its main component is not information gathering, but information warfare, manipulation, and the dissemination of narratives. He distinguishes between a regular “agent,” who is recruited and paid, and an “agent of influence.” An agent of influence, he says, does not have to be formally recruited, but can promote a foreign country’s narrative out of ideological belief. As an example, he cites Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, who passed nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union convinced they were acting for a good cause. He claims that many pro-Iranian agents of influence operate in the West, spreading narratives that serve Tehran, and Israel barely deals with this phenomenon.

The Palestinian arena: Gaza and the West Bank

According to Yaron, 2024 was characterized by the IDF’s entry into the Gaza Strip, taking control of its territory, and dismantling Hamas battalions. However, he notes that the remnants of Hamas’s forces show no signs of surrender, a phenomenon he attributes to high motivation and many years of indoctrination. He describes Hamas’s education system since 2007 as a mechanism that spread antisemitic and extreme religious incitement, which dehumanized Jews and prepared the ground for the October 7th attack.

The Israeli response was strong and largely restored deterrence. Yaron mentions the figures from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, which speak of tens of thousands killed, but emphasizes that the data do not distinguish between terrorists and civilians. He sharply criticizes the Al Jazeera network for its propaganda against Israel. The main question that remains open, he says, is who will rule the Strip the day after the war. In the absence of Israeli agreement on an alternative like the Palestinian Authority, the remaining option is Israeli military rule, a difficult scenario with serious consequences.

Meanwhile, significant fighting also took place in Judea and Samaria, with hundreds of arrests, many Palestinian fatalities, and attacks against Israelis.

Lebanon: A blow to Hezbollah

The war in Gaza created a domino effect that led to the war in the north. Yaron explains that Nasrallah tied Lebanon’s fate to Gaza’s fate, and his insistence that the residents of the north would not return to their homes left Israel no choice but to launch a broad offensive and eliminate Hezbollah’s leadership. According to him, Nasrallah is a hothead who brought disaster upon his organization.

There is now a temporary ceasefire, during which the Lebanese army is supposed to deploy in the south, but it is doing so very slowly. Yaron describes the Lebanese army as weak, fragmented, and unmotivated. Meanwhile, the Lebanese population is beginning to grasp the extent of the blow Hezbollah has suffered, and internal criticism against it is growing. The question is whether this will translate into political change, or if Hezbollah will try to renew the fighting to prove its strength.

Syria: The fall of the Assad regime

The blow to Hezbollah in Lebanon led to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Yaron describes how the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from Syria, alongside Israeli strikes, created an opportunity for the Sunni opposition organizations in Idlib. These organizations, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Jolani), launched a lightning offensive and conquered Damascus within days. Assad’s army, which was hollow, corrupt, and hungry, simply disintegrated.

Now, Syria has transformed from an Iranian protectorate to a Turkish protectorate. The new regime in Damascus is composed of Salafi-jihadist organizations, which were previously identified with al-Qaeda. Despite al-Jolani’s attempts to present a moderate facade, Yaron expresses deep concern about the changes in the education system and the harm to minorities, especially the Alawites. The Druze, seeing what is happening to the Alawites, are refusing to surrender their weapons. The future of the Kurds in the country’s northeast, who control the oil fields, is also shrouded in uncertainty.

Jordan and Egypt: Stability under pressure

Jordan and Egypt maintained stability in 2024, but both are facing severe economic crises and growing public pressure following the war in Gaza. In Jordan, King Abdullah allowed the Muslim Brotherhood movement to return to parliament to release pressure, but was surprised by their strength in the elections, where they won a fifth of the seats. According to Yaron, this situation constitutes a time bomb.

In Egypt, the economy suffered a severe blow due to the Houthis’ blockade of shipping lanes in the Red Sea, which is harming revenues from the Suez Canal. Egypt cannot act militarily against the Houthis at the request of Saudi Arabia, which wants to maintain its ceasefire with the organization in Yemen. However, the peace treaty with Israel stood the test, and Egypt refrained from military intervention or accepting Palestinian refugees.

Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf states

In Iraq, the pro-Iranian militias refrained from intervening in the war in Syria, despite an explicit demand from Iran. Yaron explains this is due to their fear of a domino effect reaching them as well, and due to American and governmental pressure. The trend in Iraq is a rapprochement with the moderate Sunni axis of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

Iran, for its part, feels that billions invested in proxy militias have gone down the drain. It faces internal criticism, and all that remains for it now is the nuclear card, in the hope of reaching an agreement with the new American administration. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, desires quiet and stability to advance its economic vision, and therefore maintains normal relations with Iran to restrain the Houthis.

In conclusion, Yaron believes that 2025 holds both dangers and opportunities. The fate of Gaza’s reconstruction, and the question of whether the money will come from moderate countries like Saudi Arabia and the Emirates or from actors like Qatar and Turkey, will be critical. He ends on a cautiously optimistic note, hoping that a new American administration will want to expand the Abraham Accords and bring greater stability to the region.